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Cover
The tall ship Lynx, a replica of a War 
of 1812–era privateer, under sail near 
Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. In this 
issue, author Christopher J. McMahon 
discusses the history of maritime trade 
warfare and the prospects that it would 
be practiced in a future conflict. Lynx 
(“America’s privateer”) hails from Nan-
tucket and is owned and operated by the 
Lynx Educational Foundation of New-
market, New Hampshire. The nonprofit 
foundation, led by President Donald E. 
Peacock, teaches “the history of America’s 
struggle to preserve its independence,” 
concentrating on the 1812 era.
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FROM THE EDITORS
In this era of globalization, it often is taken as axiomatic that maritime trade 
warfare is obsolete� Yet serious analysis of this issue is conspicuous for the most 
part by its absence� In “Maritime Trade Warfare: A Strategy for the Twenty-First 
Century?,” Christopher J� McMahon sets out to rectify this situation� After an 
extensive survey of the role of antitrade warfare—guerre de course—in modern 
times, he develops and assesses systematically the arguments both for and against 
the likely utility or threat of such warfare today� He notes that most observers 
in the years of “globalization” prior to 1914 were similarly convinced that the 
economic interests of the great powers would preclude its use in future wars—a 
prediction that both world wars showed to be completely unfounded� He also 
points out that the United States today, with its far-flung global maritime pres-
ence and relatively limited inventory of lift and sustainment shipping, should 
be giving more attention to this potential threat than it appears to have done in 
recent years� Christopher J� McMahon is the Maritime Administration Emory S� 
Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College (NWC)�
There has been much discussion over the last few years of what has come 
to be called “gray-zone conflict�” According to some, this kind of conflict— 
exemplified in Russia’s relatively bloodless takeover of Crimea—is a fundamen-
tally novel phenomenon� Van Jackson, in “Tactics of Strategic Competition: 
Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War,” takes issue with this view� He 
argues that three interrelated tactics making up gray-zone conflict—avoidance of 
“redlines,” the use of intermediaries, and the use of faits accomplis—in fact have 
a venerable history, yet stand in need of more-thorough conceptualization� Van 
Jackson is a senior lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington�
The present moment is a propitious and critical one for reexamining funda-
mental aspects of the Navy’s fleet architecture, emerging maritime technologies, 
and acquisition challenges� In his timely “Impacts of the Robotics Age on Naval 
Force Design, Effectiveness, and Acquisition,” Jeffrey E� Kline makes a compel-
ling case for a new “high-low” force mix that effectively reverses the prevalent 
concept centered on large-platform capital ships� Instead, he proposes a forward-
deployed “offensive” force using new, smaller platforms capable of dispersed and 
highly autonomous operations and equipped with continuously evolved missile 
and sensor systems, while the legacy fleet would become primarily a “defensive” 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   5 4/21/17   8:35 AM
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or sea-control force dedicated to protection of sea lines of communication� This 
argument is very much in line with the Navy’s emerging concept of “distributed 
lethality,” while drawing out some of its potentially radical implications� Jeffrey 
Kline is a professor of practice in the Operations Research Department of the 
Naval Postgraduate School�
In “Organization and Innovation: Integrating Carrier-Launched UAVs,” Greg 
Smith also is concerned with the role of unmanned systems in the Navy of the 
future, but his focus is on the development of unmanned aerial strike vehicles 
and their integration into aircraft carrier operations� Drawing on the literature 
on military innovation, he explores in depth the organizational and cultural 
challenges involved in realizing the full potential of this revolutionary capability� 
Commander Greg Smith, USN, currently is assigned to the staff of the Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy�
We turn, finally, to a less familiar—but not, for that reason, less important—
mission of this journal and the institution it serves� The late Vice Admiral James 
Stockdale remains a revered figure throughout the U�S� Navy for his exemplary 
conduct as a North Vietnamese prisoner of war� As President of the Naval War Col-
lege, Admiral Stockdale championed the centrality of moral virtue or character in 
the development of military leaders, and personally taught a course on the subject� 
The Stockdale legacy remains very much alive—as does the “Stockdale Course”—
in the College of today� Over the last half decade, NWC has been at the forefront of 
a Navy-wide effort to systematize and strengthen the formation of naval leaders at 
every level, with particular emphasis on the development of character�
Questions of ethics and character lead us inevitably to the domain of philoso-
phy� Stockdale himself was influenced deeply by the philosophy of the ancient 
Stoics, which he encountered by chance as a graduate student at Stanford� It 
takes nothing away from Stockdale to suggest, however, that there are alterna-
tives� Mark N� Jensen, in “Epictetus vs� Aristotle: What Is the Best Way to Frame 
the Military Virtues?,” argues that the fourth-century BCE Greek philosopher 
Aristotle, because he frames ethical behavior more firmly in its social and politi-
cal context, may be a better fit for today’s soldiers and sailors� Mark Jensen is a 
professor of philosophy at the U�S� Air Force Academy�
Returning to Stockdale, we conclude with two pieces that shed interesting light 
on the personality and character of this remarkable officer� Thomas J� Gibbons, 
in “Foundations of Moral Obligation: After Forty Years,” provides an account of 
the genesis and evolution of the Stockdale Course since its inception, drawing 
on unpublished materials in the NWC archives� Finally, also from our archives, 
comes a sample of the mind of the man himself, with a brief introduction by 
former Stockdale Professor of Ethics at the College Martin L� Cook: “Remarks of 
wing commander James B� Stockdale to the pilots of Carrier Air Wing 16 aboard 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   6 4/21/17   8:35 AM
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USS Oriskany, at sea en route to the Gulf of Tonkin, on April 29, 1965, one week 
before they entered combat�”
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309)� 
For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main en-
trance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236)�
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is respon-
sible for educating future leaders, developing their 
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and en-
hancing their capability to advise senior leaders and 
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included command 
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and 
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary 
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command 
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew 
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie 
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat 
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minne-
sota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political 
science, and received master of arts degrees from the 
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he 
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
SINCE ASSUMING MY POSITION as Naval War College (NWC) 
President last July, I have identified four broad elements of a 
vision under which the institution will Operationalize, Navalize, Futurize, and 
Internationalize its education and research efforts, with an overall goal of con-
tributing to the professionalism and capabilities of the nation’s future leaders. 
Previously I addressed aspects of the vision’s operationalization component in 
the Naval War College Review’s Winter 2017 issue and navalization in the Spring 
2017 issue. In this issue I will outline the actions we are taking on futurization.
Core Course Modifications
NWC efforts at futurization include an ongoing reassessment of how to prepare 
students for the strategic environment that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
articulated in his January 2016 “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” 
with its emphasis on contestation of the maritime system, the rising influence of 
the global information system, and the increasing rate of technological change. 
Our goal is to produce graduates able to succeed in the dynamic and dangerous 
strategic environment of today and tomorrow.
With regard to the information domain, the College has greatly expanded 
the cyber content in its curriculum. It also has coordinated with the Naval Post-
graduate School on a core cyber curriculum, with overlap in four content areas: 
cyber concepts; international cyber law, ethics, and standards; military cyber op-
erations; and cyber policy and strategy. To augment the NWC joint professional 
military education curriculum, a series of classified and unclassified sessions on 
cyber and emerging technologies offered at the commencement of each academic 
year will prepare students better for engaging with the challenges of cyber and 
emerging technologies during their research and studies.
On Futurization
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
 1 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Certificate in Ethics and Emerging Military Technology
The College’s new certificate in ethics and emerging military technology (EEMT) 
seeks to deepen our students’ understanding of the ethical complexities that new 
technology imposes� The certificate option was launched in the fall of 2016 as a 
specialized version of our popular electives program� We anticipate that the first 
six certificates will be awarded in June 2017�
EEMT students enroll in a trio of relevant ethics and technology courses; com-
plete one additional course (beyond the normal three-course electives sequence); 
and write an original, comprehensive, faculty-mentored research paper� They 
earn four additional graduate credits and recognition as certificate recipients in 
studies highly relevant to the Navy and the nation� Participation in this first-ever 
NWC certificate program is voluntary, goes beyond the level of effort required for 
the master of arts degree, and is limited to a small number of highly motivated 
students�
Certificate candidates will examine the ethical and military relevance of 
emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, genetic manipulation, 
neuro- enhancements, cyber, cryptology, nano-engineering, 3D printing, robot-
ics, and unmanned systems (air, surface, and maritime)� They will apply ethical 
reasoning to the challenges and consequences of rapid technological change in 
the modern security environment� The courses and research they complete will 
help them formulate original perspectives on many potential technologies and 
their ethical implications for the profession of arms�
Center for Naval Warfare Studies Initiatives
Our Center for Naval Warfare Studies is directly supporting the Assessment 
Division of the CNO staff as they consider different variations of future fleet ar-
chitectures following work done by the Navy Staff, the MITRE Corporation, and 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments� Several faculty members are 
continuing to support the CNO staff in studying other future fleet architecture 
work, looking at the 2030 and 2045 time frames� The center’s talented researchers 
also continue to support future thinking and analysis through work with the Col-
lege’s Center for Cyber Conflict Studies (known as C3S) and the Stockton Center 
for the Study of International Law’s work in the area of cyber conflict�
In March 2017, the College sponsored a workshop entitled “Military Innova-
tion and the New Presidential Administration: Lessons from the Past, Solutions 
for the Future�” This event focused on the notion that, regardless of what national 
security strategy the Trump administration ultimately pursues, maintaining the 
U�S� military’s qualitative edge will give his administration and those of his suc-
cessors greater degrees of freedom in responding to long-term security challenges 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   10 4/21/17   8:35 AM
15
War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  1 1
and short-term crises� Given the range of American security responsibilities and 
the dictates of geography, the belief is that the United States must out-innovate 
its rivals or it will be unable to accomplish American security objectives in the 
long term� The workshop also examined the successes and failures of the Defense 
Department’s widely reported “Third Offset Strategy” to help chart a proposed 
course for the new administration� It focused on practical, policy-oriented is-
sues useful for planning how to maintain the technological advantages of the 
U�S� military far into the future� The moderators, panelists, and postworkshop 
analysts emphasized implications for USN future strategy, policy, operations, 
concepts, and technologies�
Institute for Future Warfare Studies
In February 2017, we opened the Institute for Future Warfare Studies (IFWS) as a 
new research and study department aimed at understanding how armed conflict 
may evolve in the future and how the U�S� Navy can prepare for it better� The 
mission of the new institute is to serve as a cross functional focal point for the 
College as we carry out the mission of helping to define the future Navy and its 
associated roles and missions�
Anticipating future security challenges is critical to national security, and 
navies are expensive and take many years to build� That’s why we have to look 
out a long way to figure out what platforms, weapons, and capabilities the Navy 
is likely to need in the decades ahead� IFWS will be taking a long-range look at 
the warfare needs of the country� This longer time horizon is what differentiates 
our new institute from other external organizations that are looking at these is-
sues; while many other forward-looking groups tend to view the next three to 
five years as the future, IFWS will be looking out thirty years or more from today�
The institute’s location within the College allows the impressive academic 
horsepower housed in Newport to assist IFWS in carrying out its mission� We 
believe that this institute will become yet another vital service we provide to Navy 
decision makers and stakeholders� We are excited about the research findings that 
this group—working with partners in government, academia, and industry—will 
provide to NWC, the Office of the CNO, and the fleet�
Future Forces Gallery
For the past eight years, the faculty moderators of the Unmanned Systems and 
Conflict in the 21st Century elective have sponsored multiple “futurization” 
events each academic year, focusing on emerging technology related to un-
manned and robotic systems� These occasional events have brought manufactur-
ers, designers, and government scientists and engineers to campus to provide 
informational displays and demonstrations on cutting-edge technologies�
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Such events now are being presented in the College’s newly opened Learning 
Commons. To maintain a more persistent “future focus” throughout the year, we 
recently established a permanent “Future Forces Gallery” that features graphics, 
models, and large, flat-screen monitors to display new systems and concepts as 
they are designed, tested, and deployed throughout the services. A trio of “Future 
Navy” images by award-winning science-fiction artist John Berkey are featured 
prominently in the gallery, and rotating exhibits will ensure that future platforms, 
weapons systems, and exotic hardware are kept at the forefront of the minds of 
our students, faculty members, and visitors.
Some wise sage once said, “The future is closer than you think.” I agree, and we 
want to ensure that our students and our fleet customers not only learn from the 
lessons of history but consider them in the context of many possible futures.
JEFFREY A. HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?
Christopher J. McMahon
The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the 
U-Boat peril.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
MARITIME TRADE WARFARE
 Maritime trade warfare, also called commerce warfare, is a naval/military strategy that has been followed since ancient times�1 The idea of maritime 
trade warfare is to attack or neutralize the commercial shipping of one’s enemy 
in an effort to disrupt the enemy’s economy, make it more difficult for the enemy 
to continue waging war by disrupting the enemy’s military supply chain that uses 
the sea, or both�
Maritime trade warfare can take different forms� Until the twentieth century, 
close blockades of an enemy’s ports were most common, conducted to prevent 
the movement of an enemy’s commercial shipping� In the twentieth century, 
with the introduction of new technologies such as the torpedo, submarine, and 
airplane, distant blockades (farther from the enemy coast) became standard prac-
tice� Mining of ports also was practiced�2 In addition, maritime exclusion zones 
(MEZs) sometimes were established to prevent shipping from entering a desig-
nated area� Maritime trade warfare also has included attacking or seizing enemy 
shipping in general, or outright destroying an enemy’s commercial shipping in 
particular� In the twentieth century, destruction of an enemy’s port infrastructure 
to prevent the loading or off-loading of commercial vessels also became a type of 
maritime trade warfare�3
The use of maritime trade warfare in World War II and, to some extent, World 
War I is commonly understood� In the latter part of World War I, for example, the 
Germans’ indiscriminate sinking of neutral vessels incensed the United States, 
eventually driving the country into the war on the side of the Allies�4 German 
employment of submarines (U-boats), particularly in World War II, played a 
large role in disrupting the flow of supplies from North America and the British 
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Empire that was supporting the Allied war effort�5 Similarly, the United States 
waged a very successful campaign of maritime trade warfare against the Empire 
of Japan in World War II�6
The present question is: Is maritime trade warfare still a viable strategy and 
tactic to be employed by warring powers today, or is it an anachronistic practice 
that has no place in twenty-first-century maritime conflicts? There seem to be 
two very different views on this question� On the one hand, there are military 
scholars and experts who not only promote the use of maritime trade warfare 
but also emphasize that modern navies should plan and exercise for it, from 
both offensive and defensive perspectives� On the other hand, there are military 
scholars and experts who argue that commerce warfare is a tactic of the past that 
is no longer viable, with no valid bearing on today’s world� Reasons for the latter 
viewpoint, among others that will be discussed below, include the interconnec-
tedness of the global economy and the nature of modern commercial shipping�
The purpose of this article is to consider both viewpoints and analyze their 
theories and supporting arguments� In the final analysis, the answer to the ques-
tion whether maritime trade warfare belongs in the twenty-first century is com-
plex� There are many obstacles to employing maritime trade warfare in a manner 
that would strangle an enemy’s economy effectively or prevent the movement of 
military supplies� However, history shows that, given just the right circumstances 
and time, maritime trade warfare can work� In any case, it is in the interest of 
military strategists and planners to plan for and exercise offensive and defensive 
maritime trade warfare in many potential conflict scenarios�
HISTORY OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE
Maritime trade warfare is certainly not a new military strategy� It has been em-
ployed for thousands of years in various forms�
Early to Modern History
Maritime trade warfare was employed commonly throughout ancient Greek 
history� In his writings on the Greek Peloponnesian War, the ancient historian 
Thucydides (ca� 460 BCE–400 BCE) described nearly thirty years of war between 
Athens and Sparta� In these writings he referred to what was essentially maritime 
trade warfare�7
For much of history, commerce warfare largely was performed by privateers, 
who received letters of marque from their governments� This instrument pro-
vided state authorization for their actions in seizing enemy shipping� In truth, 
however, there was often a fine line between privateers and pirates, since they 
operated in very similar manners� In theory, a privateer acted at least partly in the 
interest of his nation, whereas a pirate acted solely in his own interest�8
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Essentially, privateers operating under letters of marque were nonmilitary 
persons given permission by their sovereigns or other governments to raid enemy 
shipping� This activity often was referred to as guerre de course� The intention was 
to enable a weaker naval power to attack a stronger power—and to seize booty in 
the process�9 Acting as privateers with a letter of marque, a captain and crew were 
protected from being brought up on charges of piracy if captured� When success-
ful in capturing an enemy merchant vessel, privateers turned over the vessel and 
cargo to the privateers’ government in exchange for prize money� Rewards for 
privateers often were substantial�10
From a government’s perspective, the major potential advantages of using 
privateers were the revenue generated and the damage inflicted on an enemy’s 
economy� And the efforts of privateers could be had with little or no cost to a 
belligerent’s treasury, because privateers often were completely self-funded� They 
might receive a small stipend from their host governments; Queen Elizabeth I of 
England, for example, partly funded the privateering efforts of Sir John Hawkins 
and Sir Francis Drake—Drake being, perhaps, the most successful privateer in 
history�11 Probably because of their low cost to governments combined with their 
successes, privateers continued to be used to wage warfare on enemy commerce 
until the dawn of the twentieth century�12
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, maritime trade warfare 
in Europe played a role in the almost continuous conflicts among the British, 
French, Spanish, Dutch, and others� In the second half of the seventeenth century, 
Louis XIV of France, “the Sun King” (1638–1715), engaged his country in three 
major wars: the Franco-Dutch War, the War of the League of Augsburg, and the 
War of the Spanish Succession� In all three wars, maritime trade warfare played 
an important role in damaging enemy economies and preventing the move-
ment of military supplies�13 Because France was primarily a continental power, it 
needed to fund and support large land forces� This left it with only a limited abil-
ity to build or sustain a substantial navy with which to attack enemy shipping or 
fleets directly (i�e�, guerre d’escadre, or war of fleets)� As an alternative, in the last 
decade of the seventeenth century the French began to practice guerre de course 
to contest their enemies’ complete command and control of the sea�14
The French enjoyed such great success with maritime trade warfare during 
this period that the noted late nineteenth-century naval theorist Rear Admiral 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, suggested that “at no time has war against commerce 
been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period, 
� � � [which was] a large factor in bringing the sea nations to wish for peace�”15
Guerre de course or maritime trade warfare has been called a tactic of the 
weak because it often has been practiced by nations with weaker navies�16 The 
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American colonies employed commerce warfare from the late 1600s onward� For 
example, during times of conflict in the period 1739 to 1748, American colonial 
privateers sailed on some 466 privateering voyages and captured at least 829 for-
eign vessels�17 During the War of 1812, American privateers profited handsomely 
from attacks on British shipping�18
In the Mediterranean, commerce warfare—perhaps legitimately called piracy 
by some—occurred from Roman times into the nineteenth century� The Knights 
of Malta preyed on Ottoman shipping sailing between North African and Spanish 
ports� During the Crusades, Ottoman pirates profited frequently from attacks on 
European shipping� So too the famed “Barbary pirates” attacked ships from coun-
tries unwilling to pay a tribute to the local beys (rulers)� This included attacks 
in the late eighteenth century on merchant ships flagged by the new American 
republic, which prompted the U�S� Congress and president to establish a navy�19
Following the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, the great powers 
of Europe negotiated the Declaration of Paris in 1856� Signing nations agreed to 
end guerre de course� The declaration pledged as follows: “Neutral goods, with 
the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy’s 
flag�”20 Not surprisingly, other countries did not sign the declaration� One such 
was the United States; because its Navy was small, guerre de course offered one of 
the few options by which it could attack a more-powerful naval power�21 Indeed, 
during the American Civil War, the Confederates employed guerre de course 
against Union merchant ships, albeit with only a modest degree of success�22
The twentieth century brought an entirely new approach to maritime trade 
warfare with the introduction of several new maritime and naval technologies� 
At first, in the very early part of the twentieth century, it appeared to some that 
maritime trade warfare actually might cease to be a tactic because of these tech-
nological advances and treaties such as the Declaration of Paris�
In fact, in 1911 the noted British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett declared, 
“Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed 
so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there 
is no part of the strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more 
liable to error�”23 Corbett believed it would be difficult to provide sufficient coal-
ing stations for modern steam-powered warships to cruise extensively to attack 
enemy shipping� He also believed (as though it were a requirement) that it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to embark a prize crew on a captured vessel� As to 
merely sinking enemy vessels, Corbett famously stated, “No Power will incur the 
odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their removal to the captor’s ship 
takes time�”24 He also theorized that since commercial steam vessels had great 
maneuverability, they could avoid potentially dangerous routes on which enemy 
warships might be lying in wait�25
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Needless to say, World Wars I and II clearly demonstrated the potential and 
effects of maritime trade warfare� At the beginning of World War I, German 
reliance on maritime trade for both imports and exports was substantial, and 
the British navy believed it had the potential to destroy the German economy 
through blockade�26 Ultimately, with the largest and most powerful navy in the 
world, Great Britain successfully blockaded Germany and prevented merchant 
vessels, German or otherwise, from trading at German ports�
According to Naval War 
College professor and naval 
theorist Dr� Milan Vego, “a 
blockaded countr y of ten 
resorts to commercial coun-
terblockade�”27 As an imperial 
power with the most far-flung 
empire in history, Britain was 
dependent on the sea for trade 
with its colonies and with nations providing matériel for the war effort� Not 
surprisingly, as the war progressed Germany increasingly countered the British 
blockade with commerce warfare, using the submarine�28
By the end of World War I, the Germans had managed to sink 11,153,000 tons 
of Allied merchant shipping, comprising 2,990 commercial ships and 578 fishing 
vessels� To accomplish this, the Germans used some 390 submarines, of which 
Allied forces sank 178�29
Although Germany was not as dependent on seaborne commerce at the 
beginning of World War II as it had been in 1914, its maritime trade was still 
important� As in World War I, the British early in World War II established a 
blockade of German ports� The Germans responded with commerce warfare in 
the form of air and submarine attacks on British, and later Allied, maritime trade 
and on British port infrastructure� In total, during this war the Germans sank 
5,150 Allied merchant ships displacing 21�57 million tons�30 The German attacks 
on maritime trade not only destroyed ships; they greatly disrupted the entire 
military supply chain by requiring the use of large, slow convoys and by causing 
substantial rerouting of ships, which increased voyage times� They also caused 
negative second-order effects by slowing the production of military equipment 
and supplies�31
The cost to the Germans of their submarine warfare campaign was the loss of 
785 submarines and their crews�32 However, looking at the big picture, the Allied 
cost in dollars and additional resources for protecting vessels with convoys and 
other measures and for merchant vessels lost nonetheless was substantially higher 
than the cost to the Germans of building and operating their submarine fleet�33 In 
Whether today’s Navy leadership believes 
that protecting shipping in a maritime trade 
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot 
point. . . . [T]he U.S. Navy has no doctrine 
and no current practices regarding protecting 
maritime commerce from attack, and precious 
few resources with which to do so in any case.
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other words, although the Germans were not ultimately successful in curtailing 
Allied maritime trade, they might have been if circumstances had been somewhat 
different� In any case, the U-boats greatly disrupted the entire Allied war effort 
and caused the Allies to expend substantial resources to protect their sea-lanes�34 
German maritime trade warfare was at least partly successful�
In World War II, the United States prosecuted a very successful maritime 
trade warfare campaign against Japan, destroying 8�1 million tons of merchant 
shipping� The United States employed 288 submarines in the Pacific, which were 
responsible for sinking about 4�9 million tons of that total; aircraft, surface ships, 
and mines accomplished the remainder� This crippled the Japanese merchant ma-
rine, which prevented the importation of critical supplies, starving the Japanese 
military, economy, and people�35 The Japanese did not employ any significant 
maritime trade warfare against the United States during World War II, because it 
simply was not a part of Japanese naval doctrine, nor did it seem to conform to 
the Japanese Bushido (warrior) code� Further, the Japanese offered no effective 
defenses against the U�S� maritime trade warfare campaign�36
Maritime Trade Warfare in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century
As noted earlier, the 1856 Declaration of Paris banned attacks on commercial 
shipping by privateers—at least, those of the European nations that signed the 
treaty� This was followed by significant maritime technological advances in the 
construction of naval vessels, including submarines, and the torpedo, which 
caused at least some naval theorists—such as the respected Sir Julian Corbett 
quoted earlier—to believe that commerce warfare in the modern age was far-
fetched and very unlikely� Obviously, the events of World Wars I and II proved 
otherwise�37
In the dozens of conflicts that have broken out around the globe since World 
War II, maritime trade warfare has been relatively rare� During the U�S� interven-
tions in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it was and has been limited or 
nonexistent� As a result of the lack of maritime trade warfare in recent times, and 
in a manner similar to the propositions of naval theorists a century ago, there 
are those who believe that commerce warfare has been relegated to the history 
books� As Professor Douglas Peifer of the University of North Carolina notes in 
an article, “‘Maritime commerce warfare’ has a distinctly dated whiff�”38 Still, as in 
the days of Corbett, this contention can be called into question�
Indeed, maritime trade warfare did occur in the second half of the twentieth 
century, albeit infrequently� During the period of the Yom Kippur or Ramadan 
War of 1973, for example, the Egyptians attempted to blockade commercial ship-
ping traffic to prevent oil tankers from reaching Israel from Iran� To accomplish 
this, the Egyptians mined Israeli ports and declared a naval blockade in the Red 
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Sea� Had the war lasted longer, the Egyptians’ maritime trade warfare might have 
been successful, because Israel had no other method of obtaining the necessary 
oil supplies�39
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) provides another very clear example of maritime 
trade warfare in relatively recent times� The so-called tanker war began in early 
1981, when the Iraqis announced that all shipping headed to and from Iran was 
subject to attack� In 1982, Iraq attacked the Iranian oil terminal and commercial 
shipping at Khārk (Kharg) Island�40 In every respect, this was maritime trade 
warfare�
Initially, Iran had little ability to attack commercial shipping bound for Iraq, 
but this eventually changed; by 1987, Iran was targeting tankers bound for Iraq 
effectively� In 1986, to protect its shipping interests, Kuwait requested assistance 
from the international community, including the United States� In 1987, several 
Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged to the United States, in theory protecting them 
from Iraqi or Iranian attack, since the United States was a neutral nation�41 In any 
case, it was conjectured that the U�S� Navy would protect these ships through a 
convoy system, which is what eventually occurred�
In total, the marine insurance company Lloyd’s of London reported that 546 
commercial ships were damaged during the Iran-Iraq War, killing 430 merchant 
mariners�42 Of the ships attacked, very few actually were sunk� Sixty-one percent 
of the vessels attacked (239 ships) were tankers� Fifty-five of these tankers were 
declared “constructive total losses�” Thirty-nine percent of the bulk carriers at-
tacked and 32 percent of the freighters attacked also were declared constructive 
total losses�43
The Use of Mines in Maritime Trade Warfare
Although the American David Bushnell is credited with developing the first na-
val mine in 1776 and mines were used to a limited extent in nineteenth-century 
wars, it was during World War I that the mine became a major weapon against 
navies and merchant ships�44 Mines historically have been used to restrict access 
to a sea area and to blockade commercial vessels from port areas—a form of 
maritime trade warfare� Certainly World Wars I and II offer many examples of 
this type of warfare� In World War II alone some seven hundred thousand mines 
were sown� These accounted for the loss of 650 Allied ships and 1,100 Axis ships, 
with another eight hundred damaged between them� In fact, mines damaged or 
sank more vessels than any other weapon�45 Perhaps the best example of the use 
of mines in maritime trade warfare was Operation STARVATION in the summer 
of 1945, for which the U�S� Navy and Army Air Corps sowed eleven thousand 
mines off the coasts and ports of Japan, sinking 605 Japanese merchant ships and 
sixty-five warships�46
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From May 1972 through January 1973, the United States mined Haiphong 
Harbor in North Vietnam and two other, smaller North Vietnamese ports� This 
effectively closed these ports to commercial shipping, forcing North Vietnam 
to use inland roads and railroads from Chinese ports for imports and exports�47
During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Iran made extensive use of mines in an 
effort to blockade Kuwaiti ports� The mines damaged numerous merchant ships 
from many countries, although these efforts did not curtail merchant shipping 
in the Persian Gulf�48
ARGUMENTS FOR THE USE OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE IN 
THE FUTURE
Some theorists believe that maritime trade warfare will continue to be used in any 
lengthy war conducted at least partly at sea�49 Supporters of maritime trade war-
fare acknowledge that, for it to be an effective instrument for crippling an enemy’s 
economy in general and preventing military supplies in particular from getting 
through, the time factor is essential� In other words, it takes time for maritime 
trade warfare to have the desired economic and military effects�
Geography also plays an important role in maritime trade warfare� An island 
nation, a coastal nation isolated by geographical features that are a barrier to 
land trade, or a nation with hostile neighbors is more vulnerable to maritime 
trade warfare�50 Regarding the notion that because of the integration of the global 
economy commerce warfare is unlikely in future conflicts, proponents note that 
before 1914 many Europeans believed that a large-scale European war never 
would happen because it would lead to a European economic collapse that would 
harm all participating nations� Proponents argue that in many ways the global 
economy was intertwined prior to World War I in ways similar to today, yet both 
sides used maritime trade warfare as a tactic during the war�51
Prospects for Blockading
Given the past successes of maritime trade warfare, some experts contend that 
commerce warfare not only is likely to be practiced but should be incorpo-
rated into many conflict scenarios as an essential component of military strategy 
and tactics� In a Yale Law Journal article written in the 1990s, author Michael 
Fraunces notes:
In the future, blockade may become even more important as the need of a blockad-
ing state to stop every merchant ship grows vital� The recent willingness of ostensibly 
neutral states to supply not simply technical know-how and materials for weapons of 
mass destruction, but also ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the 
highest bidder portends such a future� As the negative consequences of allowing even 
one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will become more 
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willing to use the new blockade forms (long-range blockade and blockade zones) at 
the expense of neutral interests�52
To be sure, discussion in military circles today regarding maritime trade war-
fare is very limited, if it occurs at all� There currently is no U�S� military doctrine 
that even raises the issues of offensive or defensive maritime trade warfare� This 
situation is reminiscent of the interwar years: despite the extensive use of mari-
time trade warfare during World War I, requiring the United States to protect its 
convoys, during the 1920s and ’30s the Navy essentially forgot the lessons it had 
learned� When the United States entered World War II, German submarines had 
a field day sinking American shipping, often in plain sight of the American main-
land, because merchant shipping was given no protection at all�53 The then Com-
mander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J� King, believed the Navy 
had no obligation to protect 
commercial shipping, in light 
of the many other demands 
the service faced at the time�54 
Whether today’s Navy leader-
ship believes that protecting 
shipping in a maritime trade 
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot point� Aside from fighting piracy in 
East Africa, which could be regarded as protecting shipping, the U�S� Navy has no 
doctrine and no current practices regarding protecting maritime commerce from 
attack, and precious few resources with which to do so in any case�
Some military experts contend that maritime trade warfare not only is likely in 
future conflicts, but that it can and should be a strategy the United States directs 
its military to employ� The services therefore should plan for and practice this 
employment, in the form of military exercises conducted from both offensive 
and defensive perspectives� Given the growing power, including naval power, 
of several nations around the world, some military experts have weighed the 
potential for maritime trade warfare being employed in a conflict and believe it 
is a worthy strategy�
The possibility of conducting maritime trade warfare against China is one ex-
ample� In a paper entitled “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely 
Conflict,” retired U�S� Marine Corps colonel T� X� Hammes contends that in a 
protracted conflict with China the United States could employ a strategy of “off-
shore control” to interdict China’s energy, raw material, and industrial imports 
and exports to strangle the country’s economy� According to Hammes, this could 
be achieved through the use of Navy ships, Army and Navy boarding teams, and 
contracted shipping and helicopters�55
[O]pponents of modern commerce warfare 
contend that it simply is not possible to isolate 
a powerful nation through maritime trade 
warfare without devastating the entire global 
economy.
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   23 4/21/17   8:35 AM
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
 2 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Essentially, Colonel Hammes believes that blockading shipments to China 
through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda and controlling the north–
south routes to and from Australia could block 80 percent of China’s oil imports� 
Further, blockading exports from China would rob China of its source of eco-
nomic power� This would force the Chinese to the bargaining table, which very 
likely would end the conflict�56
Colonel Hammes states:
Clearly the U�S� Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost 1,500 very large 
commercial ships projected to be in use by 2015� However, these numbers can be 
controlled by U�S� amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine boarding par-
ties that will travel with the ships to ensure they do not enter the maritime exclu-
sion zone� Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted to support the 
distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on the amphibious fleet�57
In their article “No Oil for the Lamps of China,” authors Gabriel Collins and 
William Murray further explain how the U�S� Navy could block the key straits on 
Chinese trade routes effectively:
It appears then that at least ten surface warships and two replenishment vessels would 
be required to establish an effective and protected distant blockade at the Straits of 
Malacca� This number would increase proportionally if the Lombok Strait, Sunda 
Strait, and the route around Australia also had to be patrolled� The authors estimate 
that three surface warships and accompanying replenishment vessels per additional 
strait would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that all passing tankers 
could be boarded, inspected, and if necessary escorted to a quarantine anchorage� 
This gives a minimum total of sixteen surface warships and four replenishment  
vessels�58 
In a well-researched article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, author Sean 
Mirski argues as follows: “A blockade strategy [against China] is viable, but it 
would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be en-
gaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support 
of key regional powers� The United States would also need to implement a mix 
between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict’s 
strategic context� If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese 
economy and state�”59 Mirski comments that the existing literature on commerce 
warfare is “remarkably sparse, circumscribed, and inconclusive,” in large part be-
cause commercial links between China and the United States are so intertwined 
that maritime trade warfare is considered unlikely because it would be too mutu-
ally destructive�60
Yet Naval War College professor Dr� Milan Vego believes that maritime trade 
warfare remains a possibility in the future� He notes that another large-scale 
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global war may never occur; however, history suggests that the improbable often 
becomes reality� He uses World War I as an example; as noted earlier, theorists in 
the early twentieth century did not believe a large European war would occur—
yet it did� Similarly, some naval theorists in the early part of the twentieth century 
suggested that the days of commerce warfare were over—yet in both world wars, 
maritime trade warfare was definitely a reality�61 Accordingly, Vego believes that 
in a large, long-term conflict, maritime trade warfare is probable� He also believes 
that attacks on maritime trade might take the form of attacks on infrastructure 
and ports and, perhaps, some forms of cyber warfare, but that “attacks on ships 
at sea and in port would also be essential�”62
Prospects for Use of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively to blockade merchant shipping 
from entering a belligerent’s ports� In numerous conflicts, mines have proved 
themselves to be quite deadly� It is noteworthy that since World War II, fourteen 
USN ships have been sunk or damaged by mines, compared with only two that 
have been damaged by missile or air attack�63 Mines are relatively inexpensive, 
and nations throughout the world keep tens of thousands in their inventories�64
Available current literature on the use of mines to blockade as a form of com-
merce warfare is quite sparse� However, given the low cost and deadly effective-
ness of mines in past conflicts, it seems reasonable to some experts that mines 
could play an important role in modern maritime trade warfare by effectively 
blockading the ports and harbors of an enemy�
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF MARITIME TRADE 
WARFARE IN THE FUTURE
While acknowledging the historical successes of maritime trade warfare, there 
are those who contend that this type of warfare is essentially a strategy and tactic 
of the past� Numerous factors support this position�
The Nature of the Global Economy
In a manner similar to the arguments offered prior to World War I, the integrated 
nature of the global economy today and the difficulty of interdicting maritime 
commerce often are cited as reasons there will be no maritime trade warfare in 
the future� In 1897, Germany’s Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz—given the 
situation at the time—projected as follows: “Commerce raiding and transatlantic 
war against England is so hopeless, because of the shortage of bases on our side 
and the superfluity on England’s side, that we must ignore this type of war against 
England in our plans for the constitution of our fleet�”65 Obviously, Admiral 
Tirpitz’s prediction of how developments would unfold was significantly off the 
mark�
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Regarding the integrated global economy of today, opponents of modern com-
merce warfare contend that it simply is not possible to isolate a powerful nation 
through maritime trade warfare without devastating the entire global economy� 
Yes, the global economy was integrated to some extent prior to World War I, but 
not to the degree and scope that it is today� The technological developments in 
communications and transportation and more-positive international govern-
ment policy environments established around the world in the last half-century 
have expanded trade greatly in both size and scope�66 At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, global trade was estimated to be U�S�$1�5 billion; by 1850 
this had risen to $4 billion; and by 1900 to $24 billion�67 In 2014, global trade was 
reported to be $18�5 trillion�68 Worldwide, in manufacturing exports alone there 
was a 3,500 percent increase just from 1950 to 1998�69
World Wars I and II devastated the global economy� The reasoning follows 
that, with the economic destruction they inflicted so obvious, and with the global 
economy even more integrated today than it was prior to those wars, another 
conflict involving maritime trade warfare is as unthinkable as it is unlikely�
The Nature of Global Merchant Shipping
The complexity of the global commercial maritime business also is put forward 
as a reason maritime trade warfare is unlikely in the future� Until the late 1940s, 
commercial ships typically were financed, owned, built, and crewed in the flag 
state of their registry� This changed dramatically in the decades after World War 
II, with the proliferation of “flag-of-convenience registries�”70 Today, more than 
half the world’s merchant ships are registered in flag-of-convenience countries�71 
In many cases, the actual ownership of a vessel is difficult to ascertain�
Complicating this is the very nature of modern commercial shipping� Owner-
ship of bulk cargoes such as oil, grain, and iron ore, as well as the destinations of 
those cargoes, can change, sometimes repeatedly, as cargoes are sold and resold 
throughout the course of a voyage� With general cargo and container vessels, 
ownership and cargo destinations also can be complex� A single ship can contain 
multiple cargoes—sometimes thousands—destined for dozens of countries, often 
located far beyond the port of discharge�72 The basic problem is that boarding, 
search, and seizure of vessels and cargoes on the high seas is complicated because 
it can be difficult to identify the ownership of a ship and cargo and because a ves-
sel’s cargoes often are destined for many countries� When a nation seizes or sinks 
a vessel apparently bound for a belligerent nation, its cargo, or at least a portion 
thereof, may be the property of a neutral nation, or even an ally�
Another factor of the modern global merchant marine is simply its size� 
In 1939, prior to World War II, the combined size of the entire global mer-
chant marine was about fifty-seven million deadweight tons�73 This included 
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approximately twelve thousand vessels in deep-sea trade� Today, the size of the 
global merchant marine is about 1�75 billion deadweight tons, with about ninety 
thousand commercial vessels�74 In other words, there are tens of thousands more 
vessels in the world today than in the decades prior to World War II, and they are 
larger as well� At the same time, the number of naval vessels available in the larger 
navies of the world today—those warships capable of conducting maritime trade 
warfare or interdiction in any form—is very small�
These factors clearly indicate that conducting maritime trade warfare effec-
tively would be exceedingly difficult in most scenarios today� Identifying vessels 
and cargoes belonging to a belligerent is much more complex today than it was in 
those historical situations in which maritime trade warfare proved a productive 
strategy and tactic� In any case, the number of naval vessels or auxiliaries needed 
to implement successfully an effective maritime trade warfare campaign would 
be very substantial—far more, in most scenarios, than the number of vessels 
needed during World War II� Compounding this is the fact that even the large 
navies of the world today are much smaller than in the era of the world wars�
Use of Alternative Intermodal Transportation
There are other reasons to argue that maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first 
century would require massive resources yet would be ineffective� As maritime 
transportation technologies have made great strides with the development of 
containerization and container shipping, so too have land port infrastructure 
and intermodal transportation� The majority of the world is linked as never be-
fore, not just by ports but by highly efficient ports, ports that are linked to vast 
networks of roads, railroads, and airports� This means that, in many cases, trade 
by sea can be bypassed by using other modes of transportation� Doing so might 
raise transportation costs significantly, but it nonetheless could render maritime 
trade warfare ineffective�
It must be noted, for example, that even during World War II German mari-
time trade warfare in the Atlantic was not effective in blocking the majority of 
economic and military supplies from reaching the Soviet Union from North 
America� In fact, of the supplies sent that reached the Soviet Union, 23 percent 
did so through Iran and another 46 percent reached Pacific coast ports of the So-
viet Union—passing near Japan, which had a nonaggression pact with the Soviet 
Union until 1945� Today, in an era of much more sophisticated railroad, pipeline, 
and aviation intermodal links, maritime trade warfare alone, in many cases, 
would not isolate a country—particularly one with friendly or neutral countries 
on its borders� In a conflict with China, for example, it would be highly unlikely 
that land intermodal shipments of oil and other cargoes to and from one or more 
of China’s many neighbors could be blocked�75
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   27 4/21/17   8:35 AM
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
 2 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
In November 2014, for example, China initiated a new train service from 
China west to Spain, a route covering a distance of some 6,200 miles and requir-
ing approximately twenty-one days’ travel�76 In January 2017, the first freight 
train from China arrived in London after a 7,500-mile journey, having reached 
its destination in eighteen days—half the time required for a sea voyage�77 In ad-
dition, China has the ability to link to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway and other 
rail lines across Asia� Further, according to Global Risk Insights, during the past 
few years Russia and China have forged new energy deals that will open energy 
pipeline links from Russia to China�78 The Chinese also are funding both rail 
and pipeline links from China to Myanmar ports so as to bypass the Straits of 
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda�79
In other words, although the Chinese do rely on ocean transportation for the 
majority of their energy, raw materials, and exports, they have several neighbors 
and connections to numerous intermodal links to the Middle East and Europe 
that could ease their dependence on marine transportation during a military 
conflict� Most coastal nations, especially large nations, have the same ability�
Use of Reserves and Rationing
For any military conflict or other national emergency in which vital imports 
such as energy supplies are required, many nations around the world have plans 
and infrastructure in place to conduct rationing� In addition, many countries, 
including the United States, have established substantial petroleum reserves, 
which would provide energy supplies for an extended period during a national 
emergency�80
If targeted states brought in resources via intermodal links other than the sea, 
then rationed them carefully, the results desired from maritime trade warfare 
might be minimal�
The Naval Resources Question
The question of the naval resources needed to conduct maritime trade warfare in 
the form of imposing an effective blockade is a very significant one� With regard 
to a country such as China—or any other country in East Asia, for that matter—
the supporters of maritime trade warfare cited in this article focus on blockades 
of the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda as the method for restricting en-
ergy supply lines or otherwise curtailing economic activity, particularly exports� 
These studies indicate that a relatively small number of naval ships could block-
ade the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda successfully, effectively isolating 
the energy and economic supply lines to and from China�81
However, the imposition of a blockade in these straits would be illegal under 
international law, as represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea� The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations notes:
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 Belligerent forces transiting through international straits overlapped by neutral 
waters must proceed without delay, must refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the neutral nation, and must otherwise refrain from acts of hostility and other 
activities not incident to their transit� � � � Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits 
as a place of sanctuary or as a base of operations and belligerent warships may not 
exercise the belligerent right of visit and search in those waters�82
It could, perhaps, be argued that blockading naval vessels could operate in 
waters sufficiently far away from international straits to remain compliant with 
international law� However, this would increase significantly the number of naval 
resources required to implement an effective blockade� In any case, 2014 data 
indicate that in that year alone there were some 79,000 transits through the Strait 
of Malacca� These involved 25,071 containerships and 4,993 very large crude oil 
carriers (VLCCs), in addition to tens of thousands of smaller cargo vessels and 
tankers� This translates to about 217 ships a day passing through the Strait of 
Malacca�83 Adding the vessels transiting the Sunda and Lombok Straits would in-
crease significantly the daily and annual ship-transit totals� Simply put, the naval 
resources needed to effect a legal blockade in areas near these straits—to board, 
search, and inspect vessels and to provide escorts to quarantine anchorages for 
suspect vessels—would be far more significant than is accounted for in any of the 
sources cited in this article�
It further complicates this problem that there is a huge swath of the Pacific 
Ocean that could be used for alternative routes to China and the rest of East 
Asia—numerous Pacific Ocean trade routes to Asia are available that do not use 
any strait� True, this would add to shipping and other transportation costs, owing 
to the longer distances covered (west from the Panama Canal and northwest from 
Cape Horn), but nevertheless these routes could be used�
For a VLCC traveling from Saudi Arabian oil terminals to Shanghai, China, 
today, for example, the transportation cost of crude oil is thirteen to eighteen 
cents per gallon for a transit of about eighteen days�84 Crude oil transportation 
to China from Venezuela instead, via the Panama Canal in a tanker somewhat 
smaller than a VLCC, would require twenty-six days� VLCC oil transportation 
from Angola to China via Cape Horn would entail a voyage of about forty days�85
Clearly, the added distance in longer voyages would add to transportation 
costs—possibly doubling them, or more—but this hardly would impose an in-
surmountable expense if the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda were being 
blockaded� The Suez Canal has been closed five times since its opening in 1869, 
including for the eight years between 1967 and 1975�86 Oil tankers and cargo ves-
sels transiting from the Middle East to Europe and the Americas were required 
to transit much longer distances around the Cape of Good Hope, and at greater 
expense to shippers, but this did not impose an overbearing economic hardship 
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on the countries of Europe or the Americas� Similarly, if the Straits of Malacca, 
Lombok, and Sunda were blockaded, using Pacific Ocean shipping routes to East 
Asia would create a hardship, but one that could be endured�
Any attempt to conduct maritime trade warfare (or interdiction) against all 
the Pacific Ocean route approaches to Asia and the approaches to the Straits of 
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda would require a huge number of naval vessels, with 
all the complicated logistics and resupply associated therewith� Further, for every 
naval and resupply vessel used for maritime trade warfare and blockade, one 
fewer vessel would be available for other naval missions—missions that probably 
would be critically important in a time of military conflict�
The Targeting Problem
As noted earlier, there are some ninety thousand deep-sea commercial vessels 
in the world� This does not include hundreds of thousands of fishing vessels, 
coastwise vessels, and other special-purpose vessels� The waters in and around 
East Asia teem with traffic—thousands of vessels within a relatively small area� 
Identifying which vessels to board, search, and seize would be a daunting task 
that would get harder the closer one approached the Asian mainland or a choke 
point such as a strait�
It is true that commercial vessels now broadcast on an Automatic Identifica-
tion System (AIS) frequency, by which they identify themselves, but AIS can be 
switched off� During the recent piracy crisis off the coast of Somalia, for example, 
many vessels simply turned off their AIS to avoid identification� In a maritime 
trade warfare situation, many vessels, including neutral vessels, likely would not 
broadcast their AIS signals, further complicating identification efforts�87
The Complexity Involved in Sinking Vessels
Some supporters of maritime trade warfare suggest the establishment of a mari-
time exclusion zone, with any commercial vessel entering the MEZ subject to 
attack and sinking� The theory is that this would prevent merchant ships from 
entering the zone�
However, the collateral consequences of sinking a modern commercial ves-
sel would be huge� Sinking a vessel likely would result in the deaths of innocent 
merchant mariners, probably from a large number of nations, including friendly 
or neutral ones� Some might view this as a war crime�
In addition, the environmental impact of sinking a large ship, especially a pe-
troleum tanker, would be immense� Sinking a VLCC, which can carry more than 
165 million gallons of crude oil, would create an environmental disaster of epic 
proportions� The destruction of fishing grounds and the pollution of thousands 
of square miles of coastlines would be enormous�
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   30 4/21/17   8:35 AM
35
War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 M C M A H O N  3 1
While the German and American navies had great success in sinking mer-
chant vessels during World War II, the problem today is much more complex� 
Simply put, merchant ships now are huge—much larger than those that sailed the 
seas during the twentieth-century world wars� It likely would take a significant 
amount of ordnance to sink a ship, or even to damage and disable it� Recall that 
very few of the 546 ships attacked during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s were 
declared constructive total losses, and almost none actually were sunk� No recent 
studies are available that analyze the methods and weapon capabilities needed to 
sink modern commercial vessels; the problem is likely much more complex than 
many realize�
Adding to this problem is the scarce inventory of available weapons and ord-
nance� Just as the number of naval vessels available for maritime trade warfare is 
extremely small, so too is the availability of ordnance needed to accomplish the 
task� While production of naval ships, weapons, and ordnance in theory could 
be ramped up, this would take a substantial amount of time� In fact, it would 
take much more time than was needed after America entered World War II in 
December of 1941� At that time shipbuilding and weapons-manufacturing com-
panies already had increased their production substantially over a span of years, 
yet it took years more for the United States to produce enough ships, weapons, 
and ordnance to protect against German maritime trade warfare effectively and 
to establish an offensive maritime trade warfare campaign against Japan�
Maritime Trade Warfare Does Not Curtail Shipping
Some believe that even the threat of maritime trade warfare would cause ship-
owners from nonbelligerent countries to keep their vessels out of hostile waters� 
In individual instances this might be true, but history shows that generally it is 
not so� During the age of sail, shipowners were quite willing to sail into harm’s 
way because profit motives outweighed concern for the safety of their vessels�
The world wars of the twentieth century also offer no exception� During the 
relatively recent tanker wars during the Iran-Iraq War, there was an initial 25 
percent decrease in shipping traffic, but this soon changed as profits for shipown-
ers soared� More ships became available to carry crude oil, despite the dangers 
involved� To cover the cost of higher marine insurance premiums, Iran reduced 
the price of its oil exports�88
The Question of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively in commerce warfare as a form 
of blockade to close the ports and harbors of a belligerent� Given the massive 
number of mines in the current inventories of some nations, it seems reason-
able that mines might be used with great effectiveness, and in some cases this is 
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probably true� For a relatively small island nation with a limited number of ports, 
an enemy with substantial mining capabilities probably could blockade its ports 
very effectively�
However, the scenarios under which this might occur are quite limited� With 
regard to large countries having multiple ports and effective militaries, the chal-
lenges to effective mining are many� In a country such as the United States or 
China, for example, it would be exceedingly difficult for an enemy’s submarines, 
other vessels, or aircraft to sow mines in ports, harbors, or approach channels� 
During the India-Pakistan War of 1971, for example, Pakistan attempted to sow 
mines in Indian waters with a submarine, but was unsuccessful owing to Indian 
navy intervention�89
A large country such as the 
United States, India, or China 
or an economic zone such 
as the European Union has 
dozens of ports� The resources 
needed to blockade all these 
ports effectively using mines 
would be quite substantial, 
and such efforts similarly 
would be vulnerable to intervention by local navies� Further, merchant ships 
blockaded from one port could shift to ports in neighboring countries and load 
and discharge their cargoes at intermodal facilities there, thereby limiting the 
mine blockade’s effectiveness� As noted previously, the United States did manage 
to close North Vietnamese ports with mines during the latter half of the Vietnam 
War; however, North Vietnam at the time had only one large port and two smaller 
ones, and no navy to challenge the U�S� Navy� Despite the resultant reduction in 
transportation capabilities, North Vietnam was able to divert shipping to Chinese 
ports and use road and rail into North Vietnam, although this was less efficient�
Finally, the mine ordnance necessary to effect a commercial blockade is sig-
nificant and grows substantially as the number of ports, harbors, channels, and 
coastal areas that require mining increases� And the United States, for example, 
has only a very small inventory of mines�
A review of the sources cited in this article reveals general agreement that deter-
mining the likelihood of maritime trade warfare being practiced in the future is 
a complex question� The proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare 
agree that, to be effective, maritime trade warfare generally needs to be executed 
over a significant span of time� The American and German campaigns of World 
[I]f plans are not put in place and exercised to 
protect strategic sealift vessels, . . . protection 
of warships is really a moot point. Without 
a reliable and capable supply chain of com-
mercial and military logistics ships, warships 
cannot operate and fight far from American 
shores for any significant span of time.
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War II eventually had great effect, but required several years to reach that point� 
The Egyptian campaign against Israel in 1967 was not effective because of its 
short duration�
Proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare also agree that any use 
of this strategy and tactic would have devastating impacts on today’s global econ-
omy� An unanswered question is whether maritime trade warfare really would 
bring a belligerent nation to the bargaining table, or simply escalate the conflict, 
which might spiral out of control� The answer seems to be that it would depend 
entirely on the situation; either result might occur� This certainly makes reliance 
on maritime trade warfare a dangerous business�
Another concern is that in regional or limited wars with powerful nations 
involved, commerce warfare is likely to create second-order effects that might 
draw other nations into the conflict� In the colonial-era Seven Years’ War, for 
example, British commerce raiding expanded beyond attacks on French vessels to 
include attacks on neutral Dutch vessels, which strained relations with a friendly 
country�90 In the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Russia, fearing consequences 
after numerous protests from the British and American governments, restricted 
its maritime trade warfare�91 In the early part of World War II, Hitler specifically 
forbade German submarines from attacking American vessels lest such attacks 
bring the United States into the war on Britain’s side�92 Would similar problems 
arise with modern use of maritime trade warfare? Would allied nations support 
maritime trade warfare, or would they attempt to circumvent blockades? Again, 
either outcome might occur�
Maritime trade warfare, however likely or unlikely it is to occur, could have 
vast global, regional, and national consequences� Therefore policy makers and 
military planners should consider the topic thoroughly from an offensive and—
equally important—a defensive standpoint� When the United States entered 
World War II, the Navy was ill prepared for German maritime trade warfare and 
largely remained so until 1943� The resulting commercial and military sealift 
shipping losses were enormous, and thousands of merchant mariners lost their 
lives�93 The United States today is equally unprepared to defend itself against 
maritime trade warfare or to protect American commerce and strategic sealift 
on the high seas�
To support its allies and national interests, the United States has taken on 
worldwide missions, and therefore has the most expeditionary military in the 
world� With the requirement to operate, in many cases, far forward from the 
continental United States, the armed forces rely heavily on ocean transportation 
for the majority of their lift capacity, in terms of tonnage� To support its world-
wide ocean-transportation needs, the U�S� military depends on internal sealift 
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capabilities through the Navy’s Military Sealift Command; for rapid deployment, 
on the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet of government-owned 
vessels; and for sustainment, on the U�S� Merchant Marine (commercial vessels)� 
This triad of fleets offers substantial sealift capacity�
However, the potential for losses in this maritime capability through the of-
fensive actions of enemy maritime trade warfare against the United States simply 
is not factored adequately into the nation’s policies or plans� During a July 2014 
congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy commander 
of U�S� Transportation Command was asked about the potential for attacks on 
strategic sealift vessels� In his response he admitted, “So in terms of protecting 
ships as they go across [the ocean], we � � � don’t have a lot of attrition built into 
our modeling� � � � [T]hat is not something that we really build in there�”94 In other 
words, although the United States currently has a substantial military sealift ca-
pability, the losses resulting from even moderately successful attacks on U�S�-flag 
shipping could have far-reaching consequences�
Further, the number of U�S�-flag merchant vessels engaged in international 
trade and available for strategic sealift is very small—seventy-eight—compared 
with the tens of thousands of merchant ships under other flags�95 Should losses 
occur in the U�S� Merchant Marine as a result of an enemy maritime warfare 
campaign, it is certainly questionable whether America could rely on foreign-flag 
commercial vessels for economic or military sealift�96 Yet this topic receives little 
attention�
Perhaps logically, USN planning efforts center on the protection of surface 
combatants, particularly aircraft carriers� However, if plans are not put in place 
and exercised to protect strategic sealift vessels, to include both government-
owned vessels and those of the U�S� Merchant Marine, protection of warships is 
really a moot point� Without a reliable and capable supply chain of commercial 
and military logistics ships, warships cannot operate and fight far from American 
shores for any significant span of time�
The conduct of maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first century represents 
a complex problem that in many conflict scenarios would not yield positive 
results� However, history is full of examples of maritime trade warfare proving 
an effective strategy against enemies—which sometimes was the United States� 
Likewise, history is full of examples of “experts” and political leaders insisting 
that maritime trade warfare would not work—only to be proved very wrong as 
new conflicts and scenarios presented themselves�
Accordingly, it seems quite appropriate in the twenty-first century that his-
torical lessons learned from maritime trade warfare campaigns of the past be 
studied carefully, and that political leaders and military planners consider, plan, 
and exercise scenarios involving maritime trade warfare from both offensive and 
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defensive perspectives� Doing anything less risks repeating some of the greatest 
mistakes of maritime history�
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Naval War College Review, Summer 2017, Vol. 70, No. 3
TACTICS OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION
 Defense analysts and policy makers now refer routinely to the challenges of operating in a “gray zone” of conflict, which coincides with recent scholarly 
efforts to analyze more rigorously conflicts short of traditional coercion or war�1 
Yet despite its frequent contemporary usage, the term gray zone does not seem to 
describe anything new� However, it does highlight something that is undercon-
ceptualized: the use of tactics that challenge the status quo without resorting to 
war� This article proposes that the gray zone is not a new concept, but that the 
term conveniently describes a broad class of events involving nonwar yet conflic-
tual interactions—what might be considered “normal” or “stable” strategic com-
petition� Taking policy makers’ concerns seriously, I argue that at least three types 
of interrelated tactics are historically common, if underconceptualized, ways of 
pursuing competitive gains while deferring the decision for war: sidestepping 
established defender “redline” commitments; employing intermediary actors as 
aggressors; and presenting faits accomplis to defenders�
Each of these tactics has ample historical prec-
edent; yet, as discussed below, each is also vastly 
undertheorized, which might help to explain why 
security practitioners have reached for the term 
gray zone. Bringing these tactics to the analytic 
fore gives us a different way to think about aspects 
of crucial cases etched in popular historiography, 
such as the invasion of South Korea, Egypt’s na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal, and the start of the 
Cuban missile crisis� The ability to draw on such 
marquee events to illuminate the logics of these 
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revisionist tactics also undermines suggestions that the gray zone of conflict 
represents a brave new world� What is more, recognizing when such tactics are 
in play has payoffs for how we might expect conflict interactions to unfold—the 
presence of each tactic plausibly biases the outcomes of strategic interactions in 
favor of those who take the initiative, while also introducing the classic risks of 
unintentional escalation�
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts� The first part introduces 
the modern usage of the term gray zone, its conceptual limitation, and three 
interrelated tactics that simultaneously try to avoid inciting crisis or war while 
pursuing revisionist aims—the essence of the gray-zone challenge, as explained 
by its advocates� The second part makes a prima facie attempt to identify the ways 
in which these revisionist tactics logically complicate competitive interactions in 
international relations (i�e�, how their employment plausibly affects the interplay 
of conflict, on the basis of their presence in familiar historical examples as well as 
the causal logics identified in the sparse but relevant literatures)� The final part 
surveys a diverse range of modern cases of international competition to illustrate 
the centrality of these revisionist tactics to explaining those cases�
UNDERSTANDING THE GRAY ZONE . . . OR NOT
The term gray zone appears almost nowhere in scholarly literature� Among se-
curity practitioners, the broadest and most consistent use of the term seems to 
describe what amounts to a realpolitik state of competition short of war�2 Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert O� Work acknowledged that “agents, paramilitar-
ies, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial” constitute “what some people 
have called ‘the gray zone,’” arguing that it is the type of conflict for which U�S� 
forces are least prepared�3 The former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi-
tions, Technology and Logistics similarly eschewed the term itself but addressed 
the crux of the problem by describing the category of conflict in a 2015 internal 
memo as one “that occurs again and again� These conflicts are regional, may be 
presented by an insurgency against a standing government, military and politi-
cal activities within a sovereign nation conducted by a neighbor, disputes over 
territory between neighboring nations, or terrorist or criminal activities within 
ungoverned territories or within failing states�”4 The memo even explained why 
these activities are a problem: “In these conflicts it has been very difficult to assess 
the situation and to determine what U�S� interests are at stake, � � � determining 
what actions should the U�S� take to protect those interests, who our allies and 
adversaries are in the particular situation, and what end-state would be best to 
protect our interests and result in the most favorable outcome�”5
But the gray zone is not a concern only for the U�S� government� In track 1�5 
meetings with U�S� officials and analysts, South Korean and Japanese officials 
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have expressed rising angst that gray-zone challenges may erode the credibility 
of U�S� commitments�6 In particular, the government of Japan, which started us-
ing the term in 2010, has defined gray zones as “armed incidents that fall short 
of a full-scale attack�”7 Examples that officials have offered to illustrate what 
Japan means by the term gray zone range from Chinese special operations forces 
infiltrating the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dressed as fishermen to drone 
intrusions or cyber attacks aimed at compelling Japan to stand down in the event 
of a remote confrontation in the East China Sea�8 Japan’s Defense of Japan 2014 
annual white paper also articulates concerns that gray-zone situations will pre-
sent the country with scenarios in which a military response might be necessary, 
but only its coast guard or law-enforcement agencies would have the authority to 
act�9 A number of scholars and pundits additionally have seized on the term to 
describe contemporary cases of competition, ranging from recent North Korean 
violence and Russia’s annexation of Crimea to China’s East China Sea policy and 
its ongoing artificial island building in contested areas of the South China Sea�10
Although the term gray zone is not inherently problematic, it risks obscuring 
the actual observed behaviors that are raising concerns among policy makers� If 
focusing on the gray zone amounts to nothing more than identifying the numer-
ous types of conflict short of war, there is little obvious benefit in aggregating 
them into a master category labeled gray zone� The term can be a convenient 
descriptive shorthand for referring to nonwar competition, but its use leaves 
unresolved any adequate explanation for how and why the behaviors of contem-
porary international actors apparently vex security practitioners to the point of 
leading many to reach for a new term�
But these public discussions of gray zones highlight a policy-relevant theoreti-
cal lacuna regarding revisionist tactics short of launching conventional war that 
make it possible for revisionists to establish new status quo baselines, secure gains 
at the expense of a competitor, and shape future bargaining contexts, all without 
automatically requiring coercive diplomacy, crisis, or war� From scanning the 
range of cases and definitions of gray zones that the practitioners and scholars 
mentioned above have advanced, three interrelated ideal-type tactics emerge: 
revisionism that avoids defender commitments; employment of intermediary 
actors; and faits accomplis�
The most obvious way to pursue an advantage while avoiding war is to avoid 
challenging any commitment a defender has defined as a casus belli� In other 
words, this means engaging in only those revisionist actions that sidestep defend-
er redlines, the latter term understood as a commitment threshold for punish-
ment or reaction�11 During the early Cold War period, Henry Kissinger and others 
wrote of the need to defend the “grey areas” of the globe, meaning those countries 
the NATO umbrella did not cover (i�e�, the places where U�S� commitments were 
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sparse and of questionable credibility)�12 Kissinger’s argument was a critique of 
President Eisenhower’s massive retaliation doctrine, which Kissinger believed 
basically prevented the United States from reacting to aggression in all situations 
other than a large-scale Soviet invasion of Europe� Kissinger feared that Cold 
War adversaries around the world would pursue political and military expansion 
in areas where the U�S� willingness to wage war or incur risks of conflict had not 
been established or was less than obvious� Much more recently, it has been argued 
that competitive states historically have exploited—and have enduring incentives 
to exploit—what Daniel Altman also calls “gray areas,” challenging a defender 
not where its resolve is clearest but rather where its commitments or retaliation 
thresholds have weaknesses, which come in several varieties�13
As I describe it here, though, the tactic of redline avoidance shares more in 
common with Kissinger’s “grey areas” than Altman’s “gray areas�” The difference 
is subtle but conceptually and practically meaningful� With the tactic of redline 
avoidance, the revisionist is choosing a site of contestation involving issues or 
geographies where it views a defender’s redline commitments as being absent� 
The tactic does not constitute exploitation of a weak redline but rather exploita-
tion of the absence of one� In 1962, the U�S� redline against Soviet invasion of 
Europe was strong, while no redline existed against Soviet missiles in Cuba prior 
to the Cuban missile crisis; in other words, there was not a weak redline against 
Soviet missiles in Cuba, but rather no redline whatsoever� By contrast, Altman’s 
redline typology and corresponding “gray areas” describe revisionism that ex-
ploits loopholes in perceived redlines� Such revisionism encroaches on a redline 
without crossing it, rather than avoiding it�14 The conceptual difference can be 
seen in the prelude to the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev 
is said to have thought that there was no U�S� commitment with regard to mis-
siles in Cuba (redline avoidance), which is different from saying that he thought 
he was exploiting a U�S� commitment (redline encroachment) that was weak or 
not credible�15
For policy makers, these are two fundamentally different problems� The 
former is about vulnerabilities where one allowed an absence of commitments, 
while the latter is about vulnerabilities arising from flaws in established commit-
ments� To be sure, exploiting weak redlines is one way to challenge the status quo 
without resorting to war; that is a basic argument not only in this article but in the 
recent research on redlines�16 However, as the historical example above illustrates, 
challenging the status quo while avoiding redlines altogether is tactically differ-
ent from encroaching on weak redlines; I treat the latter (encroaching on weak 
redlines) as a subset of the discussion on faits accomplis, below�
One way that revisionists avoid a defender’s redlines—a method that also can 
be used to encroach on a defender’s redlines without crossing them—is through 
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the second revisionist tactic: employing intermediaries� From prisoners’ dilem-
mas to games of chicken, theories of competition in international relations often 
employ a simplifying assumption of dyadic interaction�17 But many conflicts 
short of conventional war involve an aggressor’s third-party agents, not conven-
tional military forces�
Intermediaries in international competition are conceptualized in at least 
three ways in the literature� First, in proxy wars, intermediaries are secondary 
states or rebel groups whose war fighting benefits, or at least is consonant with, 
the goals of a primary state� States resorting to proxy wars do so in part because 
they find themselves in rivalry or strategic competition with another state, yet are 
deterred by the prospective costs of fighting a war directly; this is also a prevailing 
logic of covert war�18
Second, in the literature on third-party or “indirect” deterrence, intermediar-
ies are those actors to whom pressure is applied so that they may in turn apply 
pressure to still another actor�19 A common, if faulty, argument about how best to 
pressure North Korea has been to pressure China, which has unique economic 
leverage over North Korea and might succeed in coercing North Korea where the 
United States and South Korea have not�20
A third conceptualization of intermediaries that more commonly fits the kind 
found in the gray zone of conflict comes from the literature on state-sponsored 
terrorism�21 Intermediaries in this context are the agents in a principal-agent 
relationship and the state is the principal or patron, but the tie between them 
is an ambiguous or tenuous one� Agents in this sense sometimes are described 
colloquially as “little green men” or the “fifth column” to capture the deniable 
manner in which a patron may employ them�22 They can be any agents of a state 
that traditionally do not play a signaling role in executing the “high politics” of 
international security, such as law-enforcement authorities or guerrillas, or more-
autonomous actors that implicitly act on behalf of an aggressor, including terror-
ist groups, computer hackers, fishermen, and even members of social movements 
or an ethnically bonded diaspora�
The distinction is meaningful because the use of militaries activates instru-
mental logics of either deterrence or battlefield efficiency between competitors�23 
Intermediaries, by contrast, do not activate such logics as readily, which, as dis-
cussed below, is one of the reasons their presence both can “stack the deck” of 
interaction in favor of defender restraint and can generate distinct risks of miscal-
culation or blowback�24 Thus, China’s coast guard or its maritime militia—the lat-
ter is affiliated with the central government but is not a war-making instrument 
of the state—may engage in confrontational actions in the East or South China 
Sea� Such actions force defenders to ponder the extent to which—especially 
in contrast with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy under comparable 
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circumstances—they reflect a deliberately aggressive design by Beijing�25 The 
military instrument brings with it certain kinds of expectations and implied risks 
with regard to confrontation, while the actions of other agents of a state introduce 
at least the possibility of doubt about the logic governing their behavior�
An aggressor that employs an intermediary obscures culpability by obscuring 
identification of authority, assumptions of control, or intent� From the defender’s 
perspective, the use of intermediaries in any competitive interaction raises logi-
cal questions about these same factors� If the defender cannot know the answers 
to these questions with any great degree of confidence, then neither can it know 
whom to influence or how to do so�
Intermediaries in conflicts short of war are not passive or trivial actors� Often, 
they present defenders with a fait accompli, which is to say an “initiative that 
forces the opponent to initiate” or to stand aside�26 Faits accomplis have a long 
history in international politics, and in crisis bargaining in particular, but prior 
to recent research by Ahmer Tarar and Daniel Altman they were entirely untheo-
rized�27 This may be due in part to what faits accomplis are: unilateral acts that 
come at the expense of a competitor’s preferences�28 They often present defend-
ers with the choice of taking no direct action (i�e�, backing down) or initiating a 
coercive interaction; in other words, they can, but do not inherently, constitute 
coercive actions themselves� Because faits accomplis often sidestep deterrence 
and compellence and leave the decision to initiate such hostilities to the defender, 
paradoxically—and sometimes intentionally—faits accomplis potentially trans-
form a defender into a seeming aggressor�29
As illustrated in the figure, faits accomplis can be gradualist or decisive, and 
coercive or noncoercive� In the coercive bargaining literature, some gradualist 
fait accompli strategies are what Thomas C� Schelling famously called “salami 
Highly Coercive
Egypt’s nationalization of the 
Suez Canal (1956)
Russian intervention in Crimea 
(2014)
China’s land reclamation in the 
South China Sea (2013−present)
North Korean provocations
(1966−present)
Decisive
How Decisive?
How Coercive?
Gradual
Noncoercive
VARIATIONS OF THE FAIT ACCOMPLI
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tactics”: deliberate erosion of a defender’s redline by consciously attempting to 
stay below the perceived threshold for reaction�30 Salami slicing presents defend-
ers with situations, “none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but 
which add up over time to a substantial change in the strategic picture�”31 While 
“not quite invoking the commitment,” in other words, they manage to make “the 
commitment appear porous and infirm�”32 Faits accomplis that take the form of 
salami tactics are revisionist attempts to exploit a weak redline, providing specific 
revisionist paths of least resistance (or windows of opportunity, if one prefers), 
considering the nature of the redline’s weakness�33
But faits accomplis need be neither gradual nor coercive� They also can be 
decisive; alternatively, they can involve no threat making or redline erosion 
whatsoever� For example, a sudden military operation aimed at quickly seizing 
and occupying a swath of territory presents a defender with a fait accompli that 
is decisive, not gradual� One recent study found that territorial acquisition by fait 
accompli (defined as a unilateral, noncoercive “landgrab”) is both more common 
and more successful than attempts to acquire territory by coercion�34 Another 
study, also focusing narrowly on military faits accomplis that pursue decisive 
“landgrabs,” finds that they are often the consequence of a commitment problem 
in which the revisionist believes the defender will undertake military prepara-
tions (regardless of promises to the contrary) that would nullify or raise the costs 
of a fait accompli�35 Moreover, states may perform research and development on 
advanced weaponry or deploy military assets in outer space as ways to shift the 
military balance without intending to challenge or threaten an adversary; in such 
instances, an adversary not only may not have thought to introduce a redline but 
may not know whether such a situation warrants one�36
Even the convergence of these tactics—intermediaries and faits accomplis, 
put to the service of exploiting ambiguities in defender commitments or avoid-
ing defender commitments altogether—does not make gray zones a category of 
conflict that stands independent of coercive diplomacy, hybrid conflict, or other 
types of bounded conflict interactions short of conventional war� Such an un-
derstanding would conflate conflict tactics with conflict types� Instead, the gray 
zone, should the term be used at all, reflects a convenient description of normal 
strategic competition� The tactics we find in the gray zone are deployable in any 
competitive setting�
REVISIONIST TACTICS AND CONFLICT DYNAMICS
As a starting point for understanding how these tactics matter, this section draws 
on the applicable literature as well as classic historical examples to construct 
plausible claims about their causal implications�
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How Avoiding Redlines Affects Conflict
There are several ways in which aggressors can challenge the status quo while 
encouraging defender restraint� The most prominent way of doing so while 
avoiding war is by steering clear of a defender’s clearest redlines entirely, pressing 
only where one believes defender commitments do not exist� Deterrence theory 
long has identified an inherent trade-off when it comes to threat making: when 
a defender establishes clear redlines for the sake of credible deterrence, “there is 
a good possibility of a gap emerging�”37 An adversary may interpret issues and 
areas that go unmentioned as permissible arenas for actions that will be less likely 
to trigger retaliatory commitments� When Secretary of State Dean Acheson out-
lined the “defense perimeter” of U�S� commitments in Asia in January 1950, he 
failed to mention Korea� This proved to be one of several reasons North Korea’s 
Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin thought North Korea could in-
vade South Korea quickly; by leaving Korea out of the articulation of U�S� defense 
commitments, Acheson inadvertently may have signaled that North Korea could 
advance there without risking a larger war with the United States�38 This example 
illustrates how an opportunistic aggressor may target issues and geographies 
where defender commitments are absent, expecting that it can do so at less cost 
and risk� Acheson’s announced defense perimeter and the outbreak of the Korean 
War constitute merely one of the best-known examples in a twentieth century full 
of them�39 Kissinger’s 1955 call to defend “grey areas” (that is, non-NATO areas 
of U�S� interest) was an explicit recognition of this kind of possibility�40 The reac-
tive temptation for defenders facing this exploitive tactic is simply to add new or 
clarifying commitments to cover those ambiguities where an adversary may as-
sert itself� But such a defender strategy involves high risk and brings diminishing 
returns, because there comes a point at which the accumulation of commitments 
to employ force logically outstrips the ability to maintain them credibly� Such an 
aggressor tactic thus encourages the defender to be discerning, and somewhat 
restrained, about adding new commitments or clarifying existing ones�
Before its eruption into the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev’s attempt to place 
nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba can be seen as an initially noncoercive move in-
tended to shift the military balance by taking action in an area other than Europe, 
where commitments were more entrenched� The Soviet Union, in other words, 
may have believed “that there was no tacit commitment on Kennedy’s part to 
oppose such a deployment�”41 By shifting the military balance in its favor while 
avoiding U�S� redlines, the Soviet Union was attempting to gain a geostrategic 
advantage without engaging directly in a coercive contest�
But, as with North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, Khrushchev’s decision 
to place Soviet missiles in Cuba illustrates the risk an aggressor incurs when 
altering the status quo in places and on issues where defender commitments 
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seem unclear, weak, or absent: underestimating the defender’s resolve� In neither 
case did the aggressor seek to precipitate what became the Korean War and the 
Cuban missile crisis, respectively, but in neither case was the United States will-
ing simply to allow the aggressor’s actions to stand� Even though by using this 
tactic—challenging the status quo in a manner that avoids a defender redline, 
while targeting issues or areas high on uncertainty and low on precedent— 
aggressors aim to achieve gains while avoiding conflict, doing so risks crisis or 
conflict anyway� In cyberspace, for example, there are indications that U�S� stra-
tegic ambiguity about cyber attacks may reflect the uncertainty of U�S� officials 
about the conditions that might lead to U�S� retaliatory attacks�42 If the United 
States is unclear about its own retaliatory thresholds, then surely state-sponsored 
hackers in China, North Korea, and elsewhere are as well�
How Faits Accomplis Affect Conflict
Regardless of whether a fait accompli is coercive or noncoercive, decisive or 
gradual, it presents defenders with incentives either to back down or to take 
coercive action themselves� The deliberate use of faits accomplis, as opposed to 
some other type of aggressive action, involves an implicit wager that the action 
taken will encourage restraint and not provoke defender retaliatory measures�43
It can do this in at least two different ways� The first is by moving too quickly 
and completely for the defender to react because of material or capability con-
straints� North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea was intended to do just this, 
presenting the United States with a situation on the ground that was so far gone 
it could not plausibly be reversed� In his memoir Khrushchev recalls that Stalin’s 
decision to permit Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea was premised on the 
assumption “that if the war were fought swiftly � � � intervention by the USA could 
be avoided�”44 The second way a fait accompli encourages defender paralysis is by 
making the action such a small or gradual challenge to a defender’s redline that 
the defender finds it difficult to justify mustering a retaliatory response� Such 
gradualism can be seen in China’s repeated intrusions into the airspace surround-
ing the highly disputed (with Japan) Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China 
Sea� Each such occurrence forces the Japan Self-Defense Forces to scramble fight-
er aircraft to intercept and turn back the intruders� Between 2006 and 2014, the 
frequency of such high-friction encounters in the areas surrounding the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands has risen steadily, reaching a peak of 464 aerial intrusions in 
2014�45 Each incident is too minor for Japan to base thereon a credible threat of 
retaliation, but such incidents nevertheless repeatedly put Japan in the position 
of either scrambling fighters to confront intruders or simply allowing Chinese 
intrusions to go unchecked� The latter would establish a de facto precedent of 
Chinese presence in Japan-administered territory against the latter country’s will�
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When deployed during noncrises and nonwar situations, faits accomplis thus 
“stack the deck” of strategic interaction in favor of the aggressor at the expense of 
the defender’s preferences by encouraging restraint in the latter� But, as with any 
wager, there is a risk of being wrong� With faits accomplis, from the aggressor’s 
perspective, the cost of being wrong takes the form of unintentionally triggering 
coercion or retaliation from the defender� Inadvertent conflict and escalation 
are possible if an aggressor attempting a fait accompli has misjudged where a 
defender’s redline is (i�e�, what its retaliatory commitments are) or its resolve (i�e�, 
its willingness to retaliate when its redline proscription is violated)�46 From the 
defender’s perspective, the costs of inaction when presented with a fait accompli 
must be weighed against the costs of initiating retaliation and the risk of escalat-
ing a conflict� Kim Il Sung’s gamble that the United States would not intervene to 
reverse North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950 certainly ended up incur-
ring a high cost� But miscalculation-based escalation also can result from faits ac-
complis that do not involve military invasions or “landgrabs�” For instance, when 
Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser presented his famous fait accompli of 
nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956, he inadvertently catalyzed British, French, 
and Israeli coordinated war plans, leading to Israeli ground forces’ seizure of the 
Sinai Peninsula�47 Nasser’s unilateral yet noncoercive declaration proved to be a 
gamble that did not pay off for Egypt�
Even if an aggressor has not misjudged an adversary’s likely reaction to a 
proximate incident, there are broader risks from second-order or ancillary reac-
tions� Between the United States and North Korea during the 1960s, for example, 
North Korean salami tactics, in the form of small-scale violence, repeatedly were 
met with either U�S� decision paralysis or conciliatory offers to resolve an incident 
peacefully�48 While this might be framed as North Korea besting the United States 
in a string of specific incidents, the larger history worked against North Korea� 
The United States may have been “boxed in” to de facto acceptance of North 
Korea’s violent provocations—because the incidents were too minor to warrant 
retaliation—but it coped with that unsavory reality in ways anathema to North 
Korean interests: by redoubling its commitment to ally South Korea, enhancing 
the U�S� military presence on the Korean Peninsula, providing greater financial 
assistance to South Korean military modernization, and conducting grander 
military exercises�49
How Intermediaries Affect Conflict
The presence of intermediaries in conflict interaction represents either some 
degree of delegation of authority from a principal to an executing agent or the de-
ceptive appearance of delegated authority� From a defender’s perspective, it may 
be unclear what degree of autonomy an intermediary has, the degree to which 
an intermediary is compliant with an aggressor’s prerogatives, and whether there 
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even is a principal-agent relationship between the aggressor and the intermedi-
ary� Consequently, the presence of aggressor intermediaries structures strategic 
interaction in several ways that are potentially favorable to the aggressor—but 
with distinct risks�
One way, similar to the fait accompli approach, is to induce defender inaction 
or decision paralysis by complicating the task of identifying retaliatory targets� 
Attribution, a common problem with cyber attacks in particular, is essential 
for mounting retaliation or countercoercion�50 And even if a defender can link 
intermediaries and their patrons together accurately, ambiguities remain about 
the extent to which an intermediary is a mindless agent of a patron as opposed to 
a rogue actor�51 The United States quickly traced the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures 
Studios to intermediaries acting on behalf of the North Korean regime, but it was 
not immediately clear what exactly that meant�52 Were the perpetrators Chinese 
hackers for hire? Were they government operatives executing orders received 
from the regime in Pyongyang? Or were they autonomous actors launching at-
tacks and making threats out of symbolic or identity solidarity with the North 
Korean regime?
The use of intermediaries also can enhance the credibility of aggressor threat 
making if it ties the hands of an aggressor, which can induce defender restraint 
through successful coercion� Daniel L� Byman and Sarah E� Kreps claim this as a 
major motivation of state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East�53 Iran employs 
Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups as intermediaries against Israel in part 
to credibly threaten retaliation for any and all grievances with Israel, whereas 
the relatively poor state of Iran’s military does not allow it to make such blanket 
retaliatory threats directly�54 Credible threats of retaliation come in the form of 
support to intermediaries because direct interstate conflict per se would not favor 
Iran, in contrast with terrorist groups that are openly at war with Israel and cred-
ibly can engage in continuous retaliation if called on to do so�
A third way intermediary agents benefit the aggressor state is by giving it 
greater freedom of action through plausible deniability�55 An aggressor may seek 
openly to associate itself with, and claim responsibility for, intermediary actions, 
but only after they occur; plausible deniability allows it to take such a “wait and 
see” approach� Conversely, an aggressor may seek to distance itself from the ac-
tions of autonomous intermediaries whose actions go too far, crossing a defend-
er’s redlines, or with whose tactics they disagree� The aggressor thus may employ 
intermediaries to give itself the latitude either to claim the benefits or to avoid the 
costs of intermediary actions� The plausible deniability that intermediaries offer 
also may allow for more aggressive salami tactics than a revisionist might pursue 
using direct military force�
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Although intermediaries may skew interaction in the patron’s favor in multiple 
ways, risks of backfire or negative feedback remain� Delegating a task inherently 
involves some amount of risk (e�g�, of the agent committing unintended errors 
or taking undesirable independent actions)�56 By relinquishing direct control to 
a degree, an aggressor may have its hands undesirably tied� And when the link-
age between an aggressor and its intermediary is grounded in a shared identity 
or raison d’être, the aggressor may find it difficult to disassociate itself from the 
intermediary, should it seek to do so� States that employ relatively autonomous 
intermediaries run a risk of being “chain-ganged” into escalation of conflicts they 
sought to avoid�
Use of intermediaries also risks engendering defender reactions of retaliation 
or escalation� If an intermediary takes actions the defender finds unacceptable, 
plausible deniability may not be enough to stifle a defender’s revenge-motivated 
reaction� Decision makers are often willing to impose certainty on and form 
beliefs about situations that are fundamentally uncertain�57 Politicians in a 
defending state may feel public pressure to react quickly and forcefully and to 
find a retaliatory scapegoat even if attribution is not immediately known— 
sometimes uncertainty is no excuse for inaction� Even if an intermediary 
complies perfectly and precisely with the intent of an aggressor, moreover, it 
nevertheless may be the case that the aggressor misjudged either the defender’s 
willingness to respond or its mode of response� Escalation logically could follow 
either type of misjudgment�
DEGREES OF GRAY
As with all theoretical choices, analytic narratives constructed with a “revision-
ist tactics lens” foreground some elements over others to explain events� This is 
not to trivialize other factors, nor to claim that contexts that exclude revisionist 
tactics do not also bedevil policy makers� But there is a mismatch between the 
academic literature’s lack of emphasis on redline avoidance, intermediaries, and 
faits accomplis and policy makers’ growing concern about them�
Event Selection
The table compares several contemporary cases involving revisionism that avoids 
or defers decisions for conventional war� These specific events with these specific 
actors merit attention because they have been at the center of debates between 
critics and advocates of the term gray zone� Demonstrating that the aforemen-
tioned revisionist tactics played a nontrivial role in the unfolding of events sup-
ports both aspects of my claim about the gray-zone debate�
First, the causal logics articulated in the prior section derived in part from 
examining important historical cases in the security and strategic studies canon� 
This demonstrates that they have explanatory power in contemporary cases, 
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undermining notions that there is something new about the gray-zone security 
challenges of the present�
Second, narratives of these cases would be incomplete without accounting for 
revisionist tactics short of war, which repudiates claims that there is no explana-
tory value added in conceptualizing these tactics� Parsing any of these cases solely 
with reference to logics of coercion, conventional war fighting, or game-theoretic 
crisis bargaining not only would offer limited explanatory value but would sacri-
fice understanding of the similar role that redline avoidance, intermediaries, and 
faits accomplis played across cases�
The range of cases reveals a common tendency (regardless of whether one 
or all three revisionist tactics were employed): defender paralysis in response to 
the immediate tactic, but inevitable second-order consequences in the form of 
indirect responses�
North Korean Provocations
Twice in 2010, North Korea engaged in isolated acts of violence against South 
Korea�58 The first was a torpedo attack that sank a South Korean naval ship in 
Event Intermediaries  Involved?
Defenders Faced a 
Fait Accompli?
Aggressor Avoided 
Defender Redlines? Outcome
North Korean  
artillery attack 
(2010)
No No Yes Defender restraint, 
but adoption of 
“proactive  
deterrence” doctrine
North Korean naval 
attack (2010)
No Yes Yes Defender restraint, 
but international 
investigation
North Korean hack 
of Sony Pictures 
(2014)
Yes Yes Yes Defender restraint 
China’s ADIZ  
declaration for the 
East China Sea 
(2013)
No Yes Yes Defender restraint, 
but defiance of 
Chinese claims
Chinese artificial 
island building in 
the South China Sea 
(2013–present)
Yes Yes Yes Defender restraint, 
but increased U�S� 
patrols and regional 
security aid
Russian intervention 
in Ukraine (2014–
present)
Yes Yes Yes Defender restraint, 
but renewed U�S� 
emphasis on NATO; 
military aid to 
Ukraine
IDENTIFYING GRAY-ZONE TACTICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
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March of that year, killing all forty-six sailors on board� The second attack, eight 
months later, was an artillery barrage against South Korean–administered islands 
in a disputed maritime area near North Korea’s western coast, killing four South 
Korean marines and critically injuring a mix of dozens of marines and civilians 
on the island� North Korean conventional military forces conducted both attacks�
The torpedo attack, for which North Korea denied responsibility, was a covert 
action in international waters, taking place far from the view of any onlookers� 
The artillery attack, by contrast, was conducted close to the Korean Peninsula’s 
coast and was filmed and broadcast in near real time on South Korean news sta-
tions� North Korea not only accepted responsibility for the latter attack; it claimed 
the attack was a punitive measure in response to a South Korean military exercise 
in the area, against which North Korea had issued warnings�
The torpedo attack effectively forced South Korea to choose between doing 
nothing or retaliating despite North Korean denials of culpability� By compari-
son, the artillery attack is understood better as a coercive battlefield action, not a 
fait accompli� Both were isolated, limited attacks that fell well short of triggering 
a U�S� or South Korean invasion of North Korea, but did risk some retaliation� 
Whereas the March torpedo attack generated political controversy within South 
Korea about whether North Korea was actually responsible (a debate that pre-
vented South Korean officials from being able to retaliate), the November artil-
lery attack nearly led to South Korean punitive bombings of North Korea; these 
were avoided narrowly, only because senior U�S� officials intervened with their 
South Korean counterparts to prevent retaliation�59
Although in a crisis-bargaining sense North Korea came out of these interac-
tions unscathed and succeeded in encouraging U�S� and South Korean restraint, 
second-order consequences reified the hostility that gave rise to North Korean 
violence in the first place� The March 2010 attack led directly to an international 
investigation and the later imposition of punitive “5/24 sanctions” that cut off 
North Korea from most sources of South Korean currency�60 The November 2010 
attack, meanwhile, triggered the adoption of a South Korean “proactive deter-
rence” doctrine of preemption, acceleration of South Korean precision-strike 
missile programs, and a discourse in support of South Korea developing an inde-
pendent nuclear capability�61
Contrasting with these attacks was North Korea’s 2014 cyber attack against 
Sony Pictures Studios in response to the latter’s insulting and subversive (from 
North Korea’s perspective) movie The Interview, whose comedic plot centered 
on two journalists who assassinate Kim Jong Un� This incident featured all three 
gray-zone tactics� The hacker group, whose members called themselves the 
“Guardians of Peace,” nominally was an independent entity, yet was acting in the 
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interests of the North Korean regime�62 The group issued a number of threats—of 
a digital and physical nature—aimed at preventing the public release of The Inter-
view� Although the threats were to no avail and the movie eventually was released 
without any violence, the hackers did disrupt Sony’s computer systems and stole 
and released to the public proprietary internal company information, including 
embarrassing e-mails from Sony executives�63 The U�S� Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation eventually traced the Guardians of Peace back to North Korea, but slowly, 
and never definitively�64 To this day, North Korea refuses to take responsibility 
for the Sony hack, and some (a minority) in the technology sector in the United 
States persist in doubting North Korean culpability�65
The surreptitious intrusion into Sony’s internal information network and 
subsequent public revelation of stolen information was a coercive, decisive, and 
nonviolent fait accompli� It presented not only Sony but the U�S� government with 
multiple types of direct threats, and forced both into a position that favored not 
attempting any meaningful retaliation�
China’s East China Sea ADIZ Declaration
China long has contested the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan, which the lat-
ter administers� Every year since around 2006, China has increased the frequency 
of its attempted air and naval intrusions into the area surrounding the disputed 
islands, requiring Japan to increase the frequency with which it responds by 
scrambling fighter aircraft to escort intruding Chinese assets out of the area�66 
Some of these confrontations involve Chinese civil vessels and aircraft, but fre-
quently they have involved Chinese military assets as well� Although most of 
these confrontations have been resolved without incident, some have escalated 
to militarized crises, leading to both sides issuing redline threats� Japan, for ex-
ample, has threatened that any Chinese drone that unlawfully enters Senkaku 
airspace will be shot down, while China has counterthreatened that any shoot-
down of a Chinese drone would be an “act of war�”67
Despite the highly contested nature of the East China Sea, in November 2013 
China’s Ministry of National Defense declared an air defense identification zone 
(ADIZ) over most of the area� Imposition of an ADIZ would require incoming 
aircraft to identify themselves to Chinese authorities and, if military, to request 
permission� As with all ADIZs, a Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea would 
allow China to “identify, monitor, control, and react to aircraft entering this 
zone�”68 China also claims the right to take “defensive emergency measures” 
against noncompliant aircraft, although it has not done so—yet�69 Although 
ADIZ declarations have been common since the United States established the 
first zone in 1950, the United States and China’s neighbors view China’s ADIZ 
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as a provocative fait accompli because it was declared unilaterally, without prior 
consultation, over a maritime area that is heavily contested with Japan�70
As an act of defiance that constituted a fait accompli of its own, the United 
States flew a nuclear-capable B-52 bomber through China’s “ADIZ” only two 
days after its proclamation� The aircraft neither announced itself nor sought 
permission�71 Notwithstanding the symbolism, the B-52 flight was an isolated 
act of signaling that changed nothing with respect to China’s ADIZ declaration� 
While the United States, Japan, and South Korea do not recognize the East China 
Sea ADIZ, they have not attempted to compel China to roll it back—which pre-
serves China’s de facto “right” to enforce the ADIZ at will� A U�S� Congressional 
Research Service report assessed that China was “asserting a maximalist position, 
then seeming to back down, while preserving some incremental gain�”72 Secretary 
of State John F� Kerry accused Beijing of “an attempt to change the status quo 
in the East China Sea�”73 The ADIZ declaration involved no intermediaries but, 
from the perspective of the United States and Japan, was indeed a decisive fait 
accompli that also avoided triggering any kind of retaliatory commitments from 
either the United States or China’s neighbors�
Chinese Artificial Island Building in the South China Sea
Although not the first country to do so, China since 2013 has engaged in a rapid 
process of “land reclamation”—the construction of artificial islands—in the dis-
puted South China Sea� In less than two years, it developed more than 2,900 acres 
of “land” in a space of overlapping exclusive economic zones between China and 
other South China Sea claimants�74 Since their construction, China has posi-
tioned weapons systems and military infrastructure—including radars, artillery, 
runways, and military barracks—on them despite their being highly contested, 
and despite Chinese claims that it is not “militarizing” the islands�75
China has not issued threats in relation to these artificial islands and has not 
used them as yet to blockade others’ freedom of navigation� However, U�S� intel-
ligence officials openly express concern that China gradually is putting in place 
the physical ability to impose and enforce constraints on freedom of navigation 
through the South China Sea, should it choose to do so�76 While the United States 
maintains a commitment to freedom of navigation and open sea-lanes, that com-
mitment is open-ended and abstract� The U�S� redline concerning freedom of 
navigation is “arbitrary” and “imprecise”; the United States has issued no specific 
“redline” threat to resort to military force to fulfill such a commitment, particu-
larly in the South China Sea�77
This makes China’s land-reclamation activity a gradualist fait accompli that 
does not overstep directly any retaliatory boundaries, and is not inherently 
coercive or aggressive—even if such actions improve China’s position should 
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it take aggressive actions in the future� Any direct military action to blockade 
or attack Chinese artificial islands would require a decisive act of aggression 
disproportionate to the mundane (if strategically significant) activities of engi-
neers building artificial structures in international waters� So, while the United 
States has increased its “presence” in the South China Sea in response to China’s 
actions—including through maritime patrols, freedom-of-navigation military 
exercises, and enhanced security assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines—
none of these actions have been aimed at, nor have they had the effect of, curbing 
or rolling back China’s land-reclamation activity, which effectively establishes a 
new status quo in the South China Sea�78
Russian Intervention in Ukraine
In 2014, Russia employed all three revisionist tactics in a campaign that culmi-
nated in the annexation of Crimea, formally and formerly part of Ukraine� Al-
though the conflict had political antecedents dating back to the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, what immediately precipitated it was pro-European social forces 
in Ukraine mobilizing to oust the country’s then president Viktor Yanukovych, 
who was seen as subservient to Moscow� Within days of Yanukovych’s removal, 
Russia capitalized on Ukraine’s domestic turmoil to insert large numbers of “little 
green men”—undesignated and unidentifiable yet armed forces, widely believed 
to belong to Russian special forces—who occupied key choke points and govern-
ment buildings in Crimea, claiming to be separatists�79 Russia denied responsibil-
ity for these forces� Once the “little green men” established territorial control, a 
controversial referendum of secession was held in Crimea, which led to Russia’s 
formalized annexation of it�80
As these events evolved, in March 2014 the Donbas region of Ukraine filled 
with anti-Ukrainian protests conducted largely by members of an ethnically Rus-
sian diaspora� These pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian protests quickly militarized, 
and separatists in Donbas unilaterally declared independence from Ukraine� As 
fighting continued throughout the year and into 2015, the Russian military pro-
vided arms and logistics to the separatist forces—some members of whom were 
Russian citizens—that were fighting against the Ukrainian government� Russia 
denied any military involvement in and culpability for the events�81 Thus, under 
the cover of mobilized separatist forces in Ukraine, Russia waged what some de-
scribe as a “hybrid war” against the Ukrainian government to secure the political 
independence of a region of sovereign Ukrainian territory�82
Russia’s “little green men” perpetrated a decisive fait accompli, and they did 
so in a manner that avoided triggering retaliation or military incursions from 
NATO or the United States� U�S� and European observers were quick to recognize 
that Russia was behind the intervention of the “little green men” in Crimea�83 
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Moreover, mounting evidence increasingly made Russian involvement— 
especially in providing logistics support to the Donbas separatists—undeniable 
to outside observers, although the use of such intermediaries allowed Russia to 
continue its narrative of denial�84 But the rapid ability of the West to attribute the 
conflict to Russia did not translate into any kind of military reaction, and Russia’s 
aloofness made it virtually impossible to negotiate a cease-fire� As Russian foreign 
minister Sergei Lavrov responded when confronted with evidence of Russia’s role 
in events in Ukraine and demands for a cease-fire, “[B]efore demanding from us 
that we stop doing something, please present proof that we have done it�”85
At the end of the Cold War, the United States, along with Russia and the 
United Kingdom, agreed to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 
which afforded Ukraine underspecified “security assurances” after the latter re-
linquished the Soviet nuclear weapons remaining there�86 But this security com-
mitment was ambiguous in terms of what was required of the United States, and 
at any rate was not formalized in a treaty� In response to accusations that standing 
by while Ukraine was being ravaged damaged U�S� and NATO credibility, the 
United States was quick to point out that Ukraine was not a NATO member and 
that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine did not invoke NATO’s article 5 collective 
defense requirement; neither did the Budapest Memorandum require U�S� mili-
tary commitments to Ukraine’s security�87
As a former U�S� defense official observed, Russia effectively succeeded in 
“avoiding alliance tripwires while still subversively contributing to instability, 
unrest, and violence in Ukraine�”88 By July and August 2014, Russian rank-and-
file conventional forces, including artillery units, were crossing into Ukraine� 
Yet even when Ukrainian forces captured Russian soldiers—a seeming “smoking 
gun” of Russian culpability—Moscow persisted with its denials, claiming such 
soldiers had crossed the border by mistake�89
Subsequently, the United States and NATO, both of which were unable to do 
much beyond monitoring the situation from the outside, have strengthened their 
ties to and presence in Eastern Europe� They have attempted to make clear that 
a Crimea-like intervention would not be acceptable in a NATO country—even if 
the populations of some of them, such as Estonia, contain sizable ethnic Russian 
minorities�90
This article has attempted to examine several underlying tactics found in what 
contemporary security practitioners sometimes reference as a “gray zone” of 
conflict� Tactics other than war that seek to revise the status quo are historically 
common yet undertheorized� As an initial remedy, this article has proposed that 
avoidance of a defender’s clearest commitments, use of intermediary actors, and 
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presentation with faits accomplis are indeed old tactics, long wielded by actors 
seeking to challenge the status quo without resorting to conventional military 
force�
But just because something is not new does not mean it has been conceptual-
ized adequately� Revisionist tactics plausibly condition strategic interactions in 
important ways: they encourage defender inaction, strengthen aggressor threat 
credibility, allow aggressors to obscure culpability, and introduce proximate 
escalation risks resulting from aggressor misjudgments or intermediaries going 
rogue� As international politics becomes defined more in terms of a “diffusion of 
power” and increasingly complex interdependencies, motivations for revisionism 
are likely to endure� Such an environment may increase reliance on the tactics 
examined here�91
While the gray zone is not a new concept, as an area of concern to military 
commanders and policy makers it is understudied� This article has attempted to 
fill that gap by identifying and examining the role of tactics in conflicts short of 
conventional war, and by showing that such tactics make it possible for revision-
ists to secure gains while paralyzing defenders� This bolsters the claim that these 
tactics constitute something distinct in international security and are worthy of 
study, even if they are not new�
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Jeffrey E. Kline
It is not in the interest of Britain—possessing as she does so large a 
navy—to adopt any important change in ships of war . . . until such a 
course is forced upon her. . . . [T]his time has arrived.
ADMIRAL BALDWIN WALKER, ROYAL NAVY, 1860
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tion studies.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2017, Vol. 70, No. 3
IMPACTS OF THE ROBOTICS AGE  
ON NAVAL FORCE DESIGN, EFFECTIVENESS,  
AND ACQUISITION
 The twenty-first century will see the emergence of maritime powers that have the capacity and capability to challenge the U�S� Navy for control of the seas� 
Unfortunately, the Navy’s ability to react to emerging maritime powers’ rapid 
growth and technological advancement is constrained by its own planning, ac-
quisition, and political processes� Introducing our own technology advances is 
hindered as well� The planning and acquisition system for our overly platform-
focused naval force structure is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that 
we are ill prepared to capitalize on the missile and robotics age of warfare�
Yet by embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it rep-
resents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize 
the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages 
producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges 
and bring cutting-edge technology to contem-
porary naval warfare�1 Incorporating robotics 
technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and 
efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet’s 
capacity, lethality, and opportunity—all critical 
to strategic and tactical considerations� Doing so 
also would recognize the fiscal constraints under 
which our present force planning cannot be sus-
tained� As Admiral Walker advised above, it is now 
time to change�2
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After addressing the traditional foundations of force structure planning and 
the inhibitors to change, this article will discuss how focusing on the packages 
delivered rather than the delivery platforms would allow us better to leverage 
new technologies in the 2030 time frame� What would a naval force architecture 
look like if this acquisition strategy were employed? This article will present a 
force-employment philosophy and a war-fighting strategy based on the tactical 
offensive that align with this acquisition approach� The article does not present 
an alternative force structure with actual numbers of ships and platforms, but 
suggests a force-acquisition strategy and force-design concept that provide a 
foundational underpinning by which a specific force architecture can be devel-
oped� Three strategic force measures—reactivity, robustness, and resilience—will 
be used subjectively to assess this fleet design compared with our traditional 
programmed forces�
STRATEGIC FOUNDATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE-STRUCTURE  
PLANNING AND THE GREAT INHIBITORS
Ideally, a country’s naval force structure changes with national strategy, national 
treasure, technological advancement, and potential adversary capabilities� Na-
tional strategy provides the rationale for, purpose of, and priority among choices 
to be made in creating a fleet� National treasure defines the resources and con-
straints dictating strategic choices� New technologies provide opportunities for 
increasing fleet effectiveness, yet also may endanger fleet survival should poten-
tial adversaries expose and exploit vulnerabilities in these technologies� This is 
a complex problem even when one takes into account only these four factors; 
however, U�S� naval acquisition also is challenged by other influences that inhibit 
capitalization of new technologies�
The most powerful of these inhibitions is inertia� The existing fleet repre-
sents a capital-heavy investment by the country, one with long build times and 
lifetimes� Ships and aircraft cost billions to design, build, and maintain� They 
require a capital-intensive industry featuring heavy equipment, infrastructure, 
and a skilled workforce—all generations in the making� As a consequence, annual 
programming and budgeting decisions are marginal in nature� It is the nature of 
a large fleet to evolve slowly, as opposed to undergoing revolutionary changes 
to its composition� This is a reality the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) faces 
when considering changes to the naval forces� Each CNO’s relatively short tenure 
restricts the ability to formulate, market, and execute any maritime strategy that 
would have a comprehensive effect on ship and aircraft procurement�
Since the first six USN frigates were authorized in 1794, national internal 
political and economic factors have been another major influence on fleet 
composition� As Ian Toll illustrates well in his Six Frigates: The Epic History of 
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the Founding of the U.S. Navy, the potential windfalls for local economies when 
selected to build warships generate powerful political pressures for stabilization 
once these selections are made�3 Now just as then, senators and congressmen rep-
resenting districts that build ships (and aircraft) may be expected to defend exist-
ing programs and seek new ones, to the economic benefit of their constituents�
Next, the compartmentalization of fleet planning, budgeting, building, and 
maintenance caused by large, resource-competing bureaucracies creates a lethar-
gic environment inefficient for change� Multiple oversight agencies and bodies, 
including Congress, subject every decision that program managers make to 
often-paralyzing scrutiny� Our agility to implement rapid change is lost when the 
number of stakeholders exceeds the point at which responsibility and authority 
can be defined clearly� This is a structural issue common to all capital-heavy in-
vestment programs—the space shuttle, large multimission warships, long-range 
bombers—that require bureaucracies to design and implement them�
Finally, the very nature of a fleet’s strategic value engenders conservatism in a 
senior naval leadership faced with the options for change� This is not necessarily 
an unhealthy view, as loss of the fleet could mean loss of sea lines of communica-
tion (SLOCs), and therefore likely a war� Nonetheless, overvaluing what worked 
in the last major maritime war—which occurred in the 1940s—at the expense 
of recognizing that missile, robotics, and cyber technology has changed the pri-
mary conveyance of naval power may result in a fleet unprepared to combat an 
enemy that is not so inhibited� A less formally “capable” adversary untethered 
by allegiance to past precedent may be more flexible and therefore much more 
dangerous�
Individually, none of these influences on force structure planning can be 
dismissed� The danger is that in aggregate they result in a harmful escalation of 
commitment toward obsolete platforms, permitting only marginal changes in 
force structure amid opportunities for major technological changes� The result 
today is a brittle U�S� fleet that is susceptible to tactical surprise and slow to react 
to adversaries’ technological initiatives�4
The United States is not unique in facing these challenges� Historically, major 
changes to naval force structure have resulted from war, great technological leaps, 
or both� Rowing, ramming, and boarding vessels gave way to the naval cannon 
and sail; sail to steam; armor and rifled guns to aircraft; and aircraft to missiles� 
Now comes the dawn of a robotics age� Missiles, robots, miniaturization, hyper-
sonic technologies, and artificial intelligence give the advantage to many smaller, 
faster, and more lethal offense capabilities�5 Our challenge today is to not allow 
the restraints on current force structure planning to cede these advantages to 
potential adversaries�
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MISSILES, ROBOTS, AND AN OFFENSIVE TACTICS– 
ENABLING STRATEGY
Meeting all the desired maritime strategic capabilities—all-domain access, deter-
rence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security—while constrained 
by the budget and procurement process will require new thinking in platforms, 
weapons, and command and control (C2)� Embracing the combined capacity 
of missiles and robotics in this new era creates options for achieving a desired 
tactical end state that enables our operational and strategic goals� Strategists will 
regard this as a reversal of the traditional hierarchy of the levels of war; yet it is 
historically accurate� Technology empowers a tactical edge in maritime warfare, 
providing new operational and strategic choices� For example, the advances in 
submarine technology during the first half of the twentieth century resulted in 
a new form of commerce raiding and sea-lane interdiction� The reach of carrier 
aircraft changed the nature of naval combat in World War II� Advances in nuclear 
propulsion and ballistic-missile technology in the second half of the twentieth 
century led to a third way of offering nuclear strategic deterrence: from the 
sea depths� Parallel examples can be made for missile-carrying aircraft and the 
guided torpedo�6
Today, investing in a very “smart” long-range autonomous offensive missile 
that can outrange those of our adversary may permit us to build less-expensive, 
less-well-defended ships from which to launch them, thereby making sea combat 
more affordable� Shifting emphasis to the weapon’s ability and the force’s target-
ing capability, rather than concentrating on the platform itself, changes both the 
risk and cost calculus�
Take a specific example� Purchasing one fewer Burke-class guided-missile de-
stroyer (DDG) would allow the acquisition and operation of thirty-five to forty 
large autonomous surface vessels (LASVs)�7 If each of the latter were armed with 
eight antiship cruise missiles, from 280 to 320 offensive missiles could be dis-
persed in a contested region, as opposed to the eight missiles (canister) or at most 
ninety (vertical launch systems) that the DDG could bring to one location� Our 
potential adversaries show an appreciation for this concept by building smaller, 
missile-capable combatants, establishing a clear missile gap between themselves 
and U�S� surface forces in contested regions�8
The proposal here is not to replace all DDGs with unmanned surface vessels, 
but to refocus our investments on less expensive “payloads” delivered, kinetic or 
cyber, not the more expensive delivery platforms�9 The goal is greater affordabil-
ity paired with enhanced fleet capacity and employment options, thereby creating 
uncertainty in our potential adversaries’ strategic calculus� A stark example is a 
weapon that has huge maritime influence—changing our strategic risk calculus 
—yet has no maritime platform: the Chinese DF-21 antiship ballistic missile�
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As important as it is to focus on offensive payloads so as to provide rapid 
change capacity, doing so yields other benefits as well� It lessens many of the 
political, economic, and bureaucratic challenges associated with investing in 
capital-heavy platform programs� Since it is easier to modify weapons than plat-
forms, technological upgrades to weapons systems can be accomplished quick-
er�10 The forty-year-old Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo illustrates how an offensive 
weapon may evolve with new capabilities, even with no major modifications to 
its platform� There is also less political interest invested in weapon procurement, 
as these systems do not require the resources associated with a new submarine 
or aircraft carrier� Fewer stakeholders burden weapon design, procurement, as-
sembly, and modification� These factors enable us to modify offensive capabili-
ties quickly as new technology emerges, or to respond better when an adversary 
surprises us with a new capability� The ability to test, fail, and quickly change a 
portion of the fleet that is less capital heavy than our traditional forces is an ad-
vantage from any perspective�
This philosophy is particularly exploitable in the electromagnetic (EM) and 
cyber realm� Inexpensive, disposable unmanned aerial vehicles employing radar 
reflectors or chirp jamming systems can be more cost-effective delivery platforms 
for EM packages than a single EF-18 Growler� The introduction of inexpensive, 
credible, and numerous decoys into the air, on the surface, and undersea also 
is enhanced by the robotics age’s ability to deliver confusing effects with little 
risk to manned systems� In defense, developing left-of-launch effects against 
an adversary’s surveillance systems—countertargeting—need not be expensive, 
and, if synchronized with the movement of actual forces, mitigates risk to sailors 
operating in contested areas�
In other words, when building a fleet for contested environments while op-
erating under real financial constraints, our investments should concentrate on 
technologies that enhance the right side of our offensive kill chain and enable us 
to disrupt the left side of an adversary’s kill chain prior to his launch� Building 
kinetic weapons for offense and nonkinetic weapons for defense are more cost-
effective options than building multimission, hardened, and therefore expensive 
platforms� Robotic vehicles for delivering these weapons put the focus of warfare 
close to the enemy and farther from us�
We are not there yet� If resource allocation is a mirror of strategic choices, in 
the president’s fiscal year 2017 Defense Department budget, of the $183 billion al-
located for modernization (which includes procurement and research and devel-
opment), about 40 percent is allocated for aircraft procurement and shipbuilding, 
less than 8 percent for munitions�11 Substantial change, involving Congress and 
the Navy Department, will be required to move past procuring a platform-centric 
force to procuring a sensor/weapon-centric force� However, we are beginning to 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   67 4/21/17   8:35 AM
72
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
 6 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
explore the value of naval offense in employing our current fleet, and this, com-
bined with opportunities presented in the robotics age, provides the opportunity 
to affect positively both fleet architecture and fleet design�
A TAILORED MARITIME OPERATIONAL AND  
ACQUISITION CONCEPT
Faced with real challenges to sea control by emerging competitors, we are re-
learning the basic tenet that offense is the most cost-effective form of naval 
warfare—in both acquisition and employment� Our surface navy is exploring 
distributed lethality, an offensive operational concept enabled by the missile age, 
and its principles are being adopted for a distributed fleet, with enhanced lethal-
ity and targeting capabilities across the force and across multiple domains� We 
find that the range of an offensive missile matters, but only if its reconnaissance 
and targeting system holds the advantage over a potential adversary’s reconnais-
sance and targeting system� As a result, we are reinvigorating EM warfare for 
surveillance, deception, and countering rival EM systems� Employing some old 
Cold War tricks enhanced with new technologies, we are considering seriously 
the use of and training in methods to find, target, and kill in an EM “night” (i�e�, 
when advanced surveillance and targeting systems are available to neither side)�12 
These are necessary steps to provide an immediate credible threat, and therefore 
a deterrent, to potential adversaries’ adventurism in regions we hold to be critical 
to our national interest�
Yet we cannot abandon tactical and operational defense and still maintain 
use of the oceans� Only in an ideal Mahanian total battle fleet–on–battle fleet 
engagement, in which all an enemy’s sea-command capabilities are defeated in a 
single massive exchange, can offense achieve sea control� The twentieth century 
showed this idea to be limited to the age of sail, if it applied even then� Preserv-
ing SLOCs and associated logistic-hub availability will require defense against 
ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and torpedoes, mines, and guns� Our 
countersurveillance, countertargeting, and close-in soft-kill systems become as 
critical as our hard-kill systems� Dedicated multimission platforms still will be 
required to defeat an enemy’s attacks across our sea and air logistics lines�
For the past forty years, the cost-effective way to provide both offensive and 
defensive capabilities at sea has been to leverage economies of scale by placing 
as much multimission capability as possible in a ship hull� Our advanced Aegis 
Burke-class DDGs are the result� Once deployed to, say, the Central Command 
area of operations, this DDG can conduct counterpiracy activities in the morn-
ing, then relocate on short notice to mount theater ballistic-missile defense in 
the afternoon� It can hunt other surface ships and defend an aircraft carrier from 
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cruise-missile attack� It is versatile, fast, and multifunctional� Operationally, it is 
limited only by its draft�
But these ships also are limited by their expense� Plus, if a war starts and we 
begin to lose them, replacement time will be problematic� In a major war at sea, 
we may find that our cost-effective peacetime strategy of concentrating on econo-
mies of scale has created a situation of “too many eggs in one basket�” The loss of 
a DDG while conducting an independent offensive surface action becomes a loss 
of missile and air defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and escort capacity to 
the fleet—as well as a highly skilled crew�
In the past we addressed economic constraints that prevented our entire fleet 
from consisting of advanced multimission ships by building a “high-low” mix, 
incorporating a few special-mission ships to conduct mine countermeasures and 
logistics� We envisioned the “low” ships in the mix filling the constabulary and 
escort duties farther from harm’s way during times of conflict� But if we consider 
distributed lethality and the advantage of the offense, combined with advances 
in unmanned systems, autonomy, and longer-range, smarter missiles, a new op-
portunity for an economical fleet mix emerges� Its fleet design is the opposite of 
the traditional high-low mix: we would employ smaller, cheaper offensive plat-
forms to operate forward, and larger sea-control ships to defend against our ad-
versaries’ advanced sea-denial capabilities�13 A fleet employment of such a force 
results in finding and destroying the enemy with offensive systems that are more 
numerous, less expensive, and lower manned�14 They will be the sea-denial force� 
More-expensive defensive platforms will be deployed in areas of vital interest, or 
to protect high-value ships and convoys that are within the enemy’s reach�15 This 
“protection” force will be the sea-control force� The adversary cannot disregard 
our threat of offensive force to focus on attacking our interests while we have 
placed the best multimission ships to defend those interests� This is distributed 
lethality combined with smart defense�16
As the distributed lethality concept evolves into distributed maritime op-
erations and multidomain concepts, the offsetting of constraining budgets with 
opportunities in new technologies will nudge us naturally toward this mixed 
approach� Offensive antiship missiles are becoming smarter and our adversaries 
have learned to employ them in various ways: from shore, shipping containers, 
bombers, and missile boats� Our own offensive fleet could be just as versatile, 
composed of missile corvettes paired with missile-equipped LASVs working 
in coordination with undersea systems and long-range bombers armed with 
hypersonic missiles� The objective of the components of this force is to close 
silently and deceptively; deliver their missiles, torpedoes, mines, or cyber pack-
ages; then retire or, if unmanned, stay as a reconnaissance node, if desired�17 This 
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concept leverages technological advances in missiles, unmanned systems, and 
countertargeting methods to provide a threat more credible, practical, useful, 
and economical� (In a calculus of value, a commander is more willing to risk what 
he or she values less; the more so when its capabilities nonetheless enjoy his or 
her confidence�) Our traditional fleet primarily will fill the role of the protective 
force, using strike when necessary to kill threats advancing toward our SLOCs�
This concept is an operational expression of tactics that Arleigh Burke devel-
oped during the Solomons campaign� Commodore Burke championed sending 
the small, maneuverable destroyers ahead of the battle line to conduct coordi-
nated torpedo attacks� Frederick Moosbrugger executed these tactics at Vella 
Gulf, and Burke did so at Cape Saint George� Burke’s fighting doctrine of simplic-
ity, surprise, and delegation of authority also provides the tenets for employing 
today’s offensive force� And, like Burke’s skillful employment of radar to provide 
a tactical edge, the offensive force will be enabled with the latest targeting, coun-
tertargeting, and killing technology as it becomes available�18 A characteristic of 
light, inexpensive delivery platforms is their ability to be upgraded quickly and 
cheaply through payload replacement or, if desired, whole-platform change-out�
As the sea-control force evolves through retirement of the top-end multimis-
sion platforms, it too will become more tailored by employing the latest tech-
nology to counter specific threats, although, by the nature of its purpose, it will 
remain multimission in character� For example, theater ASW ships still will be 
required to protect themselves from submarine-launched antiship cruise mis-
siles, and escort duty will require some form of area defense from all threats�
During more-peaceful times, the offensive force can fill peacetime constabu-
lary duties and engagement exercises in forward regions� But dividing a force 
into offense and protective defense elements is a war strategy, not a peacetime 
maritime security strategy�19 Building a portion of the force dedicated to offense, 
exercising and testing tactics using new technologies in robotics and automation 
in this force, and engaging allies in its employment signal serious intentions on 
our part to prepare for actual combat and the willingness to accept some losses� 
As a result, the new, offensively disposed force provides a stronger deterrence�
The evolution to a tailored fleet from our current force will be more effective 
and less expensive than simply adding offensive capability to each new ship built 
in a total multimission force� The tailored fleet will distribute offense to more-
numerous platforms, while concentrating defense on areas of vital importance to 
maintain the true strategic end of our nation’s Navy: use of the seas� Such a fleet 
provides a way to distribute offensive lethality economically and to distribute de-
fense efficiently� Making the offensive force both lethal and sufficiently resilient 
to ensure its deterrent credibility is addressed next�
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WEB FIRES, FOOTBALL,  
AND ACCELERATED CUMULATIVE WARFARE
In a 2016 report to the CNO, Strategic Studies Group (SSG) 35 identified the 
next “capital ship” as the network of machines and humans�20 It recognized that 
emerging technology enables a multitudinous, disaggregated force of manned 
and unmanned systems to challenge adversary situational awareness and target-
ing� It is the end vision of a sensor/weapon-centric force and describes a way to 
employ the offensive fleet� But, in this model, what now is a capital ship? Under 
the traditional definition, it is the most heavily armed and powerful warship, one 
of the first rank in size and armament�21 The capital ship is the main conveyance 
of naval power� The SSG implicitly selected the “main conveyance of combat 
power” definition to describe its network of systems and concept of employ-
ment� However, if the main conveyance of naval power is defeated, so is the Navy� 
Capital ships can be viewed as a naval center of gravity� In a network of manned 
and unmanned systems, the network becomes the naval center of gravity—and 
therefore a target of interest to an adversary�
Like the SSG’s network, the maturing “web fires” or “netted fires” concept 
is a vision of netted sensors, shooters, and communications linked together to 
provide multiple options in executing detect-to-engage sequences across an area 
of operations� Information will be ubiquitous and accessible to all sensor and 
weapon operators via a web construct, linked through various methods of mesh 
networks, burst transmissions, and traditional communication channels resis-
tant to enemy jamming and interference�22 The mesh network “capital ship” is 
designed to survive against interference and intrusion, just as the battleship was 
armored to survive against rifled rounds� It will enable distributed operations or 
massing of fires across all domains, including the human domain� It provides the 
surveillance and information advantage needed to employ long-range weapons 
before an adversary does� This web fires concept will be enriched by the use of 
unmanned systems, smart weaponry, and autonomy� It is the natural technologi-
cal evolution of the Soviets’ reconnaissance-strike complex�23 It is the realization 
of the third offset, as envisioned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work�24 
It is the implementation of the SSG network of machines and humans�
Then the fighting starts� How battle resilient the web fires and distributed 
forces will be depends on the technology that enables them; on the C2 and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and tactical philosophy 
envisioned when the elements are built; and on the sailors who operate them� 
The United States cannot be assured of technological superiority in the future, 
so our Navy must retain war-fighting methods that do not assume assurance 
of continuous information to all elements of the force� It must create a force 
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design—defined as the way we fight—to leverage the greatest advantage of Amer-
ican forces: individual command initiative and innovation in the face of adversity�
Web fires and a distributed force to be used as the offensive or sea-denial 
force should be built from the bottom up, not from the top down, meaning that, 
if necessary, every manned node in the web can act independently as a scout, 
commander, and shooter within its own area of responsibility� This decentralized 
execution is not a new concept for U�S� naval forces (every submariner will recog-
nize the C2 concept), but unless the web is built with self-reliant, capable nodes 
from the start, we may not be able to implement fully a command philosophy of 
distributed decision making, particularly if we must fight in the electromagnetic 
night� “Offboard” information provided by the web, or subelements of the web, is 
then viewed as an enhancer, but not necessary to employ weapons� The offensive 
force will be network enabled, not network dependent�
Employing the offensive fleet as a distributed force comprising self-sufficient 
weapons-launch platforms, augmented by web fires’ off-platform information 
when available, achieves a highly resilient force structure� In a fight, the force net-
work leverages a strategy of accelerated cumulative warfare, relying on individual 
engagements to create the desired emerging operational and strategic effects�25 It 
confounds an adversary by offering a multidomain, independent, dispersed, and 
offensively oriented challenge to defeat� This foundational philosophy turns the 
focus to tactical offense, reorients acquisition from platforms to weapons (kinetic 
and nonkinetic), and accelerates employment of technologies in missiles and ro-
botics� It leads to a more numerous force composed of smaller platforms, as John 
Arquilla envisioned in his 2010 Foreign Policy article “The New Rules of War�”26
In execution, such an offensive force resembles an offensive football squad� Af-
ter a play is called, each player proceeds to his assigned area, with full knowledge 
of his role in the called play� No communication is required after the ball is hiked� 
Although everyone has a role, each, if necessary, also can carry the football, run 
for a touchdown, or tackle� If the quarterback views new information after the 
play is called, a short audible at the line may change the play� Employment of the 
offensive fleet in a distributed force is similar� Pairs of delivery systems may move 
into position on the basis of commander’s intent and up-to-date intelligence; 
no communication is required� If an audible is called, it can be communicated 
through brief signals in code along short-burst, mesh-network paths�27 And each 
player, if necessary, can target and shoot independently within his or her area of 
responsibility�
The emergent effect of this cumulative strategy is sea denial close to the 
enemy’s objectives, with or without a continuous C2 network� This achieves 
the intent of both the web fires and manned-and-unmanned network concepts 
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without dependency on an actual network, thereby eliminating a possible single-
point vulnerability for the enemy’s attention� This enhances force resiliency and 
increases each unit’s survivability�
ASSESSING THE CONCEPT
For a comprehensive quantitative assessment of a future naval force, we would 
need a complete force architecture with specific numbers of ships, aircraft, sub-
marines, weapons, unmanned platforms, facilities, and basing locations� We also 
would need a concept of employment, operations, doctrine, and tactics for the 
force architecture—a force design� These types of studies are conducted cycli-
cally, with the most recent set requested by Congress and delivered to it in 2017�28
The intent of this article, however, is to present a foundational precept on 
which to build both a fleet architecture and a fleet design: seeking to increase the 
fleet’s offensive power and ability to adapt by leveraging the robotics age’s emerg-
ing technologies in kinetic and nonkinetic warheads, missiles, and platforms to 
deliver them� In lieu of a detailed quantitative assessment, a subjective overview 
of the concepts will be discussed using more-strategic metrics� Although many 
metrics could be selected to assess alternative future naval force structures, as its 
strategic litmus tests this analysis will use reactivity, robustness, and resilience� 
For this purpose they are defined as follows:
• Reactivity is a fleet’s ability to capitalize quickly on new technology advance-
ments and react to a “capability surprise” from a potential adversary�
• Robustness is a fleet’s ability to be relevant across a variety of futures that dif-
fer in national priorities, geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions, maritime 
strategies, and conflict scenarios�
• Resilience is a fleet’s ability to sustain damage in a particular future and 
conflict scenario while still accomplishing national objectives� Resilience is a 
subset of robustness, and is similar to the concepts addressed in current Navy 
staff analyses conducted to assess programmed fleet capabilities�
Reactivity
Much of the foregoing highlights the characteristics necessary for a payload-
focused force to be more adaptable than the current acquisition program’s ex-
pensive, long-lived, multimission ships and aircraft� By increasing the proportion 
in the mix of smaller (whether unmanned or manned single-mission) delivery 
platforms, we increase a fleet’s reactivity� Missile seekers, sensors, software, and 
unmanned systems can be replaced or modified, tested, corrected, retested, and 
introduced into the fleet with fewer challenges than a multimission destroyer�
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The former lend themselves to advantages in maintenance and repair as well, 
with less nonavailability time fleet-wide� For example, when a DDG is in dry 
dock availability, the fleet loses all its mission areas� This is an aspect of the “too 
many eggs in one basket” finding in our previous wartime example� In contrast, 
when a single-mission platform is undergoing maintenance, the fleet loses only 
that one mission� In addition, numerous smaller platforms allow a greater por-
tion of the fleet to be forward deployed while the remaining force is being up-
dated in rear areas�
Robustness
Although the ability to perform the enduring missions of strategic deterrence, 
protecting SLOCs (sea control), denying adversary sea communications (sea de-
nial), and projecting power from the sea is desirable in naval forces, the capabili-
ties and capacities of a nation’s navy to exercise these missions are influenced by 
the political will, economic resources, and global power aspirations of its people� 
These can change faster than the capital-intensive, long-lived, multimission ships 
and submarines of our programmed force� A comprehensive assessment of a fleet 
architecture’s robustness or utility across several international political and eco-
nomic environments—with various competing national strategies and possible 
conflicts—will involve extensive future scenario planning to assess strategic risk� 
For brevity, only general observations are made here�
Our current programmed force is heavily invested in complex multimission 
platforms that employ advanced technologies, mainly in defense� It seeks to 
optimize the fleet’s influence in a future that is a projection of our current fiscal 
and political environment, with operational concepts born during World War II� 
Although any robust U�S� fleet will have some of these platforms, allocating too 
large a share consumes and locks in future fiscal resources for maintenance, man-
ning, training, and operations� In addition, if the fleet is successful in deterring 
the very-high-end conflicts for which these platforms are built, those platforms 
may find themselves conducting missions for which they are not well suited, 
such as when cruisers conduct counterpiracy operations� Worse, if fiscal con-
straints become onerous, the expense of operating these platforms may become 
prohibitive, so the only affordable strategy becomes to employ them as a “fleet in 
being”—tied to the pier� Adding to the mix more smaller platforms, both manned 
and unmanned, is a cost-effective way to provide policy makers with design op-
tions for fleet employment, reconfiguration, and basing� A core portion of the 
fleet comprising long-lived, multimission ships remains dedicated to exercising 
sea control, while the offensive sea-denial force composed of smaller, less expen-
sive systems may grow or diminish as the national strategy and available national 
treasure vary�
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Resilience (or Toughness)
As mentioned, fleet resilience is a subset of fleet robustness� The ability of the 
fleet to sustain damage yet continue to operate in a contested environment 
against an adversary may be achieved in two major ways: build in a vigorous 
damage-containment design through redundancy and compartmentation in 
individual platforms, or have many platforms�
Advanced weaponry’s ability to inflict a mission kill makes building individual 
ship resilience challenging and costly� Having many ships in a fleet also imposes 
costs, but can be achieved if the fleet, not individual ships, is built with a redun-
dancy of smaller, mission-specific platforms organized into task groups that are 
dispersed while in contested waters�
A fleet with numerous offensive sea-denial forces, as in the fleet mix proposed 
here, would enjoy greater resilience than the current programmed force� The lat-
ter relies more on active defense and individual platform survivability to sustain 
the fleet in a contested environment, but in the missile and robotics age this will 
remain difficult and expensive to achieve and maintain�
We are in the missile age and at the dawn of the robotics age� Cyber warfare 
already has arrived in peacetime and will affect combat operations in wartime� 
Emerging technologies give us new ways to convey naval power and may allow us 
to overcome the inhibitors to changing a capital-intensive, long-lived, platform-
centric fleet�
We would begin this journey by tailoring the fleet into offensive sea-denial 
forces and protective/defensive sea-control forces� The offensive force would be 
built using manned and unmanned systems, in all domains, in relatively large 
numbers, to deliver kinetic and nonkinetic effects� This would be a “package”-
centric force, with short testing, learning, and upgrading cycles� It would be 
employed under a netted-web-fires and distributed-fleet concept, but from the 
bottom up, with each manned node capable of independent weapon employ-
ment� The manned systems, such as missile corvettes, would be built in sufficient 
numbers to conduct the mainstay peacetime presence and constabulary duties, 
in cooperation with allies�
Our traditional fleet, with its advanced multimission capabilities, would have 
the more difficult defensive or sea-control role� It too could be upgraded with 
lessons learned from the offensive force and to counter new enemy technolo-
gies� With constraining budgets, our traditional fleet would have to be somewhat 
smaller to fund the less expensive offensive fleet, but it no longer would have to 
meet the presence requirements that drove up its force numbers�
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This fast-evolving wartime fleet concept will challenge potential adversar-
ies with a close-in, lethal, yet resilient threat, while providing robust defense to 
our nation and our own SLOCs� A fleet architecture founded on leveraging the 
missile and robotics age in this manner will increase its capability to be reactive, 
robust, and resilient�
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ORGANIZATION AND INNOVATION
n 2015, the Secretary of the Navy asserted that the F-35 likely would be the last 
manned fighter aircraft the Navy would buy, and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) embarked on a Third Offset Strategy that plans to leverage unmanned and 
autonomous systems (UASs) and human-machine teams to ensure technologi-
cal superiority over potential adversaries�1 Yet in spite of significant advances in 
robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAS technology, the Navy’s unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) remain predominantly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) assets, and none are carrier based� Effective employment of UAVs by 
the Navy’s carrier air wings requires more than the acquisition of new technology, 
and without focused efforts to accelerate integration it likely will take several more 
decades before carrier-launched UAVs (CL-UAVs) are optimized across the entire 
spectrum of carrier aviation missions� Throughout history, organizational changes 
have been instrumental to enhancing the effectiveness of military technology� 
The integration of CL-UAVs can be accelerated by 
making organizational changes that facilitate the 
development of an internal constituency within the 
carrier aviation community and foster experimen-
tation and bottom-up innovation�2
It has been one hundred years since Secretary 
of the Navy Josephus Daniels authorized the 
U�S� Navy’s first investment in UAVs�3 During 
World War II, the Navy became the first service 
to use UAVs in combat, employing TDR-1 as-
sault drones at Bougainville and Balalai Islands in 
1944�4 These early UAV investments contributed 
I
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to the development of target drones in the 1920s and ’30s, then cruise missiles 
in the 1950s and ’60s� However, with the exception of these two mission areas, 
neither of which required the aircraft to return safely after a mission, naval avia-
tion’s manned aircraft have outperformed unmanned systems� Even when high 
casualty rates for reconnaissance aircraft and crews during the Cold War and 
Vietnam conflict led the U�S� Air Force to invest heavily in UAVs and satellites, 
the Navy eschewed significant investment in UAVs, especially for carrier-based 
operations�5
The U�S� military has operated UAVs continuously since World War II, and 
today all services employ UAVs in some capacity� The most extensive operational 
employment of UAVs during the twentieth century involved the Air Force’s de-
rivatives of Ryan Firebee target drones, which executed more than 3,400 recon-
naissance “sorties over North Vietnam and China in the 1960s and early 1970s�”6 
The U�S� Navy did employ UAVs, such as the QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine 
Helicopter (DASH) between 1960 and 1971 and the RQ-2 Pioneer beginning 
in 1986, but these were developed to meet narrow mission requirements of the 
surface fleet and were never integrated into naval aviation� Since the 1990s, UAVs 
have demonstrated increasing reliability and utility in combat, and have become 
integral to ISR and counterterrorism missions around the globe� The Navy has 
accumulated more than 26,000 flight hours in its two largest UAV programs, the 
MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4C Triton, but neither operates from the centerpiece 
of naval aviation—the aircraft carrier�7
There are many reasons the U�S� Navy has not fielded a CL-UAV yet, but 
certainly technological immaturity long rendered tactically effective naval UAVs 
cost prohibitive, and the additional performance requirements for carrier avia-
tion exacerbated the cost-capability dilemma that plagued nearly all large UAV 
programs in the twentieth century�8 The Navy’s dismal experience with its first 
unmanned helicopter, the QH-50 DASH, of which nearly 50 percent were lost in 
peacetime accidents, highlighted the technological shortcomings of shipboard 
UAVs and may have contributed to a bias for manned aircraft among both surface 
warfare officers and aviators�9 However, in 2004 a Defense Science Board task 
force concluded, “There is no longer any question of the technical viability and 
operational utility of UAVs,” and a 2008 study coauthored by Robert O� Work, 
now Deputy Secretary of Defense, observed that “the combat value of unmanned 
aircraft is no longer much debated�”10 A CL-UAV has been in various stages of 
research and development since 1999, but fiscal constraints and prioritization of 
other naval aviation requirements have slowed its development, even though the 
rise of great-power competitors and the proliferation of antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD) capabilities pose the most significant challenges to carrier air wing op-
erations since World War II� As DoD embarks on a Third Offset Strategy that is 
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based on human-machine teams, the aircraft carrier and its air wing—together, 
the centerpiece of U�S� power projection for nearly seventy-five years—must 
adapt to integrate CL-UAVs�
Optimizing the military effectiveness of CL-UAVs involves much more than 
the introduction of a new platform� The Navy made important organizational 
changes to sustain and improve UAV development in recent years and is on pace 
to deliver the carrier-launched MQ-25 Stingray by 2020; in a competitive fiscal 
environment, merely programming a CL-UAV is something of a bureaucratic 
accomplishment� However, it represents only one step toward realizing the po-
tential of the CL-UAV innovation, which still faces institutional and cultural bar-
riers� Organizing to support the development of a CL-UAV constituency within 
the carrier aviation community will facilitate adoption and integration of the new 
technology, and organizations that enable experimentation and exploit end-user 
innovation will accelerate the development of innovative operating concepts and 
follow-on requirements that will optimize its effectiveness�
TECHNOLOGY, ORGANIZATION, AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
The ultimate goal of pursuing and acquiring CL-UAVs, or any new military 
technology, is to increase military effectiveness�11 George Raudzens observed 
that even significant technological advantages merely influence the way wars are 
fought, rather than the “outcomes of combat�”12 Stephen Biddle has argued that 
force employment was as much the key to the success of the U�S�-led coalition 
during the 1991 Gulf War as was technological superiority�13 Although there is 
room for disagreement with these well-defended assertions, there is little doubt 
that the utility of a new weapon system in combat depends as much on the train-
ing of associated personnel, the system’s interoperability with other systems, the 
ability to support and maintain it in sufficient numbers, and the development of 
appropriate doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics as it does on the system’s 
technological superiority� Organization greatly influences all these elements, 
from the unit to service levels, and therefore is integral to optimizing the ef-
fectiveness of the technology� The hoplite phalanx that optimized the shield and 
spear and Napoleon’s corps d’armée that enhanced employment of artillery, infan-
try, and cavalry illustrate the influence of organization on military effectiveness�
Furthermore, greater technological leaps may necessitate a more significant 
departure from traditional organizational constructs to optimize employment�14 
As Edward Luttwak has argued, “If the new is a real innovation, not just a new 
model, � � � then the armed forces must change their structure to absorb it, usu-
ally by creating new units�”15 For example, the U�S� Air Force (and its predeces-
sor, the Army Air Corps) and U�S� Cyber Command were created to facilitate 
the application of new technologies to warfare� It remains to be seen whether 
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CL-UAV optimization will require new units or merely the introduction of CL-
UAV platforms into existing organizations� The U�S� Air Force created an entire 
air wing with subordinate squadrons to employ its remotely piloted aircraft, but 
also found it necessary to assign some remotely piloted aircraft squadrons to 
fighter wings� The Navy created a new squadron to operate the MQ-4C Triton as 
a subordinate command under an existing maritime patrol and reconnaissance 
wing; after originally planning independent MQ-8 Fire Scout units, it now is 
assigning the rotary-wing UAV to existing helicopter squadrons� These organi-
zational decisions are driven by considerations of cost, safety, and manpower, 
with the unstated goal of minimally disrupting current operations, but they also 
should take into account how organization will influence military effectiveness 
over the long term�
Failing to make organizational changes or making poor organizational de-
cisions can reduce the military effectiveness of new technology drastically� In 
the case of the French introduction of a carriage-mounted machine gun, the 
mitrailleuse, in 1870, poor organization not only prevented optimization of 
the weapon but completely negated its technological advantage� Prior to the 
Franco-Prussian War, the French secretly procured the mitrailleuse, which was 
capable of accurately firing three hundred rounds per minute to ranges of five 
hundred meters—a vast improvement over existing weaponry�16 However, the 
French army assigned the mitrailleuse to the artillery, largely on the basis of the 
capacity of that branch to provide the necessary logistical support (e�g�, wagons 
and horses that could transport the weapon and its ammunition), without due 
consideration to how the weapon would be employed on the battlefield or how 
its firepower could alter fundamentally the way the infantry engaged in combat� 
Although the mitrailleuse provided the French with sufficient firepower to repel 
Prussian infantry, the weapon remained with the artillery—which, in keeping 
with doctrine, was positioned behind the infantry on the field of battle�17 In that 
position, the mitrailleuse rarely could be brought to bear on the enemy without 
fratricide until the Prussians had broken through the French infantry lines� Orga-
nizational changes would have been required to provide the necessary logistics to 
the infantry or to modify artillery employment doctrine� Assigning the weapon 
system to the “wrong” branch and failing to make organizational changes negated 
the firepower advantages of the mitrailleuse and drastically reduced its military 
effectiveness�18
Effective military innovation is a continuous process that is rarely complete 
before the end user employs new technology in combat or realistic exercises� 
In the case of the mitrailleuse, the project’s extreme secrecy prevented end us-
ers from performing the experimentation and concept development that likely 
would have identified the need for organizational or doctrinal changes� There is 
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a substantial body of literature that analyzes military innovation and the factors 
that aid or hinder the adoption of technology�19 In a 2006 review of that litera-
ture, Adam Grissom highlighted a lack of analysis of bottom-up innovation�20 He 
described the U�S� Army’s experience with the Force XXI initiative to illustrate 
how users employed the system’s chat, e-mail, and moving-map capabilities in 
combat in ways the system’s designers never envisioned� He also observed that 
this end-user influence mirrored what was being discussed in scientific and tech-
nical literature about bottom-up innovation in the commercial sector�21 Since that 
observation, much of the innovation literature has used bottom-up innovation 
or adaptation to explain commercial and military changes, and it suggests an im-
portant and perhaps increasing role of the end user in technological innovation�22
In an environment of rapidly changing and proliferating technology, there is 
a natural tendency to refine a system continuously in the laboratory, attempting 
to incorporate all the latest scientific and technical advances before releasing it 
to the operators; but definitive innovations may not occur before the end user 
has adopted that technology and applied it for tactical advantage� In Grissom’s 
words, “the impact of a new technology, doctrine, or organizational schema may 
not solely be in the hands of the senior officers and civilians�”23 Those making 
organizational decisions regarding the MQ-25 Stingray and future CL-UAVs 
should consider the likelihood that innovation will continue and may accelerate 
when the UAVs are introduced to the fleet�
In the past, the U�S� Navy demonstrated a willingness to explore the potential 
of unmanned platforms to solve unique tactical or operational challenges of the 
surface fleet—and a tendency to abandon UAVs in favor of competing manned 
platforms or more reliable and affordable alternatives as soon as those were 
available� The individual decisions, such as the one to cancel the QH-50 DASH, 
were influenced by poor reliability and technological immaturity, but they also 
contributed to a clear preference for manned aircraft in the Navy� Subsequent 
technological improvements have been insufficient to ensure adoption of UAVs 
by carrier aviators, so senior leaders have found it necessary to make policy and 
organizational changes to preserve the Navy’s UAV development and accelerate 
the acquisition of supporting technologies� Additional organizational changes 
will be necessary to optimize the military effectiveness of CL-UAVs�
ORGANIZING TO SUPPORT UAV PROGRAMS
Bureaucratic organizations such as the military services tend to preserve the sta-
tus quo and resist disruptive changes� As a result, peacetime military innovation, 
if it occurs at all, usually is an evolutionary process� Adopting new approaches 
during peacetime usually requires clear recognition of a changing security en-
vironment, an outside threat, or strong top-down leadership�24 Even though the 
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United States has been at war for the past fifteen years, its air superiority has 
not been challenged, and therefore there has been no natural motivation for the 
carrier air wing to adopt disruptive innovations such as UAVs into all carrier air 
wing missions� Some have argued that the growing threat that A2/AD technolo-
gies pose to the survivability of the carrier air wing warrants greater prioritization 
of CL-UAVs�25 However, the carrier air wings plan to address the A2/AD threat 
through weapon system improvements, including next-generation manned 
aircraft, and new countermeasures rather than through integrating UAVs or 
disruptive technologies that might require a more dramatic shift in war-fighting 
concepts�
The introduction of CL-UAVs is essentially a peacetime innovation that is pro-
ceeding at an evolutionary pace and has required strong leadership to overcome 
institutional and cultural barriers to change� UAV development has benefited 
from technological advances in navigation, communications, autonomy, and 
computer processing, as well as strong support from senior DoD and congres-
sional leaders for most of the past fifteen years; but to ensure program survival, 
especially in competitive budget environments, organizational changes have been 
necessary�
In 2015, the Navy created the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Unmanned Systems (DASN UxS) and the Unmanned Warfare Systems Direc-
torate (OPNAV N99) to coordinate better the disparate efforts to develop UASs to 
support naval operations in the air, land, surface, and subsurface environments� 
These changes reflect the commitment of civilian and military leaders to achiev-
ing a technological advantage over adversaries through UASs� The centralization 
of authority and accountability for immature unmanned systems under OPNAV 
N99 removed risky investments from the budgets and portfolios of the other 
warfare directorates and provided the opportunity to expedite the acquisition 
of UASs and supporting technology and to ensure their technological readiness 
prior to commencing initial production�26 It also facilitated the authorization of 
additional funding for Navy UASs in the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Au-
thorization Act�27
However, neither DASN UxS nor OPNAV N99 is adequately manned or re-
sourced for the task of fully integrating unmanned systems�28 The establishment 
of such offices reflects the high priority senior leaders place on acquiring inno-
vative unmanned and autonomous technology, but, as discussed previously, the 
acquisition of technology is only one aspect of successful military innovation� 
Even though the Director for Unmanned Warfare Systems will play a critical 
role in evaluating prototypes and ensuring the technological readiness of UASs, 
OPNAV N99 lacks the authority over manpower and organizational decisions 
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that ultimately will determine the pace of integration and the effectiveness of the 
new technologies�
Prior to the establishment of OPNAV N99, the Navy found it necessary to 
insulate unmanned platforms from direct budget competition with manned plat-
forms� To accomplish this, the Navy assigned responsibility for unmanned pro-
grams to the Director for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6) rather than 
the Director for Air Warfare (OPNAV N98)� This organizational construct has 
been reflected formally in the Navy Program Guide since 2012, when coverage of 
all Navy UAV programs of record moved from the Naval Aviation / Aircraft sec-
tion to the Information Dominance / ISR section of the report�29 OPNAV N2/N6 
is responsible for providing ISR capabilities to support fleet and combatant com-
manders, and UAVs are an effective way to do so� OPNAV N2/N6 also is respon-
sible for the command, control, communications, and information systems that 
are essential to the performance of networked UASs�30 So it is not unreasonable 
for UAV requirements to be addressed by OPNAV N2/N6, even though OPNAV 
N98 is responsible for the majority of naval aviation programs, including aircraft 
carriers and most manned aircraft�
Locating UAVs organizationally in the OPNAV N2/N6 portfolio essentially 
reduces direct budget competition with manned aircraft (for missions other than 
ISR) and has facilitated UAV development and initial procurement� In spite of 
the challenging fiscal constraints of recent years and the need to recapitalize the 
majority of naval aviation’s manned platforms, the decision to cut or delay UAV 
programs to sustain the procurement of manned aircraft could be made only at 
the highest levels�
However, the assignment of UAV requirements to OPNAV N2/N6 perpetuates 
the perception that naval UASs are “only” ISR assets� This artificially channels 
UAVs toward the ISR mission, inherently restricting UAV integration across the 
spectrum of carrier air wing missions� This raises the question whether assigning 
the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) or follow-
on CL-UAVs to OPNAV N2/N6 is analogous to assigning the mitrailleuse to 
the French artillery in 1870� Is the Navy limiting the military effectiveness of its 
UAVs by making organizational decisions on the basis of the perception that they 
will remain ISR platforms, without due consideration of how CL-UAVs could be 
employed in other carrier air wing missions?
Perceptions about the role(s) of CL-UAVs also influence decision making 
about organization and manpower for CL-UAVs at the unit and wing levels� 
Ultimately, the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), who typically is a carrier 
aviator from the strike fighter community, will determine the structure of CL-
UAV units� CNAF balances manpower requirements to support UAVs with those 
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for aircraft carriers and manned aircraft units� The Director for Air Warfare is 
the resource sponsor for the vast majority of the naval aviation budget, including 
manpower, but, as noted previously, is not responsible for UAV programs� This 
structure, combined with the perception that UAVs are ISR-only assets, creates 
institutional challenges to prioritizing manpower and organizational support for 
UAVs, especially for missions other than ISR�31
In sum, the organizational changes the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) made in recent years were designed to ensure the con-
tinuation of UAV programs and to influence the acquisition of innovative UAS 
technology in the face of bureaucratic and institutional resistance� By separating 
UAVs from other air warfare requirements, the Navy distributed financial and 
technical risk to (and therefore resistance from) influential parts of the Navy’s 
bureaucracy� These changes will continue to facilitate the introduction of new 
unmanned and autonomous systems for ISR missions, but the institutional sepa-
ration of UAVs from much of the carrier aviation community perpetuates the 
perception of UAVs as external, ISR-only assets�
Therefore, integrating CL-UAVs across carrier aviation missions will require 
deliberate efforts to overcome institutional and cultural perceptions� Historically, 
optimization and integration of technological innovations have been facilitated 
by creating an internal constituency and conducting experimentation that en-
courages bottom-up innovation�
ORGANIZING TO DEVELOP AN INTERNAL CONSTITUENCY
In his doctoral dissertation on UAV weapon system innovation, Thomas Ehr-
hard explains that “although external advocates and agencies undoubtedly play 
an important role in weapon system development and adoption, the symbiosis 
between service and machine required for combat innovation depends on the 
mobilization of an internal constituency�”32 Ehrhard is referring to the inadequa-
cies of joint acquisition programs that plagued UAV development following the 
enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, but the same is true within the 
Navy as various internal constituencies vie for a portion of a finite budget� The 
establishment of OPNAV N99 and DASN UxS created external advocates for 
unmanned systems, but not constituents within the carrier aviation community� 
Stephen Rosen explains in Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 
Military that developing such a constituency to support a technological innova-
tion typically requires a generation—the amount of time it takes for the junior 
officers who operated the technology in combat to rise through the ranks to 
positions of influence�33
Ehrhard also argues that “full integration includes the establishment of 
dedicated units, the adoption of follow-on systems, and the development of a 
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dedicated officer constituency�”34 An internal officer constituency is critical in 
the face of cultural or institutional resistance because it can advocate for program 
continuation, explain system shortcomings, identify requirements to improve the 
technology, develop new operating concepts, and be held accountable for success 
or failure� The fact that past UAV programs have failed to develop an internal 
officer constituency within naval aviation may have contributed to their failure 
to endure�
The Navy’s first combat UAV, the TDR-1 assault drone that was used against Jap-
anese targets in the Solomon Islands in 1944, did develop an officer constituency 
—but for guided missiles, as opposed to UAVs� After successful demonstra-
tions in early 1942, Commander Delmar S� Fahrney was assigned as program 
manager of Project OPTION� Leveraging the latest television technology from 
Radio Corporation of America (i�e�, RCA), OPTION developed the TDR-1, which 
was guided remotely by pilots in the rear seats of specially configured TBM-1C 
Avengers�35 The mixed combat performance of the assault drones (thirty-one of 
fifty struck their poorly defended targets, and fewer than half inflicted meaning-
ful damage) encouraged its advocates regarding the viability of the concept but 
failed to gain the support of carrier aviators� The assault drone program was 
canceled in September 1944 owing to a combination of technological immaturity 
and competition from other platforms�36 However, the experience with Project 
OPTION developed a constituency of officers and technical experts who became 
the lead advocates for the development of guided missiles� Fahrney went on to 
command the Naval Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, California (now the Na-
val Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division), retired at the rank of rear admiral, 
and has been called the “Father of the Guided Missile�”37
In spite of eight years of operationally employing the QH-50 DASH, no inter-
nal officer constituency developed� To the contrary, DASH was rejected by both 
the surface and aviation communities� Aviators were wary of flying in proxim-
ity to the drones and often discouraged their integration into fleet operations� 
The surface community was not committed to training its personnel to operate 
the UAVs, and ship captains who employed the unreliable drones risked being 
held accountable for their many failures�38 Overcoming DASH’s technical short-
comings would have required a strong constituency to advocate for expensive 
improvements to its control systems or extensive training for personnel� The 
development of antisubmarine rockets, which gave the surface Navy the ability 
to attack submarines at range, and Light Airborne Multipurpose System (i�e�, 
LAMPS) helicopters, which provided an officer constituency that integrated 
the manned platform into fleet operations and could be held accountable for 
mishaps, offered suitable alternatives to DASH, which were preferred by both 
aviators and surface warfare officers�39 Lack of technological reliability was the 
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most important impediment to DASH’s acceptance, but without developing an 
internal officer constituency the innovation would not have been integrated into 
naval aviation even if it had been more reliable� A quick comparison between 
the respective integrations of the RQ-2 Pioneer into the Navy and Marine Corps 
further illustrates this point�
The establishment of dedicated units contributed to development of an inter-
nal constituency for small, tactical UASs (STUASs) and enabled Marine Corps 
aviation to integrate the RQ-2 Pioneer and follow-on platforms� The Navy and 
Marine Corps acquired Pioneer in the 1980s, and both employed the system dur-
ing the 1991 Gulf War� The Marine Corps established remotely piloted vehicle 
(RPV) companies under its surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence groups� 
Then, in the mid-1990s, the RPV companies became Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Squadron 1 (VMU-1)� Integration continued as two VMUs were established and 
assigned to Marine aircraft-control groups, and today they are being integrated 
into Marine aircraft groups with other fixed-wing aircraft� The Marine Corps’s 
stated objective for STUASs is for them to “play a key role in all USMC missions 
across the range of military operations, to include forward presence, security 
cooperation, counterterrorism, crisis response, forcible entry, prolonged op-
erations, and counterinsurgency�”40 This should not imply that the integration of 
UAVs into Marine aviation has been seamless, but—especially when compared 
with the Navy’s experience with the same platform—it demonstrates the value 
of establishing a constituency of dedicated units to support the UAV innovation�
The Navy, which acquired Pioneer to provide reconnaissance and targeting 
support for its battleships, employed aviators to run Pioneer detachments but did 
not establish dedicated UAV squadrons� When the battleships were decommis-
sioned, the Navy lacked an internal constituency to support follow-on models, 
so since the mid-1990s the RQ-2 has been used primarily as a test and evalua-
tion platform�41 Certainly there were other factors, such as cost, unique mission 
requirements, and the post–Cold War security environment, that influenced the 
rate of integration of Pioneer into the Navy and Marine Corps aviation commu-
nities, but the fact that the service that developed an internal constituency with 
dedicated aviation units also better sustained and integrated the innovation is an 
important correlation�
In addition to a service’s establishing dedicated units, Ehrhard argues that 
to explore the utility of UAVs and completely integrate them into the service, 
UAV operators should remain a part of their aviation subgroup and maintain 
“currency in manned flight operations [to] develop their aviation professional-
ism and give them some credibility when teamed with rated pilots on staffs�”42 
Written more than a decade prior to the restrictions of the Budget Control Act 
of 2011 and the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, these sentiments represent an 
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unachievable ideal for the naval aviation community in 2017�43 However, still 
relevant is the need to ensure that UAV operators possess sufficient credibility to 
positively influence interoperability across the air wing and adequate experience 
to develop effective operating concepts and tactics� Attracting qualified person-
nel who are also competitive for future promotion will be critical to developing 
the internal constituency and will enhance greatly the integration of the CL-UAV�
The U�S� Air Force has taken deliberate steps to create an internal constituency 
for its remotely piloted aircraft—with mixed results� The Air Force originally 
employed pilots from other communities to operate its remotely piloted aircraft 
(RPA)� Many who were competitive for promotion within their original com-
munities were able to stay on track for continued promotion and command; for 
example, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Goldfein, 
lists the MQ-9 in his official biography among the aircraft he has piloted�44 The 
number of RPA pilots in the Air Force is increasing, but there remain manpower 
and organizational challenges that have required significant policy adjustments, 
including creating an RPA pilot officer community, increasing incentive pay 
for RPA pilots, and authorizing enlisted airmen to serve as RQ-4 Global Hawk 
pilots�45 It is unclear whether RPA pilots will be competitive for wing command 
or promotion to the highest levels�46 It also is not yet possible to determine how 
separating RPA pilots from the fighter and bomber communities will influence 
the integration of UASs into non-ISR missions� In spite of these challenges, there 
is little doubt about the Air Force’s commitment to UAV integration�47 Navy and 
Air Force war-fighting requirements and officer career paths are distinct, but 
additional analysis of Air Force organizational decisions regarding UASs may 
provide insights for the Navy�
Thoughtful organization can provide incentives for highly qualified naval 
aviators, including both pilots and naval flight officers, to pursue assignments in 
UAV units� In a study of military aviators published in 2007, James FitzSimonds 
and Thomas Mahnken found that opportunities for promotion and command 
were likely adequate and provided key incentives for “drawing junior officers into 
new operational specialties” such as UAVs�48 Command at sea remains the pri-
mary goal and the key to continued promotion for career-oriented naval officers� 
Therefore, the Navy should articulate viable career paths for officers assigned to 
duties operating CL-UAVs�
Organizational changes, such as establishing separate CL-UAV squadrons, can 
provide additional command opportunities for CL-UAV aviators� As Stingray 
is introduced to the fleet or CL-UAV units are established, consideration also 
should be given to processes and career timing that will enable junior officers to 
complete successful tours in manned platforms, operate CL-UAVs in subsequent 
tours, and return to manned platforms as department heads and commanding 
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officers� This will both enhance integration between manned and unmanned 
units and ensure that officers assigned to operate CL-UAVs remain competitive 
for command� To accomplish these objectives so as to support the introduction 
of the MQ-4C Triton, which theoretically can be controlled from anywhere via 
satellite, the maritime patrol community intends to man its operational Triton 
squadrons with aircrews on shore duty so they can continue to achieve their 
critical sea-duty milestones in manned maritime patrol and reconnaissance 
squadrons�49 Employing officers on shore duty likely will not be an option for 
carrier-based units, so other solutions will be required� In any event, CL-UAV 
operators will need viable career paths if they are to form an influential constitu-
ency within the carrier aviation community�
If separate CL-UAV units are created, consideration should be given to es-
tablishing CL-UAV squadrons as commander (O-5) at-sea commands to attract 
top aviators and facilitate the development of an internal constituency whose 
members are competitive for promotion to captain (O-6)�50 Another option 
would be to select postcommand commanders who are already competitive for 
promotion to fill the initial officer-in-charge or squadron commanding officer 
roles, to build a senior internal constituency rapidly� Thoughtful organizational 
decisions could attract high-quality officers and greatly facilitate the creation of 
an internal constituency to support the development of operating concepts and 
follow-on platform requirements�
In making organizational decisions, the naval aviation community should ver-
ify assumptions about the professional desires of junior officers and assess their 
impact on the fleet’s UAV manpower over the long term� Many have argued that 
aviators have not integrated UAVs readily because the systems challenge what it 
means to be an aviator and a warfighter�51 Stereotypes suggest that aviators always 
will avoid assignments that keep them out of the cockpit� However, neither factor 
emerged as the most significant barrier to UAV acceptance in the comprehensive 
historical review of empirical analysis of officer attitudes toward UAVs reviewed 
during this study�52 A 2006 survey of “400 officers with aviation specialties” that 
examined their perceptions of the impact of UAV adoption revealed that “avia-
tors had attitudes that diverged markedly from popular stereotypes�”53 This does 
not mean there is no resistance to weapon system innovation among aviators, but 
it does suggest that failure to integrate UAVs into carrier aviation is not simply 
the result of irrational responses by carrier aviators� Therefore, organizational 
changes that are informed by empirical understanding of cultural and institution-
al barriers instead of stereotypes can be effective mechanisms for developing an 
internal officer constituency to support the integration of CL-UAVs� Additional 
empirical analysis to refine the conclusions of previous studies would provide 
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insights into the types of organizational changes that would facilitate best the 
adoption and integration of CL-UAVs by carrier aviators�
Naval aviation has the opportunity to create organizations that will facilitate 
the integration of the MQ-25 Stingray and future UASs� Certainly, establishing 
Stingray units under existing carrier air wings and assigning Stingray platforms 
to existing squadrons should be explored� Organizing with the goal of developing 
an officer constituency within carrier aviation will complement the organization-
al changes at higher levels that preserve funding and facilitate the acquisition of 
UAS technologies� An internal constituency would advocate for improvements to 
the MQ-25 Stingray and for increasingly effective follow-on models� The optimal 
constituency also would enable the integration of CL-UAVs into all carrier air 
wing missions� Integrating a new technology, such as the CL-UAV, and develop-
ing a constituency for it during peacetime typically require a generation� CL-UAV 
integration can be accelerated by encouraging experimentation and adopting 
bottom-up innovations�
ORGANIZING TO ENCOURAGE EXPERIMENTATION AND  
DEVELOP INNOVATIVE OPERATING CONCEPTS
Developing effective operating concepts involves the employment of technol-
ogy in realistic conditions, typically during combat or military exercises� Initial 
operating concepts are developed to inform the design of new technology, but 
innovation continues for years (sometimes decades) after technology reaches the 
end user� Eliot Cohen, writing about the U�S� Army in Afghanistan in 2001 and in 
Iraq in 2003, observed a lag between the introduction of information technology 
and the related organizational and operational concept development� He argued 
that “[t]hroughout most of military history, to include the current period, change 
tends to come more from below, from the spontaneous interactions between 
military people, technology, and particular tactical circumstances�”54 This is 
entirely consistent with the observations of Grissom and others discussed previ-
ously who have explored the phenomenon of bottom-up innovation� In a similar 
way, integrating and optimizing the effectiveness of CL-UAVs across all carrier 
air wing missions will require adopting input from end users� The Navy should 
consider how organizational changes can expedite and facilitate experimentation 
and bottom-up innovation�
CNO Admiral John M� Richardson embraced the role of end-user or bottom-
up innovation in explaining a recent decision to revise the requirements for the 
UCLASS program� The low-observable and deep-strike capabilities that were 
envisioned when the program was known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air 
System (i�e�, J-UCAS) in 2003 were removed in the latest request for proposals 
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for the MQ-25 Stingray�55 In March 2016, Richardson explained, “It will get us 
unmanned on deck � � � so we can start to confront those operational challenges 
and we can learn our way forward�”56 Introducing the MQ-25 as a refueling and 
reconnaissance CL-UAV provides the Navy with the opportunity to explore orga-
nizational, manpower, logistics, and operating challenges, while building confi-
dence in the ability to execute closely coordinated carrier operations� It certainly 
will result in significant end-user innovation�
However, it would be a mistake to assume that getting the MQ-25 Stingray 
safely to the fleet will deliver desired advances in military effectiveness automati-
cally� The Navy’s official goal for the UCLASS program remains an “autonomous 
aircraft capable of precision strike in a contested environment,” as the Secretary 
of the Navy described in 2014�57 Therefore, organizations that are sufficient for 
the integration of the MQ-25 as an ISR and aerial refueling platform might not 
be sufficient to support simultaneously the development of innovative operating 
concepts or to refine requirements for follow-on CL-UAVs that will be employed 
across the full spectrum of carrier aviation missions� To balance these competing 
demands, it may be necessary to create organizations dedicated to experimenta-
tion for both the Stingray and follow-on CL-UAVs�
Experimentation can be the key to developing optimal operating concepts� Se-
nior leaders in DoD in fact have called for greater experimentation, for increased 
use of war games, for “failing fast,” and for innovation at every level� There 
are institutional and cultural barriers to such an approach, but organizational 
changes could facilitate overcoming these barriers� Requiring a squadron, air 
wing, or ship to take on the risk of experimentation and primary responsibility 
for developing operating concepts for CL-UAVs without alleviating other prede-
ployment or operational requirements places an additional burden on an already 
overstressed force�
Today, the Navy is unable to meet combatant commander demands fully, 
not only for carrier strike group presence, but for ISR and maritime patrol as-
sets, exercise participation, and the like� The need for and development of the 
Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the carrier gap in the Persian Gulf in the fall 
of 2015, and the extension of aircraft carrier deployments are all symptoms of 
a force stretched thin� However, failing to prioritize experimentation cannot be 
attributed wholly to operational requirements� The Navy also proved unable to 
experiment effectively during the 1990s when the fleet was much larger than it is 
today and faced fewer urgent threats and operational commitments� As Robert 
C� Rubel testified to the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the 
House Armed Services Committee in February 2016, “Despite all the lip service 
that has been paid to innovation and concept development over the past twenty 
years, the Navy has not been able to free up significant forces for experimentation 
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duty�”58 This is consistent with the findings of another Mahnken and FitzSimonds 
study, published in 2003, which found that officers “were unwilling to support 
tradeoffs between force structure and readiness, on the one hand, and investment 
in transformation, on the other�”59 At that time, the emergence of a near-peer 
competitor was still a decade away, but the pressure on units to meet current mis-
sions impeded investment in or experimentation with future capabilities� Simi-
larly, budget limitations cannot take all the blame for the lack of experimentation� 
The successful Fleet Problem series of exercises and experiments were begun in 
1923 on a tight budget and continued during the Great Depression, albeit by a 
Navy with fewer obligations around the globe�60 Clearly, there is institutional or 
cultural resistance to diverting Navy resources to large-scale experimentation, 
even though such experimentation is recognized widely as required to optimize 
technology�
The CL-UAV provides a superb basis around which to build new organiza-
tions dedicated to experimentation and rapid adoption of bottom-up innova-
tions� There is a strategic need to accelerate the integration of CL-UAVs and 
rapidly identify and articulate the requirements for follow-on UASs, such as the 
unmanned combat air vehicle (i�e�, UCAV) envisioned in the early part of this 
century� There is also broad support for CL-UAV innovation from senior civil-
ians in DoD and Congress� The Navy should explore organizational changes that 
encourage greater experimentation and rapid concept development�
Naval aviation’s strike fighter community already supports expedited refine-
ment of technical requirements on a small scale by employing new technology 
in its aggressor squadron aircraft at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 
(NSAWC) in Nevada� These limited efforts provide rapid feedback to systems 
engineers by allowing experienced aviators to employ new technology in sce-
narios that reflect the anticipated operating environment� Unfortunately, with 
UAVs seen as ISR assets that are operated by personnel outside the carrier air 
wing, there is little internal incentive to prioritize experimentation at NSAWC 
with UAVs in non-ISR roles� This experimentation also is not something a fleet 
squadron is organized to do, operating as it does with inexperienced aviators and 
the minimal required personnel, aircraft, and flight hours to meet established 
training and readiness standards� Therefore, dedicated experimentation units 
may be required�
Many will argue that such experimentation is the purview of Naval Air Sys-
tems Command (NAVAIR), and indeed NAVAIR is critical to operational and 
developmental testing� However, NAVAIR ensures that new technology and 
platforms meet minimum standards; it is not organized to conduct extensive 
experimentation dedicated to identifying entirely new operating concepts� Navy 
test and evaluation squadrons are tied to programs of record and acquisition 
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milestones� Engineers and test pilots have much to contribute to the acquisition 
of UAS technology, but expanding the role of NAVAIR could perpetuate the per-
ception that speeding up technology acquisition is the silver bullet of CL-UAV 
integration� A better approach would involve new or repurposed experimenta-
tion units that are not focused on operational readiness or program acquisition�
Even if new experimental units cannot be established, the need to develop in-
novative operating concepts and identify requirements for CL-UAVs of the future 
will remain� Given DoD’s stated intention to pursue human-machine teaming 
for future warfare, it would be wise to include officers from all carrier aviation 
communities in the development of such concepts and requirements, especially 
if Stingray is limited to ISR and aerial refueling missions� This is contrary to the 
model planned for the MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4C Triton, which relies primar-
ily on one or two communities to take ownership of UAV integration; but those 
are both ISR platforms� CL-UAV optimization will require expertise from across 
the spectrum of carrier air wing missions�
Consider the likely possibility that the unmanned ISR and aerial refueling mis-
sion would be assigned to the airborne early warning (VAW) community� While 
the VAW community, which currently operates the E-2 Hawkeye, might absorb 
these missions readily and employ the MQ-25 Stingray innovatively in support 
of air wing datalink and battle-space management requirements, its members 
are less well suited to develop the CL-UAV requirements and operational con-
cepts required for conducting unmanned deep strikes or jamming in an A2/AD 
environment than are the pilots and naval flight officers from the strike fighter 
(VFA) or electronic attack (VAQ) communities�61 Assigning CL-UAVs to a single 
community that readily accepts them likely would contribute to building an 
internal constituency, but it also could detract from the development of follow-
on requirements for CL-UAVs integrated across all air wing missions� Stingray 
organizations should facilitate the participation of all aviation communities, es-
pecially the strike fighter community, to optimize the effectiveness of follow-on 
CL-UAVs� Units comprising officers from all carrier air wing communities would 
support that objective�
As the naval aviation community assesses the trade-offs of various organiza-
tional options, it should consider the effect of organizational decisions on the 
pace of integration across all air wing missions and how new organizations can 
influence experimentation and bottom-up innovation�
The U�S� Navy, which operated its first UAV in combat in 1944, is still more than 
a generation away from fully integrating CL-UAVs across the spectrum of car-
rier air wing missions� Advances in data communications, computer processing, 
navigation, and autonomy have overcome technological barriers to employing a 
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tactically effective CL-UAV, but they have done little to address the institutional 
and cultural barriers to innovation within the carrier aviation community� Opti-
mizing the military effectiveness of the CL-UAV innovation will require contin-
ued top-down leadership and additional organizational changes�
The Navy already has made organizational changes and programmatic deci-
sions to speed the development of the MQ-25 Stingray and UAS technology, but 
fielding the MQ-25 Stingray will be only one step toward realizing the potential 
of the CL-UAV innovation� The Navy should complement its pursuit of technol-
ogy by organizing to develop a CL-UAV constituency within the carrier aviation 
community and to encourage experimentation and bottom-up innovation� Orga-
nizational decisions should be based on empirical analyses of the attitudes of car-
rier aviators, especially within the strike fighter community, to understand fully 
the cultural and institutional barriers to CL-UAV integration and experimenta-
tion� Organizations and processes also should be designed to adopt bottom-up 
innovations rapidly and to exploit the role of end users in refining the require-
ments for future innovation and follow-on CL-UAVs� Experimentation should 
be prioritized and, when possible, the responsibility for experimentation should 
be assigned to dedicated organizations that are not simultaneously responsible 
for operational deployments or formal test and evaluation of programs of record�
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Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ� Press, 1991); and Williamson Murray 
and Allan R� Millett, eds�, Military Innovation 
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bottom-up innovation has been referenced 
ninety-eight times in books and scholarly 
journals in the decade since its publication� 
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and James A� Russell, “Innovation in War: 
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EPICTETUS VS. ARISTOTLE
 The virtue theoretic approach to ethics locates moral value primarily in the character of the agent rather than in the rules governing an act or the con-
sequences that follow from it� Concerns about the character of the agent long 
have been a central preoccupation of military organizations� To be sure, modern 
military organizations in the United States and other Western, liberal, democratic 
states pay close attention to the rules governing acts and the consequences of 
these acts� Nevertheless, virtue ethics are of first importance, insofar as military 
organizations aim to cultivate soldiers, sailors, and airmen with specific sets of 
character traits, habits, and practices� This interest in moral development and 
moral virtue is especially evident in the missions and operations of service acad-
emies, officer training schools, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs� 
It also can be found in the programs for training enlisted personnel as well as the 
regular, annual training provided to operational forces�
When we consider virtue ethics as a moral theory, it is important to under-
stand that there is no single account� Virtue ethics includes a family of theories 
with a rich and complex history, including ancient 
perspectives from the likes of Aristotle and the 
Stoics, as well as medieval perspectives such as 
that of Thomas Aquinas�1 More recently, there 
has been a significant uptick of interest in virtue 
ethics, with notable yet very different approaches 
offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hurst-
house, Michael Slote, Robert Adams, Julia Annas, 
Nancy Sherman, Christine Swanton, Nancy Snow, 
and Daniel Russell, among many others�2
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While military theory and practice have not been insulated from these con-
temporary developments, military thinkers have tended to be attracted to the 
Stoics� The leading voices here are James Stockdale, Nancy Sherman, and Mi-
chael Evans�3 The Stoics themselves do not speak with one voice, and the extant 
writings that we have from ancient Stoic authors do not offer the same kind of 
substance and depth that we find in contributors such as Aristotle and Aquinas� 
Epictetus’s Handbook, for example, is a series of loosely connected aphorisms and 
short reflections� The same can be said of Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations� Never-
theless, a close reading of Stoic texts reveals a set of themes that together outline 
a distinct and different approach to virtue ethics� In brief, while the ultimate good 
for humans is happiness, the Stoics regard the social world in which we try to 
attain this good as opaque, unfair, and out of our control� As a result, happiness 
must be achieved entirely in the inner life, as it is the only realm we can control� 
Emotions, insofar as they are responses to external events, must be regulated 
tightly or eliminated� The virtues themselves are inner, rational dispositions that 
contribute to self-control� Public service is valuable not for the attainment of 
honors or external goods, but as an opportunity to practice the virtues� Social 
attachments are grounded in a cosmopolitan respect for shared humanity� In the 
military context, the Stoic approach is thought to resonate with the international 
nature of conflict; the chaos of warfare; and the need for order, discipline, and 
bravery on the battlefield�
It seems to me, however, that military organizations’ attraction to the Stoic ap-
proach to virtue ethics is misplaced� In this article, I will argue that an approach 
to virtue ethics inspired by Aristotle provides a better theoretical and practical 
foundation for military organizations than the approach offered by the Stoics� It 
is not just that Aristotle offers a more sophisticated account of human flourishing 
and the attendant virtues; his approach has the added value of speaking to mili-
tary organizations on and off the battlefield in ways that are especially relevant to 
the nature of modern Western militaries and their activities� I will not be argu-
ing that the approach of the Stoics is false or dangerous; I will argue instead that 
Aristotle’s is simply better� In particular, the Aristotelian approach (1) is a better 
match for the institutional nature of modern Western military service, (2) in-
corporates a higher degree of flexibility, which allows the account to be adjusted 
appropriately to the variety of circumstances in which modern militaries operate, 
and (3) is better able to contend with the kinds of tragedies that are at the heart 
of the military experience in war�
The article is organized as follows� I begin with a comparative sketch of 
Aristot le’s approach and the Stoic approach� I then point out salient features of 
modern Western military practice, noting how they comport with the systems of 
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Aristotle and the Stoics� At this stage I develop in detail the three areas in which 
I take Aristotle’s account to be superior� I conclude with a comparative practical 
example: a brief sketch of how Aristotle’s ethics might provide better resources 
for tackling the current challenge that modern Western militaries, especially the 
U�S� military, face in terms of eliminating sexual assault and sexual harassment�
COMPARATIVE ETHICS: ARISTOTLE
All virtue theoretic approaches begin with an account of the excellent person, 
especially the habits, traits, and practices that together constitute human excel-
lence�4 This focus on excellence of character contrasts with other prominent 
theoretical approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism, which focuses on the 
good that we bring about through our actions, and deontology, which focuses 
on the moral laws that we should obey� Among the virtue theoretic approaches, 
Aristotle’s account is a complex affair with many moving parts� To frame a use-
ful comparison with the Stoic account, I will focus on each account’s answer to 
two questions� First, what is moral excellence? Second, what are the intrinsic 
limitations that we face in trying to achieve moral excellence? While there is 
much more that could be said, and indeed has been said, in defense of these two 
accounts in general, my argument here will focus narrowly on their comparative 
fitness for military professionals and their organizations� It is my view that our 
accounts’ comparative answers to these two questions will be sufficient to deter-
mine which is better for the military context�
Moral Excellence according to Aristotle
Aristotle believed that moral excellence is found in a happy human community� 
By happiness we mean a life of “doing well” or “being well�”5 Many commentators 
propose that the happy life is understood best as the flourishing life, to distinguish 
it from the various trivializations of “happiness” that seem to have taken over 
contemporary Western culture� The flourishing human life, in turn, is defined 
in terms of human function�6 In other words, just as we can determine what 
it means to be an excellent or flourishing dolphin if we have an account of the 
purposes, lives, and nature of dolphins, so we can determine what it means to be 
an excellent or flourishing human if we have an account of the purposes, lives, 
and nature of humans�7 On that score, we observe that a full account of human 
function will make reference to psychological and sociological contexts, as these 
are main contexts within which humans live�
Psychologically speaking, every human being is composed of rational and 
nonrational faculties, where the nonrational faculties include those that are 
capable of listening to reason (appetites and passions) and those that are not (in-
voluntary bodily functions)�8 According to Aristotle, moral excellence is found 
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at the intersection of the rational faculties and the nonrational faculties that are 
capable of listening to reason�9 The morally excellent person uses her reason—or, 
more specifically, her deliberative and decision-making powers—to regulate her 
appetites and passions so she can fulfill those functions specific to the appetites 
and passions themselves� Aristotle is not suggesting that we suppress or eliminate 
our appetites and passions; instead he argues that, in a flourishing person, appe-
tites and passions will be expressed in ways that accord with right reason� Simply 
put, the morally excellent person is the well-regulated person�
Moving from psychology to sociology, we note that the functions of our facul-
ties of appetite and emotion often are connected to our social roles� At the same 
time, part of the human function is defined in terms of the various social and 
political roles that we fulfill in human community� For each of these discrete 
faculties and roles, Aristotle maintains that we can isolate a specific moral excel-
lence in the mean between extremes� Consider three examples� Fear is an aspect 
of human emotion that serves as an indicator of and a response to a threat� As Ar-
istotle puts it, when we are fearful at the right time, toward the right people, to the 
right degree, and so on, we achieve an excellence with respect to fear: bravery�10 
If one is fearful in the wrong circumstances, one has an excess of fear: the vice 
of cowardliness� If one fails to be fearful when the circumstances require it, one 
has a deficiency of fear: the vice of foolhardiness� Consider another example� In 
our everyday interactions with others, we find some people who are ingratiating: 
they never disagree and always offer praise� Others are quarrelsome: they object 
to everything and everyone� The mean between these extremes, according to Ar-
istotle, is friendliness�11 Finally, consider the hierarchical ordering of our various 
social and political roles� Given the contributions that we make in our families, 
communities, and businesses, we should expect an appropriate response, whether 
that be remuneration, recognition, or gratitude� In terms of extremes, those who 
seek out honors that do not befit their respective places in the community we call 
“honor loving,” while those who are deficient fail to enjoy the honor that is their 
due� Aristotle does not give us a clear name for the virtue, other than to call it the 
virtue concerned with small honors�12
Multiplied across our passions, appetites, and social roles, overall moral excel-
lence can be captured in a catalog of the virtues� Aristotle’s own catalog names ten 
virtues of character; subsequent virtue theorists have provided different, often 
longer, lists� While Aristotle himself does not provide us with an explicit story of 
how we might determine which traits belong in our catalog and which do not, the 
theory behind his catalog suggests an account� Excellent character is a composite 
of excellences attached to our humanity, to our socioeconomic status, and to our 
social and political roles� In other words, the catalog of virtues is tied to one’s 
specific psychological, sociological, and political functions�
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As a result, the list of virtues for each person will be slightly different� Where 
we share a function with everyone else, we will have common virtues� Where we 
do not share a function with others or share a function with only a subgroup, we 
will have special virtues� Common virtues, in other words, include those attached 
to our universally shared features� These include virtues tied to our emotional life 
(e�g�, bravery), our appetites (e�g�, temperance), and the inescapably social nature 
of our species (e�g�, friendliness)�
Special virtues are those determined by the specific circumstances of our so-
cial, economic, and political conditions� Magnificence, Aristotle’s virtue for gen-
erosity as it pertains to large gifts, will be relevant to me only if I have significant 
wealth� The virtue concerning small honors will be relevant to me only if I have 
no social and political potential for magnanimity, which is the virtue concerned 
with big honors� Outside of Aristotle’s catalog, we can conceive of a host of ad-
ditional special virtues� The virtues associated with being the firstborn (perhaps 
including special responsibilities for younger siblings and for older parents) will 
apply only if one is in fact the firstborn� The virtues associated with democratic 
citizenship (e�g�, being well-informed, capable of deliberating over public policy, 
and committed to democratic decision-making processes) will apply only if one 
happens to live in a democracy� And the virtues associated with officership in 
the military of a democracy (e�g�, loyalty, honor, integrity, and courage) will be 
determined by one’s specific responsibilities and rank and the overall mission of 
the military institution�
Understood in this way, the catalog of virtues is derived from psychological 
and sociological facts about us� On the one hand, these grounds provide for a kind 
of universality and permanency in the catalog, insofar as our nature as human 
beings and the basic features of human life are unchanging� On the other hand, 
insofar as our roles and functions are defined at least in part by the particulars of 
our social and political circumstances, the catalog will have variations across in-
dividuals in their various social, cultural, and political circumstances� There will 
be lots of ways in which the specific conditions of our lives imply different roles 
and functions, which in turn will specify modified, and possibly novel, virtues�
It will be helpful, then, to notice the way that Aristotle organizes our various 
roles and functions within the broader social and political context� Moral excel-
lence is not an individual achievement but instead the achievement of a commu-
nity� Every flourishing person, in virtue of her humanity, is part of a larger social 
and political project� We are, as he phrases it, “political animals�”13 Put another 
way, humans are members of a species that flourishes in a particular type of com-
munity� Just like the ant, bee, wolf, or lion, the character of the individual human 
being cannot be understood fully apart from an understanding of her particular 
role or function in the community to which she belongs�
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For his part, Aristotle describes a nested set of three communities: family, 
village, and community�14 Our roles and functions in each of these communities 
imply an account of performing specific roles and functions excellently and, in 
turn, define part of the catalog of virtues that apply to us� In the family we might 
be a son or daughter, brother or sister, father or mother, husband or wife� In the 
village we have roles in terms of our vocation, in terms of our property and neigh-
bors, and in terms of our local institutions� In the community we are defined in 
terms of our citizenship in general as well as in terms of any specific role we might 
occupy in the institutions of the community (e�g�, legislator, soldier, judge)� With 
respect to each role that I occupy in my family, village, and community, we can 
specify what it means to flourish, and then in turn identify those virtues that con-
tribute to, as well as constitute, my flourishing in that context� Some of these will 
be specialized versions of virtues of which I make use in other contexts; others 
will be unique to my particular roles� Insofar as our roles change over the course 
of our lives, our catalog will change as well� This does not mean that morality is 
relative; it means instead that moral excellence is context sensitive� Human life 
is not a static or uniform experience; any description of the excellences required 
for flourishing must be adjusted to fit our circumstances�
Despite the variety of catalogs of virtues that apply to individuals, Aristotle 
argues that we can identify an unchanging common good: the good of the com-
munity� The good of the community is the flourishing of the community qua 
community� This is the chief good, such that the goods of all the other compo-
nents of the community are subordinate to it� We must be careful here, however: 
to say that the goods of the components of the community are subordinate is not 
to say that they simply are means to achieving the chief good� Nor are we saying 
that the chief good is simply the aggregate of all the goods of the components� 
Aristotle’s account here is more nuanced� The goods of the subordinate commu-
nities are ends in themselves as well as means to achieving the chief good� It is 
also correct to say that they are constituents of the chief good, although the chief 
good cannot be defined purely in terms of the achievement of its subordinate 
elements� Overall excellence or flourishing is achieved not merely by my excel-
lence as a family member and a village member; it also requires my excellence as 
a citizen—a role that cannot be reduced to the others�
Moral Limitations according to Aristotle
The excellent or flourishing community, together with the morally excellent 
people who constitute it, is vulnerable on Aristotle’s account� Some forms of at-
tack or corruption will be sufficient to impair excellence and flourishing both for 
individuals and for the community as a whole� We can distinguish two kinds of 
challenges to the flourishing of the community: internal challenges and external�
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Consider one form of internal challenge� The moral virtues are habits that 
must be cultivated through a program of education that includes apprenticeship 
under those who have a high degree of mastery of the virtues already� For exam-
ple, one learns to be brave under the tutelage of brave people� But if a sociopoliti-
cal system lacks a program of education in the virtues or lacks exemplars, moral 
excellence becomes very difficult to achieve� A second form of internal challenge 
is associated with the intelligibility of the social world� Identifying the special 
virtues associated with one’s various social roles presupposes a clearly defined set 
of social roles as well as a clear understanding of what one’s social roles are� Oth-
erwise, one’s account of excellence in one’s various functions will be incomplete, 
vague, or perhaps missing altogether� But in contemporary societies, especially 
the large, complex, and disorganized societies that characterize the West, we find 
just these kinds of challenges to the clarity of social roles and our understandings 
of our respective places�
External threats to the flourishing of an otherwise morally excellent commu-
nity are often more straightforward� External threats such as war, natural disaster, 
or the scarcity of natural resources can undermine the ability of a community to 
achieve and maintain flourishing� Sometimes, despite our best efforts, circum-
stances that are completely out of our control can get the better of us�
Taken together, the vulnerabilities associated with these two types of chal-
lenges imply that a people can fail to achieve moral excellence and that, in many 
cases, this failure can happen through no fault of their own� In other words, moral 
tragedy is a real possibility in Aristotle’s world; human excellence or flourishing is 
dependent on circumstances that are, at least in part, out of our control�
COMPARATIVE ETHICS: STOICISM
Let us turn now to the Stoic account and consider the Stoic answers to these same 
questions� Of course, in one sense there is no single Stoic answer, insofar as Sto-
icism is a philosophical school with many adherents but no dominant voice� We 
also do not have a complete record of Stoic teachings� Nevertheless, we can detect 
themes that run throughout Stoic writings—themes that provide a sense of the 
Stoic account, and themes that have been picked up by military ethicists such as 
Sherman, Stockdale, and Evans� In fact, since these contemporary writers serve 
as the primary lens through which many military members and organizations 
have been introduced to Stoicism, it is their interpretation that provides the best 
target for our discussion here� Just as with Aristotle, we cannot hope to provide a 
comprehensive account, but we can present a contrasting picture that will be suf-
ficient for discussing the relative merits of the Stoic perspective for contemporary 
military service�
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Moral Excellence according to the Stoics
It is important to keep in mind that the Stoic approach to virtue ethics is deeply 
indebted to Aristotle� While virtue theory, broadly considered, is the central ap-
proach to ethics for most of the thinkers throughout the Greek and Roman world, 
Aristotle’s account is among the most prominent, and philosophers who come 
after him presuppose aspects of his view even when they attempt to depart from 
it� Stoic philosophers, for their part, see themselves as developing or improving 
on earlier accounts� One way to exercise charity in reading the Stoics is to regard 
their comparative lack of theoretical sophistication as a reflection of a common 
philosophical background and a common set of assumptions� In other words, 
perhaps they are understood best as taking much of Greek philosophy, including 
Aristotle, for granted, and then focusing their own efforts on the few places where 
they believe the account should be updated�
Taking this approach, we can see a variety of ways in which the Stoics modify 
Aristotle’s account of moral excellence� With Aristotle, we saw that my happiness 
is only partly under my control� Since I am a dependent and social creature, my 
own good is bound up with the good of others: if my community is not flourish-
ing, then I am not flourishing� In other words, living a flourishing life depends, 
at least in part, on good moral luck� The Stoics find this approach entirely wrong-
headed� As they see it, the excellent or flourishing life ought to be in my power, 
not arbitrarily subject to the choices of others� Aurelius writes, “[T]rue good 
fortune is what you make for yourself� Good fortune: good character, good inten-
tions, and good actions�”15 In other words, my happiness should be entirely up 
to me: if I can develop the right kind of character, I can control my own destiny� 
Evans provides a summary as follows:
In the Stoic catechism there is no such category as “victimhood” because there is no 
moral economy outside of the workings of our inner selves� Stoicism is thus about 
empowerment by perception—a cultivation of an invincibility of the will through 
minimizing personal vulnerability by a mixture of Socratic self-examination and 
an emphasis on control of the emotions� Stoicism teaches concentration on what 
individuals can control, what Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations called the “inner 
citadel” of the soul�16
The Stoic focus on controlling our fate changes the nature of our moral life in 
many ways, but for the purpose of developing an argument with application to 
contemporary military service I will focus on just two: individualism and interi-
orization� By individualism, I mean the way in which Stoics focus on the ethics of 
the individual rather than the ethics of the community; by interiorization, I mean 
the way in which Stoics focus on the mental lives of individuals rather than their 
actions� Both of these modifications reflect Stoic objections to Aristotle’s program�
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   108 4/21/17   8:35 AM
113
War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 J E N S E N  1 0 9
Let us begin with individualism� Stoics agree that the flourishing person has 
excellent character, and excellent character is a matter of having a specific set of 
moral virtues�17 Stoic catalogs of the virtues are different from Aristotle’s: some-
times they include virtues that appear to be broader in scope, such as righteous-
ness, honor, and dignity; at other times, Stoics hint at virtues that reflect a dis-
engaged or aesthetic life� Aurelius, for example, lists honesty, gravity, endurance, 
austerity, resignation, abstinence, patience, sincerity, moderation, seriousness, 
and high-mindedness�18
The more important contrast, for our purposes, can be found in the different 
aims of the Stoic virtues� On the Stoic account, the cultivation and exercise of 
these virtues have value primarily for the development of the character of the 
individual, not for the sake of the community� Aurelius writes, “[P]eople are our 
proper occupation� Our job is to do them good and put up with them� But when 
they obstruct our proper tasks, they become irrelevant to us—like wind, sun, and 
animals� Our actions may be impeded by them, but there can be no impeding our 
intentions or dispositions�”19
Every action stands on its own as a measure of the character of the agent who 
performs it, independent of the value of the action for the community� I am not 
responsible for the actions of others, and they cannot be responsible for my own 
actions� After all, I cannot control them and they cannot control me� My own 
good is therefore my ultimate point of reference, as it is the only thing I truly can 
control� In this way, the Stoic approach to happiness is far more individualistic 
than the approach offered by Aristotle� Where Aristotle views the ethical life as a 
joint enterprise aimed at building our social and political world, the Stoics view 
the ethical life as an individual enterprise aimed at achieving excellence despite 
our social and political world�
This contrast should not be especially surprising� Aristotle’s starting point in 
his writing, as in his life, is the self-contained social and political unity of the 
Greek city-state� Stoic writers, in contrast, are lost in the vast, diverse, cosmopoli-
tan expanse of the Roman Empire� Correspondingly, the Stoics view the social 
world as opaque, cruel, and arbitrary—utterly outside the control of the individ-
ual� To be sure, Stoics were not the kind of pessimists who aim at disengagement; 
they were not the Roman equivalent of modern doomsday preppers� Stoics call 
for service, kindness, and other forms of social engagement� Moreover, Stoics 
themselves were active for the good of their friends and their communities, what-
ever their stations and circumstances� Cicero and Seneca were Roman politicians; 
Marcus Aurelius was a soldier and emperor� But all these exercises of the social 
virtues reflect a much more detached approach to our social and political world, 
an approach centered on the character of the individual agent� At the same time, 
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Stoic social and political engagement did not have as its primary objective the 
achievement of a common good or the construction of a flourishing community�
In the midst of this chaotic world, it seems fair to ask the Stoic whether moral 
excellence or flourishing is even possible� This brings us to the second point of 
contrast between the Stoic approach and the Aristotelian approach: the interior-
ization of the moral life� When Aristotle allows that tragedy can make an other-
wise virtuous person unhappy, the Stoics recoil� They propose instead a system 
in which happiness is not at all dependent on one’s social, political, and physical 
circumstances� Aurelius writes as follows:
If you do the job in a principled way, with diligence, energy and patience, if you keep 
yourself free of distractions, and keep the spirit inside you undamaged, as if you 
might have to give it back at any moment—If you can embrace this without fear or 
expectation—can find fulfillment in what you’re doing now, as Nature intended, and 
in superhuman truthfulness (every word, every utterance)—then your life will be 
happy� No one can prevent that�20
In other words, the happy life is a matter of internal rather than external ful-
fillment� Whatever the state of the world around me, it is still possible for me to 
have excellent character� I can accomplish this, the Stoics explain, provided that 
I achieve the following�
First, I must come to terms with the fact that happiness has nothing to do with 
external successes� Epictetus writes, “Do not seek to have events happen to you as 
you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your 
life will go well�”21 If happiness lies entirely within my control, and the only things 
over which I have complete control are my internal responses and my internal 
life, then I must learn to master my internal life and avoid seeking happiness in 
external goods� External goods of wealth, fame, and power are outside my control; 
it would be a mistake to put my happiness in them� To be sure, this does not mean 
that Stoics eschew these goods� Stoicism need not imply a monkish way of life; 
such a way of life itself could become an object of worship� Instead, the Stoic avoids 
emotional attachment to external goods� Epictetus explains somewhat graphically: 
“It shows lack of natural talent to spend time on what concerns the body, as in ex-
ercising a great deal, eating a great deal, drinking a great deal, moving one’s bowels 
or copulating a great deal� Instead you must do these things in passing, but turn 
your whole attention toward your faculty of judgment�”22 In other words, it is our 
attitude toward external goods that matters, not the goods themselves�
Second, I need to learn to be guided by reason alone� While our social and 
political world may be chaotic, the universe as a whole is guided by reason� There 
is a natural order or a law of nature that I discover and toward which I can ori-
ent my will� Again, Epictetus: “On every occasion you must have these thoughts 
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ready: lead me, Zeus, and you too, Destiny, wherever I am assigned by you; I’ll 
follow and not hesitate, but even if I do not wish to, because I’m bad, I’ll follow 
anyway� Whoever has complied well with necessity is counted wise by us, and 
understands divine affairs�”23
To do this, I must learn to control my emotions� In particular, I must recondi-
tion my emotional life so that I am not emotionally sensitive to the things that I 
see and the events that befall me, no matter how pleasurable or cruel they may 
be� Sherman explains the Stoic perspective here: “They hold that emotions, as 
most of us experience them, typically involve assent to false opinions� That is, the 
impressions we assent to have a propositional structure � � � and emotions typically 
involve false opinions of good and evil�”24 It is not that Stoics eschew emotions 
altogether; what they claim instead is that our emotional responses must be keyed 
solely to our mental life� We can take pleasure in our virtuous intentions, but not 
in the results that come from actions that accord with those virtuous intentions� 
After all, the results of our actions, no matter how well intended they may be, are 
not in our control�
Third, and in keeping with the previous achievements, I must cultivate inner 
strength, especially fortitude, if I am to flourish in the midst of the cruel and 
harsh world in which we live� Not only is my social and political context outside 
my control; it actually tends to pose a threat to my physical, social, and political 
well-being� In this way, inner happiness is something that I must achieve despite 
my suffering� Suffering and death are inevitable� Aurelius’s Meditations, in par-
ticular, are preoccupied heavily with reminders of the shortness of life and the 
inevitability of death: “[K]now this: Human lives are brief and trivial� Yesterday 
a blob of semen; tomorrow embalming fluid, ash� To pass through this brief life 
as nature demands� To give it up without complaint� Like an olive that ripens and 
falls� Praising its mother, thanking the tree it grew on�”25
Moral Limitations according to the Stoics
From the preceding discussion, it should be evident that if the Stoic life can be 
achieved, there will be no limits on my happiness� Insofar as I resist the tempta-
tions of worldly goods and worldly pleasures, I can create for myself an impen-
etrable mental fortress—a place where I am immune to the effects of tragedy, 
a place in which I can be happy, though the world may fall apart� As Sherman 
explains, for the Stoics, “[H]appiness must be a matter of virtue alone�”26
This is not to say that Stoicism is easy� Reconditioning my emotional life ac-
cording to the Stoic program is especially difficult, as my emotions seem to be 
naturally responsive to my experience in the world and not to the particulars 
of my character� Stoics recognize the challenges here� They remind followers 
that Stoic ideals are achieved to one degree or another; one need not achieve 
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perfection to have made progress� Flourishing does not require the complete 
realization of the ideal; further achievement with respect to happiness is always 
possible� Whatever the world may throw at me, my happiness remains in my 
control, and I can take steps to achieve it all the more� Evans quotes Henley’s 1875 
poem “Invictus” to make the point: 
Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul�
In the fell clutches of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud�
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed�
Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid�
It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll�
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul�27
THE SUPERIORITY OF ARISTOTLE IN THE MODERN  
MILITARY WORLD
At first blush, one can see the attraction of the Stoic approach to the military con-
text� Soldiers on the contemporary battlefield are expected to perform excellently 
when their lives are under constant threat, often in the midst of great suffering, 
and under strategic and tactical conditions that are nearly always out of their 
control� The fear of death can be psychologically paralyzing; the Stoic power to 
eliminate that fear and concentrate single-mindedly on the tasks at hand sounds 
like liberation for the soldier in combat� James Stockdale famously remembered 
thinking to himself, as he parachuted into a North Vietnamese village, that he 
was “entering the world of Epictetus�”28 Stockdale believed the Stoic approach 
described above was vital to his survival as a prisoner of war (POW) in North 
Vietnam, and vital to his effective leadership there�
On the one hand, we should not dismiss Stockdale’s experiences, or those of 
other soldiers who have found resilience and liberation in Stoic philosophy, with 
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a mere wave of the hand or a short piece of philosophical argument� Certainly 
under POW conditions, there is very little among our externalities that we can 
control, and any happiness that we find likely will be a matter of the inner char-
acter and strength that the Stoics describe� It may be that the Stoic approach to 
pain and suffering could be a helpful addition to certain parts of military train-
ing, especially those concerned with survival and capture�
On the other hand, the conditions in which Stoicism seems especially per-
tinent are not the experiences of the vast majority of soldiers in the modern 
military� Instead, soldiers in modern militaries are contributors to an enormous 
and complex social and political project, a project that requires creativity and 
flexibility, and a project that can and sometimes does go wrong� In my view, this 
is the world of Aristotle, not the world of Epictetus� In providing a detailed argu-
ment for the superiority of Aristotle’s approach, I will focus on three features: 
the institutional setting of modern Western military service, the need for higher 
degrees of flexibility, and the reality of tragedy�
In the first place, Aristotle’s account is better suited to the institutional condi-
tions of contemporary military service� Unlike the Stoics, Aristotle does not view 
the social world as opaque and arbitrary� Aristotle’s theory is not concerned with 
explaining how we might flourish in spite of our institutions, but more optimisti-
cally provides a road map for the creation and development of excellent institu-
tions in which we can flourish together� The fact is, modern Western military 
conditions and practices are well suited for this approach, especially in those 
aspects that extend beyond individual psychology� Each soldier has a specific 
role to play associated with her unit, and the description of this role implies an 
account of excellence� Each unit, in turn, is part of a larger unit in the military 
organization, where that military organization in turn plays a very specific role in 
the good of the state� Thus we have a set of elements analogous to the family, the 
village, and the community� The chief good for the soldier is found in the good 
of the state, while the military itself plays a specific role in sustaining that good� 
As with Aristotle’s other intermediate institutions, the good for the military is 
neither a mere means to nor a mere constituent of the good of the state� Soldier-
ing is both an end in itself and a means to the achievement of other ends� At the 
same time, the achievement of the good for the military and its units is a neces-
sary condition for the achievement of the good for the state, but in the sense that 
the specific good for the military organization is an end itself, a means through 
which other aspects of the state can achieve their good, as well as a constituent 
element in the complex common good by which we assess the state as a whole�
This organizational structure is not merely thrust on soldiers in modern 
militaries; instead they construct and sustain it� Both officers and enlisted per-
sonnel are expected to take on leadership roles gradually, using their experience, 
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together with the guidance of their superiors, to build and rebuild the organiza-
tion in keeping with an account of its good that they are responsible for formulat-
ing and reformulating� In this way, the institution presupposes that its members 
will exercise control over it, despite the challenges of size and complexity� Notice 
that this account contrasts sharply with the Stoic approach to social and political 
institutions� While Stoics allow for public service and contributions to the good 
of the community, the Stoic must not take on the good of these institutions as her 
own� To do so would be to accept the existence of external goods and subject one’s 
own happiness to the judgments and actions of others� Insofar as social trust is 
built on identity of interests, shared commitments, and common purpose, Sto-
ically oriented soldiers will not be as trustworthy as Aristotelians in the project 
of building and sustaining modern military organizations�
In the second place, Aristotle’s account allows for significantly more creativity 
and flexibility than the account we get from the Stoics� Aristotle’s virtue of pru-
dence is proactive: one evaluates the circumstances in which one finds oneself, 
identifies the goods relevant to one’s circumstances and the circumstances of 
one’s group, and then identifies practices and activities that will contribute to the 
accomplishment of those goods� Since the common good is always in view, Aris-
totle’s soldiers never are preoccupied with their own individual happiness—after 
all, their own individual good is a constituent of and a means to accomplishing 
the common good, given the natures of their particular roles� By definition, the 
Aristotelian does not interiorize her ethical life—the common good is exterior, 
at least with respect to the others that compose her group�
War is, at least in one sense, a violent competition among groups with (at 
least) two different visions of the good� Stoics who distance themselves from the 
common good, and who view the external world as a place of temptation and 
cruelty, seem to be unattractive partners in the social and political project that is 
modern warfare� To be sure, it appears that Stoic detachment could be useful in a 
narrow range of circumstances in modern warfare, such as when captured by the 
enemy—Stockdale’s experience� Nevertheless, it seems to me that proponents of 
Stoicism under these conditions miss the fact that Aristotle’s virtue of prudence, 
with its context-sensitive adjustment to new circumstances, could prescribe an 
account of flourishing similar to that prescribed by the Stoics under conditions 
of capture� In other words, where the Stoics propose a rigid morality of detach-
ment, Aristotle proposes a kind of adaptability that could recommend a degree of 
emotional detachment when circumstances call for it� When an Aristotelian finds 
himself in a social structure that is inimical to flourishing in the conventional way 
(e�g�, family, village, community), he will look for ways to make the best of his 
circumstances� In fact, Stockdale’s own experience as a POW had far more Aristo-
telian elements than he seems to have recognized� By accepting a leadership role 
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among the other captured Americans, by promulgating principles for prisoner 
behavior, and by finding ways to encourage others in the midst of their suffering, 
Stockdale remained committed to the good of the American prisoners, not just 
as individuals but as Americans committed to the good of the United States�29
Finally, Aristotle’s account has a better approach to error and tragedy� Where 
the Stoic is expected to be “astonished at nothing,” Aristotle recognizes the possi-
bility of genuine errors, mistakes, and tragedies in the context of military service 
and war� Not every social structure conforms to the ideal; warfare, quite obvi-
ously, is a nonideal social circumstance� Things have gone wrong, possibly quite 
badly, and this is a genuine tragedy for Aristotelians—the social structures that 
support a life lived according to the virtues and in pursuit of joint goods have bro-
ken down, thereby reducing the amount of happiness that is possible in the mo-
ment� The Stoic response would appear to be to chide the Aristotelian for looking 
for happiness outside herself; the Stoics insist that it can be found reliably only 
within� In this way, the Stoic detaches herself from the possibility of tragedy, from 
the very idea that our circumstances can be described as bad or good� However, 
it seems to me that if we do not recognize tragedy, we will have little motivation 
to work to prevent it in the future� Whatever the merits of the Stoic approach as it 
concerns the resilience of the individual, the fact is that modern soldiers in mod-
ern militaries strive for more� Military action often aims at stopping and respond-
ing to tragedy, and even learning from it so as to put in place measures to prevent 
it from recurring� Tragedy cannot be eliminated from warfare, insofar as good 
men and women always will suffer and die; however, our response should not be 
to structure our mental life so we are not affected by tragedy, but instead to rejoin 
more forcefully the challenge of building institutions, practices, and soldiers who 
are adept at minimizing internal and external harms� Modern institutions like the 
military aim to improve performance, achieve efficiencies, and accomplish very 
specific common ends� More generally, our political systems and political leaders 
should be striving to find peace and support flourishing nations and citizens� The 
Stoic ethic, with its much more limited focus on the good of the individual, does 
not seem to be as good a fit as the Aristotelian ethic, with its focus on building a 
flourishing set of nested institutions�
THE SPECIAL CASE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In recent years, the U�S� military has become especially concerned with incidents 
of sexual assault and harassment inside the organization� Leaders are looking for 
better ways to catch and remove those who perpetrate these crimes, as well as 
ways to build a culture of zero tolerance� Both are goals of long standing, but they 
have proved elusive� Insofar as virtue theorists are concerned with cultivating 
individual and social moral excellence, and a culture of sexual harassment and 
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sexual assault falls well short, they would seem to have something to contribute 
to the conversation�
Stoicism, with its virtues of righteousness and decency, offers an account of a 
moral soldier and a military culture consistent with the elimination of sexual as-
sault and sexual harassment� The Stoic focus on cultivating resilience in the face 
of personal suffering also might prove useful to victims� However, there seem to 
be very few resources in Stoicism that might provide better guidance for solving 
the problem� As it stands, it is not as if the message of treating one’s fellow soldiers 
with decency is absent, nor is resilience missing from contemporary military 
training� Quite the opposite: in the annual sexual assault prevention and response 
training that members (including myself) of the U�S� Defense Department of all 
ranks receive, respect and resilience as ethical virtues are central themes� Yet 
sexual harassment and assault persist�
Aristotle provides a richer theoretical framework from which to start our re-
flections on how to make progress on this issue� We begin with the observation 
that the vast majority of the sexual assault and harassment incidents involve men 
assaulting or harassing women� Instead of focusing on individuals qua individu-
als and promoting general virtues such as respect and decency, Aristotle would 
begin by identifying the psychological, sociological, and political conditions that 
give rise to the trends we observe� In other words, if there is a problem that seems 
to be connected to a particular demographic, it makes sense to start at the level 
of sociological investigation to determine root causes across the population� Why 
do men tend to be the perpetrators; why do women tend to be the victims?
At the same time, Aristotle would begin to think about solutions from inside 
the sociological circumstances� What are the social norms and virtues that we 
expect men and women to cultivate in the context of their relationships, both to 
the military and to each other? Notice that, in answering this question, Aristotle 
would be concerned not only with preventing bad behavior but with cultivating 
good behavior� Remember, in Aristotle’s virtue theoretic account, bad moral be-
havior occurs when a person tends toward the extreme of some feeling, appetite, 
or social role, rather than toward the mean� The cowardly person has too much 
fear, the brave person has the right amount; the overly social person is ingratiat-
ing, the friendly person is social to the right degree�
If sexual assault and harassment are actions attached to vices that are akin to 
cowardice, then what is the feeling, appetite, or social role that is in question? 
Suppose, insofar as sexuality is a psychological and sociological aspect of human 
beings, that there are virtues and vices associated with human sexuality� If sexual 
assault and sexual harassment are vices with respect to human sexuality, then 
it follows that there also must be virtues associated with sexual excellence and 
sexual flourishing� Moreover, since vices fall on the extremes and virtues fall in 
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the mean between the extremes, any program to reduce vice is, for Aristotle, at 
the same time a program to improve virtue; we cannot help but cultivate bravery 
in the process of reducing cowardice�
In other words, an Aristotelian program for reducing or eliminating sexual 
assault and harassment must be, at the same time, a program aimed at cultivating 
sexual excellence and sexual flourishing� The important practical implication of 
this story, Aristotle would argue, is that we cannot institute programs to change 
the culture and practices that encourage sexual assault and harassment until we 
have a clear account of the culture and practices that cultivate sexual excellence 
and flourishing� This, of course, means that we need a robust account of sexual 
excellence and sexual flourishing in the first place� For Aristotelians, such an ac-
count cannot simply be a set of rules, e�g�, all sex must be consensual� Although 
Aristotelians are happy to include laws, rules, and principles in their social and 
political schemes, they would not want their approach to be confused with or 
reduced to a deontological approach� Instead, Aristotelians will search for an ac-
count of how human sexuality contributes to the excellent functioning of human 
beings as individuals and in their relationships with others�
It is these two pieces of information—an account of sexual flourishing, to-
gether with an account of the social conditions that will cultivate and sustain 
it best—that we need if we are to make genuine progress in eliminating sexual 
assault and harassment from military organizations� On the one hand, the unfor-
tunate fact is that at present we do not possess either of them� While the second 
piece of information is something we could investigate as a matter of psychology 
and sociology, the first is not� An account of sexual excellence and sexual flour-
ishing is a matter of ethics, and therefore not a matter of conventional empirical 
research� Certainly, ethical research, together with common and historical expe-
rience, has resulted in agreement on important issues� We reject slavery, murder, 
and adultery, and we affirm the importance of equal treatment and opportunity 
across distinctions of race and gender� Nevertheless, the content of sexual eth-
ics does not appear to be one of these areas of agreement� At present we do not 
have a social or political consensus sufficient to serve as the basis for a program 
of improvement�
Unfortunately, Aristotle’s own views will not be of much help here� Among 
the things on which we do agree is that Aristotle’s patriarchal approach to family 
relationships, grounded on his belief that women are inferior to men, is wrong� 
While he does not offer an explicit theory of sexual excellence or sexual flourish-
ing, we safely can assume that any theory he would offer would be grounded on 
assumptions that we reject�
On the other hand, if we are in agreement that these two pieces of informa-
tion are what we need if we are to make progress, we can devote our attention 
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to acquiring them� This means, in the first place, that we need to have a serious 
discussion about human sexuality, with an eye toward developing an account of 
an excellent and flourishing sexual life� Perhaps we never will agree on all the 
particulars, and perhaps there are groups that always will insist on their own 
eccentric views� But we may find that there are areas of agreement that will be 
sufficient to establish a counterweight to the vices of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment, even if we cannot agree on a comprehensive account of the ideal� 
With these areas of agreement in hand, we then can turn to social science to 
make progress in determining what types of institutional and cultural changes 
will achieve these ends best� Together, these two pieces of information constitute 
the heart of an Aristotelian approach to solving the problem of sexual harassment 
and sexual assault in military organizations�
Stockdale kept a copy of Epictetus’s Handbook on his bedside table aboard 
ship during the Vietnam War� Admittedly, the Handbook may be better suited 
for bedtime reading in wartime; its short paragraphs and aphorisms are pithy, 
memorable, and challenging, and have the appearance of offering important and 
profound wisdom on how an individual might find happiness amid daily mortal 
threat and uncertainty�
In contrast, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Politics do not make for 
good bedtime reading� They offer complicated and open-ended arguments that 
require serious interpretive work to be relevant to our modern conditions� In this 
way, Aristotle is a bit like the road less traveled� And yet the implication of the ar-
gument I have made here is that our military forces and our character-education 
programs would be much better off following the Aristotelian than the Stoic path� 
While it might be more difficult, the payoff will be much better�
N O T E S
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FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL OBLIGATION
n these times of ethical uncertainty, especially among senior Navy leaders amid 
the ongoing “Fat Leonard” fiasco, we need to look to our roots� The Foundations 
of Moral Obligation elective, otherwise known as “The Stockdale Course,” has 
been a mainstay at the Naval War College (NWC) for most of the past forty years� 
Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, USN, the fortieth President of the College, 
collaborated with Dr� Joseph Brennan, a professor emeritus from Columbia Uni-
versity’s Barnard College, to develop the elective shortly after Stockdale assumed 
the presidency� Little did they know how popular the elective would become and 
the positive impact it would have on graduates over the years� The Foundations 
elective has become a part of the moral fabric of both the institution and the U�S� 
Navy�
One indication of this is that NWC’s formal role in both leadership and eth-
ics has expanded relatively recently� Then–Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan 
W� Greenert approved the first Navy Leader Development Strategy in January
2013 to “synchronize the Navy’s leadership and 
strengthen our naval profession by providing a 
common framework for leader development�”1 In 
early 2014, Greenert directed the President of the 
Naval War College to be responsible for all officer 
and enlisted leadership and ethics curricula for 
the Navy�2 A few months later, in March 2014, the 
Naval Leadership and Ethics Center was created at 
Naval Station Newport to provide leadership edu-
cation and training, curriculum support, research, 
and assessment�3 With their Foundations elective, 
I
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Stockdale and Brennan laid the foundation for leadership and ethics instruction 
at the Naval War College, and their work continues to have a profound impact on 
leaders throughout the Navy today�
Stockdale and Brennan wrote the Foundations syllabus and cobbled together 
the reading list and assignments in about six months during the first half of 
1978� The course was offered for the first time in the fall trimester of academic 
year (AY) 1978–79, then was taught again during the winter trimester that same 
academic year� Stockdale himself only taught the course that bears his name for 
one year (actually two trimesters)� Brennan continued to teach the elective until 
he retired in 1992� Professor Paul Regan began teaching the Foundations elective 
in the fall trimester of 1994 while on active duty as a U�S� Coast Guard (USCG) 
captain� He retired from the Coast Guard the following year, but continued to 
teach the Foundations elective for the next sixteen years, through 2010� Dr� Mar-
tin L� Cook assumed duties as the Stockdale Chair at the Naval War College in 
June 2009 and cotaught the elective with the author until his retirement in 2016� 
Each of these men brought passion and vigor into the classroom to make the 
course successful�4
The purpose of this article is to highlight the history of the Foundations of 
Moral Obligation elective and to illustrate how it has changed over time—and 
yet how much it has remained the same� The article also will attempt to answer 
the question of why this elective has remained one of the most popular at the 
College� It seems deeply counterintuitive, on the face of it, that midgrade and 
senior military officers and government civilians—a group typically educated in 
technology and management and focused on the practical—would find the read-
ing of difficult primary sources in philosophy and literature such an important 
part of their NWC education�
Stockdale graduated from the U�S� Naval Academy with the class of 1947� 
His classmates include former president Jimmy Carter; Senator John McCain; 
and Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret�), who later became director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency�5 While serving as President of the College, Turner 
made sweeping changes to improve the curriculum, based on his experience as a 
Rhodes Scholar� In fact, many of the improvements instituted during the “Turner 
Revolution” are still in effect today� Stockdale, having spent nearly seven and a 
half years as a prisoner of war at the infamous Hanoi Hilton, came to Newport 
intent on making an impact and establishing an elective course in ethics� In a let-
ter to Brennan dated December 5, 1977, Stockdale wrote, “I have come to the con-
clusion that if I am to leave a legacy here it must be done from the classroom� My 
boss, Jim Holloway, and my predecessor, Stan Turner, and others advise against 
‘getting tied down’ to a lecture schedule� I’m going to ignore their warnings—and 
try, by next fall, to structure an elective course in something like ethics�”6
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The Stockdale legacy of leadership and ethics has grown exponentially 
throughout the U�S� Navy over the years� As Dr� Cook highlighted, “I think the 
most remarkable thing � � � [is] that every major institution and activity explicitly 
dedicated to questions about ethics and leadership in the U�S� Navy is named after 
James Bond Stockdale�”7 Stockdale’s legacy in leadership and ethics throughout 
the U�S� Navy is unquestionable� However, he was not always interested in ethics�
THE INFLUENCE OF EPICTETUS
After his graduation from the Naval Academy, Stockdale pursued tough op-
erational Navy assignments� He eventually attended flight training and became 
a fighter pilot and later an experimental test pilot� In 1960, he was selected to 
attend graduate school for two years at Stanford University to get a master’s de-
gree� While at Stanford, Stockdale wandered over to the halls of the Philosophy 
Department one morning� He became enamored of philosophy, although his 
academic adviser tried to discourage him, telling him it was a waste of time�
We all experience moments like these, those crossroads at which we choose 
a path that fundamentally changes the course of our lives� This visit to the Phi-
losophy Department was a life-changing moment for Stockdale� That morning 
he met a USN veteran of World War II, Professor Philip Rhinelander, who was 
teaching in the Philosophy Department after a long and distinguished academic 
career� Rhinelander took Stockdale under his wing, enrolled him in his course, 
and over the next few weeks tutored him privately� Stockdale thrived, and even 
took additional philosophy courses from other professors at Stanford�8
In their last meeting together prior to his graduation, Rhinelander gave 
Stockdale a copy of Epictetus’s handbook, The Enchiridion�9 Stockdale was dumb-
founded, but took the book and read it, out of respect for Rhinelander� In a letter 
to Brennan years later, Stockdale confessed, “I recognized nothing that applied to 
the career I had known� I was a fighter pilot, an organizer, a motivator of young 
aviators, a martini drinker, a golf player, a technologist—and this ancient rag 
talked about not concerning oneself with matters over which he had no control, 
etc� I thought to myself, ‘Poor old Rhinelander—he’s just too far gone�’”10
Little did Stockdale know that this small book would be his salvation, his 
source of strength in the prison camps of North Vietnam� Stockdale would 
embrace the Stoic philosophy and make it his own� He would write essays and 
deliver speeches to audiences throughout the country� In fact, years later as 
President of the College, he often began his remarks to students with the phrase 
“Remember, life is not fair� Once you accept that, you can move on�”11
Epictetus’s teachings and the Stoic philosophy would play a major role in 
Stockdale’s life, especially while he was imprisoned in North Vietnam� He wrote 
to Brennan, “My ‘secret weapon’ was the security I felt in anchoring my resolve to 
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those selected portions of philosophic thought that emphasized human dignity 
and self-respect� Epictetus certainly taught that�”12 While in prison, Stockdale 
lived in the world of Epictetus and applied the lessons and teachings from The 
Enchiridion to survive� “The Stoic philosopher Epictetus was foremost among my 
consolations in the pressure cooker of Hanoi�”13
After his release from prison in 1973, Stockdale spent nearly a year in recovery 
healing his physical wounds—and pressing charges against fellow prisoners who 
had collaborated with the enemy and violated the Code of Conduct� Stockdale 
wrote, “To the Stoic, the greatest injury that can be inflicted on a person is ad-
ministered by himself when he destroys the good man within him�”14 Stockdale 
argued that the collaborators had betrayed the trust of their fellow prisoners and 
deserved punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; however, the 
U�S� government took no action against the collaborators and eventually allowed 
them to retire� In 1976, Stockdale became a national hero and received the Medal 
of Honor for his service in Vietnam, which included spending almost seven and 
a half years as a prisoner of war, much of it in solitary confinement�15
STOCKDALE AND BRENNAN
In 1975, Dr� Joseph Brennan was teaching philosophy at Columbia University� 
He became intrigued by what he read about Stockdale and his study of Epictetus 
and the Stoics� He sent Stockdale a letter asking how philosophy had given him 
inner strength throughout his time as a prisoner of war in Vietnam� Brennan 
subsequently requested to add Stockdale’s lengthy response to an upcoming book 
he was writing� This exchange laid the groundwork for a friendship that would 
endure for the rest of their lives�16
Stockdale took command of the Naval War College as its fortieth President 
on October 13, 1977� Shortly after taking over, he contacted both Brennan and 
Rhinelander to get their assistance with and feedback on his proposed philosophy 
course� Although they had corresponded by letter for almost two years, Stockdale 
and Brennan did not meet until the change of command� In a letter to Brennan 
dated December 5, 1977, shortly after taking command, Stockdale wrote, “What 
are the philosophic roots of a military profession? What are the watershed dis-
tinctions that separate bureaucrats from warriors, winners from losers? I know 
this is no simple matter to get a layman up to speed to teach such sensitive 
material—but I want my students to have something more than a few mutually 
contradictory slogans when their backs are against the wall� � � � I need a theme, a 
recommended reading list, and a lot of time to think�”17
Brennan visited Newport and the College again over the Christmas holidays 
in 1977� He met with Stockdale several times during the visit to discuss the pro-
posed ethics course� Brennan was on track to accept a position in India with the 
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State Department, but turned it down when Stockdale offered him a part-time 
job as his assistant to develop and teach the course� In a letter to a friend dated 
January 21, 1978, Brennan wrote as follows:
My job title is Consultant to the President, term: 11 months of 1978; my duties in-
clude preparing the course, getting up a reading list, conferring with the admiral until 
17 August when my wife and I will move to Newport for the 16 weeks that the class 
runs� I’ll be on standby to give classes when the admiral is called away� The hardest 
part will be to prepare the course—it’s easy enough to do that for oneself, but when 
somebody, who is not a professional, is to teach it, that’s a new one for me�18 
Brennan immediately went to work preparing the course� In his undated 
NWC journal notes, Brennan wrote, “When I suggested I’d like to visit classes 
and talk to other faculty, he [Stockdale] said, ‘Don’t pay too much attention to 
those guys�’”19
As the new President of the College, Stockdale spent time reviewing the cur-
ricula for all courses� He was concerned about what he found, and decided to 
implement electives for all students during the following AY, 1979–80� In a letter 
to Brennan dated January 13, 1978, he wrote as follows:
I’ve created quite a stir with the Departments, asking for electives—not only for  
myself—but for Constitutional Law, Soviet foreign policy, etc� I’m telling ’em that I 
can drive a truck through the Gaps our three departments leave in the educational 
base for mid-career officers and that the option is to let me supervise a broad elec-
tives program or move over and give me 25 percent of the room for my 4th depart-
ment (Philosophy & Law—or whatever)� The profs Love it; the Administrators are 
adapting�20 [emphasis original]
Stockdale was passionate about implementing changes to make sure the cur-
riculum and the faculty met the needs of its graduates, then and in the future� The 
existing curriculum did not address any of the things that Stockdale had found 
most valuable during his time as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam� As Stock-
dale noted, “‘No philosophical survival kits are issued’ when man goes to war�”21
Stockdale and Brennan both spent long hours trying to decide on an appropri-
ate name for the course they would teach� As Brennan noted, “Stockdale did not 
like the word ethics� He thought the contemporary ‘ethics explosion’ had eroded 
the older, nobler sense of the word� He knew that ethics courses were spreading 
rapidly, not only in military institutions but also in business, industry, and the 
professions�”22 Stockdale thought that the term moral philosophy was more suit-
able because it tied into the humanities�23 Stockdale and Brennan finally agreed 
on the course title Foundations of Moral Obligation� But they spent many ad-
ditional hours deciding on the absolute best readings and lessons for the course� 
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In a letter to a friend dated January 21, 1978, Brennan wrote: “I do know that he 
is interested in anything that has to do with prison camps—he is trying to get 
Alex� Solzhenitsyn up to the War College for a lecture� He also wants to put some 
literary works on his reading list, and mentioned Camus� Since he, Stockdale, 
is an enemy of bureaucracy, I thought that something of Kafka might do� Even 
Darkness at Noon occurred to me as a possibility� � � � If you have any suggestions, 
I’d be grateful�”24
In a letter to a friend dated February 5, 1978, Brennan wrote as follows:
I spent this last long weekend, Thursday through Saturday, with Adm Stockdale at 
Newport and Providence� � � � He is a very intense, very attractive man� � � � We now 
have a course title, “The Foundations of Moral Obligation,” as well as a tentative 
reading list which includes the Book of Job, the Socratic Dialogues of Plato, selections 
from Aristotle’s Ethics, Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Mill’s Utilitarianism, Sartre on Existentialism, as well as fiction readings including 
Conrad’s Typhoon, Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, Kafka’s Trial � � � and Solzhenitsyn’s 
Ivan Denisovich�25
Stockdale and Brennan finalized the course readings and syllabus during the 
spring of 1978 and prepared to offer the elective during the fall trimester�
THE STOCKDALE-BRENNAN ERA
Neither Stockdale nor Brennan knew how well the new course would be received 
by students once they actually started teaching� Both worked diligently to en-
sure that the syllabus, reading list, and subsequent seminar discussions would 
provide valuable information to midgrade military officers in search of a moral 
compass� Brennan wrote, “Through the winter, spring, and summer of 1978, 
Admiral Stockdale and I met frequently for intensive discussions concerning the 
organization of the course�”26 Stockdale fervently believed the course would fill 
a void in the students’ careers� He told a reporter, “Today’s ranks are filled with 
officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the 
better business schools—that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils� This 
course is my defense against the buzz-word-nomograph-acronym mentality�”27
In an address he gave at Trinity Church in Newport on Sunday, May 7, 1978, 
for Rhode Island’s Independence Day, Stockdale used material from the upcom-
ing course in his remarks� Stockdale highlighted both Viktor E� Frankl’s book 
Man’s Search for Meaning and Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov to illustrate 
the importance of freedom to the individual�28
The news of Stockdale’s Foundations of Moral Obligation course spread quick-
ly to the Navy Staff� A retired Navy captain who was in the first seminar shared 
the following: “By early 1978, the word on the street around DC was that this 
course is a ‘must take’ if you wanted to think deeply about the business you were 
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in and were lucky enough to get orders to the War College�”29 Stockdale’s reputa-
tion as a Medal of Honor recipient, along with Brennan’s prowess as a scholar, 
fueled the media blitz� The fact that they were team-teaching a philosophy course 
for military students, many with recent combat experience in Vietnam, added 
to the attractiveness for the media� Brennan wrote, “Word got around that a 
Vietnam war hero with the Medal of Honor was teaching a course in moral phi-
losophy at the Naval War College, and the media moved in with tape recorders, 
television cameras, and fast-writing reporters�”30
The initial seminar, offered in the fall 1978 trimester, was capped at fifty stu-
dents� The second offering was in the winter trimester; it had thirty-five students 
and fifteen auditors� Brennan related that the students idolized Stockdale, so 
there was no difficulty filling all the seats�31 The course was designed for Stock-
dale and Brennan each to deliver one-hour lectures on Wednesday afternoon, 
followed by a one-and-a-half-hour seminar discussion on Thursday afternoon� 
The elective met for ten weeks during the trimester� Stockdale intended to use 
original classic material along with popular novels, and he created a challenging 
reading list�32 Stockdale said, “We studied moral philosophy by looking at models 
of human beings under pressure, their portraits drawn from the best materials we 
could find in philosophy and literature�”33 The syllabus included the following:
Week One Introduction� The Prisoner of War and the Human Predica-
ment� The World of Epictetus�
Week Two The Book of Job and the Problem of Evil�
Week Three The Socratic Example� Four Platonic Dialogues�
Week Four Aristotle and the Nichomachean Ethics.
Week Five Law: Of Conscience and the State� Kant and Hart�
Week Six Happiness as Utility; Justice and Fairness� Mill and Rawls�
Week Seven Individualism and the Collective I� Emerson; Sartre; Camus�
Week Eight Individualism and the Collective II� Lenin and Soviet 
Philosophy�
Week Nine Science and Values� Monod and the Moral Ideal of Objective 
Knowledge� Wittgenstein and the Ethic of Silence�
Week Ten Return to the Beginning� The Stoic Ideal and the Ethic of the 
Military�34
Each student took a midterm and a final examination and submitted a short 
paper� The weekly readings were difficult for the students, especially those 
without a background in philosophy� However, the seminar discussions allowed 
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Stockdale and Brennan to interact with students and facilitate the learning pro-
cess� Moreover, the elective gave students an opportunity to expand their hori-
zons and to read and discuss material they never would have read on their own�
During the first academic year it was offered, the Foundations elective received 
high ratings from students� In fact, in a report to the President of the Naval War 
College, Brennan related that it “ranked highest of the 18 electives offered, topped 
only by FE-117, a course in advanced electronic warfare�”35 Student evaluations 
ranged from 6�19 to 6�58 on a 7-point Likert scale�36 Overall, the initial offering 
was very successful� Brennan related that one of the few negative comments was 
that “[t]here was not enough structure to the seminars and there was a tendency 
to rely too much on unprepared class discussion to carry them�”37 Stockdale and 
Brennan worked to improve the seminar discussions for the second offering�
Both Stockdale and Brennan were passionate about the Foundations elective 
because it filled a void in the students’ professional development� This passion 
was evident to the students, faculty, and staff at the Naval War College and 
throughout the Navy� Unfortunately, Stockdale retired from the U�S� Navy and 
left the College shortly after AY 1978–79 to accept a position as president of The 
Citadel� However, his interest in and influence on the Foundations course con-
tinued long after he retired� Likewise, the bond of friendship that Stockdale had 
forged with Brennan continued to grow and prosper over the years�
THE BRENNAN YEARS
After Stockdale’s retirement, Brennan decided to remain at the College and con-
tinued to teach the Foundations elective himself as a part-time employee for the 
next thirteen years� Brennan did not change the course significantly during those 
years� However, he limited the course to twenty-five students to make it more 
manageable for only one instructor� Brennan continued to offer the course for 
two trimesters each academic year�38
During the period 1986–91, Brennan developed and taught another elective, 
“Philosophy in American Values�” This course was popular at the College and 
allowed Brennan to dig deeper into American philosophy and literature� He also 
served as an academic adviser to international students at the Naval Command 
College� Although still a part-time employee, Brennan carried what many today 
would consider a full load�39
Throughout this time, Brennan’s friendship with Stockdale and his family con-
tinued to blossom and grow� In a letter to Stockdale dated September 13, 1979, 
Brennan wrote as follows:
Yes, Foundations of Moral Obligation did meet for the first time yesterday, but it 
was a little like putting on Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark� Still, the class is 
delighted to know that you will come to deliver the valedictory lecture at the 10th 
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session� � � � This academic year will show, I think, whether EL 101 (Foundations 
of Moral Obligation) has what-it-takes to stand on its own feet� I think it can and 
should, but the comparatively large audience for the course’s first trimester is still a 
result of your personal contribution and fame�40 
In a subsequent letter dated November 6, 1979, Brennan wrote, “Mid-term 
is past, course papers are being busily written, and so far all seems to have gone 
very well, though I do miss you� I’ve had to do a lot more restructuring [of] the 
course than I had thought� Not that the content or the reading has changed—no, 
just the way of doing the course without you�”41
Stockdale contemplated introducing the Foundations course to students at 
The Citadel�42 He continued to rely on Brennan’s feedback and advice in his out-
side presentations and articles� But he also provided input to his successors as 
NWC President about Brennan’s success with the elective at the College� In a let-
ter to Brennan dated March 19, 1982, Stockdale wrote, “Before I forget it, please 
let me know what you hear about the identity of Ed Welch’s successor� I’ll get on 
the phone with him right away and make a plea to keep the Philosophy Depart-
ment (i�e�, You)� All I need is his name�”43
Stockdale subsequently wrote to Rear Admiral James E� Service, Commander, 
Carrier Group Two, the incoming College President, on August 5, 1982:
I’m always afraid that NWC will be put under pressure to rid itself of all apparently 
quasi-military courses such as the Foundations of Moral Obligation which I founded 
with my good friend Dr� Joe Brennan�
I have no idea that you would even consider discontinuing it, but just as a precaution, 
let me give you my impressions of how it has gone under Joe Brennan alone since 
I left� I speak to his classes nearly every year� (He has added an American Values 
course which also draws a lot of subscribers in the spring trimester)� As the classes 
filed out of their joint session to hear me this spring, officer after officer—particularly 
Marines—said “Best course, Best teacher in the place�” I think a review of the class 
critiques will verify this� Joe rings the bell�44 [emphasis original]
Stockdale also spoke to Rear Admiral Joseph C� Strasser, a later President of 
the College, about Brennan and the Foundations elective� In a letter to Brennan 
of January 10, 1992, Stockdale wrote: 
Then at my request he buzzed the Admiral, and I told Joe [Strasser] how proud I was 
to be a part of your project� We shared stories about the number of Marine and Naval 
officers we’ve each run into, who, on mention of the Naval War College, immediately 
mention “Joe Brennan’s courses�” As I count it, you are now in your 14th year there, 
and some of our 42 year old students in ’78–79 are now 56! Some retired Admirals 
and Generals telling young grandchildren about their career highlights� � � � Admiral 
Strasser is a great fan of yours�45 
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Upon his retirement in 1992, Brennan received many accolades, including 
designation by the Secretary of the Navy as professor emeritus of philosophy�46 
His book Foundations of Moral Obligation: A Practical Guide to Ethics and Moral-
ity was published in 1992, shortly before he retired�
Brennan died in 2004, but his legacy is well established at the Naval War Col-
lege� He helped to develop the Foundations elective and continued the course for 
thirteen years after Vice Admiral Stockdale retired� However, his legacy consists 
of much more than that� Brennan touched the hearts and minds of hundreds of 
NWC graduates and inspired them to look at things in a different light and to 
consider alternate paths to achieve their own eudaimonia�47
At Dr� Brennan’s retirement ceremony, Stockdale said, “From the classics, 
throughout 14 years of teaching here, you have conducted what I consider to be 
the world’s best course in military leadership� Never after taking your course will 
anyone be comfortable in believing that the analytic and reasoned approach is the 
‘be all and end all’ of officership�”48
Perhaps that is the essence of the Naval War College education�
THE REGAN YEARS
Paul Regan began teaching the Foundations of Moral Obligation elective in the 
fall trimester of AY 1994–95 while on active duty as a USCG captain assigned to 
the College as the USCG adviser� There was a two-year gap in the course between 
Brennan’s retirement and Regan taking over�
Originally, Regan was recruited, with two other faculty members, to teach the 
Foundations elective to end the temporary discontinuation of the course� Regan 
had a background in philosophy and volunteered to assist� When both the other 
faculty members fell out, Regan agreed to teach the elective alone� Even after his 
retirement from active duty in 1995, he continued to teach the elective one tri-
mester every academic year for the next fifteen years� He worked for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in Boston and drove to Newport one 
afternoon each week to teach�49
Regan was also responsible for keeping the Stockdale name associated with the 
elective� Regan wrote, “About halfway through my time with the course I began 
to realize that many of the students no longer associated the course with him 
[Stockdale], so I requested the name change to include ‘The Stockdale Course�’ 
Enrollment figures immediately jumped up�”50
Regan did not change the course significantly when he started teaching� In a 
statement dated June 6, 2016, Regan confessed, “I made a conscious decision to 
stick with the basic outline that Stockdale initiated and Prof Brennan continued� 
Since my degree is in scholastic philosophy, which is heavily based in classic phi-
losophy, I say—and continue to see—the value of reading the actual works of the 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   130 4/21/17   8:35 AM
135
War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
G I B B O N S  1 3 1
great philosophers� Quite honestly, from my background in philosophy, were I 
to design the course from scratch I would have used much the same approach as 
Stockdale and Professor Brennan�”51 However, when the Berlin Wall came down 
in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the original lesson on Lenin and 
Soviet philosophy became outdated and was removed�
Regan continued to use Brennan’s book Foundations of Moral Obligation as a 
major course text� The major change he instituted was to establish two different 
paths, a reading path and a writing path� Students in the reading path completed 
all assigned readings and the final examination; students in the writing path 
completed only the major readings and Professor Brennan’s book, and were re-
quired to write a ten-to-twelve-page paper on a topic dealing with ethics or moral 
judgment�52 Regan explained, “After a while it was clear that the workload for this 
course was substantially greater than that of most other electives� Indeed, even 
after a degree in philosophy and years teaching, I could read most of the material 
at about 6 pages an hour� I attempted to level out the course by letting the students 
choose to express their thoughts in a longer paper (the standard elective length) 
or devote their time to the reading�”53
Although he only taught the course for one trimester each academic year, Paul 
Regan’s legacy is that he kept the elective vibrant and exciting for the students� 
He taught the course alone longer than Brennan had� His seminars were popular 
and full of lively discussions� Regan admitted, “Having lived real lives, students 
were not afraid to (courteously) say, ‘Captain, you’re full of crap’ � � � which [led] to 
debate and, hopefully, the opening of minds�”54 Regan summarized it best as fol-
lows: “And finally, I think every good teacher realizes he or she learns as much as 
the students� Teaching the Stockdale Course was a privilege for me� I mentioned 
that in the last few years I taught by taking leave from FEMA every Wednesday 
and got no reimbursement—but really would have paid to teach for all I learned 
and all the fine and dedicated students I had over the years� � � � It was an honor 
and has become part of who I am�”55 Regan left the College after AY 2009–10�56
THE COOK YEARS
Dr� Martin Cook came to the Naval War College in 2009 as the Vice Admiral 
James B� Stockdale Professor of Professional Military Ethics� He cotaught the 
Foundations elective with Dr� Tom Gibbons� Cook came from the U�S� Air Force 
Academy but also had taught at the U�S� Army War College in Carlisle, Penn-
sylvania, for several years� His record of publication and teaching professional 
military ethics was unsurpassed, and he integrated quickly into the College’s 
leadership and ethics team�
Dr� Cook knew little about the Foundations of Moral Obligation elective 
before he arrived but quickly realized its value for active-duty military officers� 
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Accordingly, he made the decision to offer the elective during all three trimesters 
of the academic year� Cook also modified the curriculum to reflect contemporary 
issues affecting the military today� He added lessons on non-Western religion, in-
cluding reading the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, and a lesson entitled “Finding Mean-
ing in One’s Life,” reading Leo Tolstoy’s short story The Death of Ivan Ilych and 
Elie Wiesel’s novel Night� Cook introduced Jostein Gaarder’s novel Sophie’s World, 
an easy-to-read history of philosophy, to help students gain a better understand-
ing of the different philosophers they studied�57 Karl Marlantes’s book What It Is 
like to Go to War is one of the best accounts of modern combat ever written, and 
became popular with students and faculty alike� Cook sponsored Marlantes as a 
guest speaker at the College every year�
Cook’s syllabus included the following:
Week One Greek and Roman Stoics� Epictetus� Stockdale’s Thoughts of a 
Philosophical Fighter Pilot.
Week Two The Greek Tradition� Socrates/Plato� “Euthyphro,” “Apology,” 
and “Crito�”
Week Three Plato� The Republic�
Week Four The Greek Tradition� Aristotle� Nichomachean Ethics�
Week Five The Western Religious Tradition�
Week Six The Enlightenment� Immanuel Kant�
Week Seven Life in Society� UN Charter, Declaration of Independence, U�S� 
Constitution, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and Kant’s “Per-
petual Peace�”
Week Eight Finding Meaning in One’s Life� Tolstoy and Wiesel�
Week Nine Non-Western (Hindu) Perspective� The Bhagavad Gita� Early 
Christian “Just War,” and Karl Marlantes’s What It Is like to Go 
to War.
Week Ten Some Skeptical Challenges� Dostoyevsky’s “The Grand In-
quisitor,” Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus, and the Book of Job�
Cook established at the Naval War College the “Great Books” method taught at 
his alma mater, the University of Chicago, and at St� John’s College in Annapolis, 
Maryland, and Santa Fe, New Mexico� The students read original-source great 
books and then discussed the readings in seminar, with the faculty members fa-
cilitating the discussion� In other words, the seminar discussion was the primary 
focus, not the faculty members’ lecturing from the front of the classroom� Cook 
and Gibbons sat at different ends of the classroom to facilitate and moderate the 
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student discussions� Students learned just as much from each other and from the 
readings as they did from the faculty moderators� Cook commented, “I person-
ally believe that the modified great books method makes the students engage far 
better than a lecture-discussion course would�”58
Cook also relied heavily on technology; he instituted use of the Blackboard 
learning management system� The electronic syllabus he built within Blackboard 
actually came alive on screen with links to podcasts, embedded videos, and 
contemporary lectures on relevant topics� From the readings each week, every 
student wrote a one- or two-page posting of thoughts, criticisms, comments, 
and points to be explored� Students also were required to read and comment on 
each other’s postings� This system had several advantages� First, students started 
the weekly discussions before they even arrived at the classroom, by comment-
ing on each other’s postings� Additionally, students improved their writing skills 
through the weekly postings and immediate feedback, rather than writing a 
ten-to-twelve-page paper at the end of the course� Blackboard enabled Cook and 
Gibbons to jump-start the seminar discussion before they actually came to class�
Cook departed the Naval War College in 2016 to work at the U�S� Air Force 
Academy as a distinguished visiting professor� His fame and reputation as a lead-
ing scholar in professional military ethics had enhanced the Foundations elective 
and helped to establish it as one of the most popular electives during his tenure� 
His legacy of using technology, along with the Great Books method, improved 
the delivery of the course and brought it into the twenty-first century�
STAYING POWER
Why has the Foundations of Moral Obligation elective continued to be so popu-
lar after nearly forty years? This simple yet thought-provoking question has many 
answers� The easy one is that the course owes its success to a triad of the faculty, 
the syllabus and readings, and the students� But there is much more to answering 
the question than that�
The faculty members who taught the elective over the years were all qualified 
and competent in their discipline� Moreover, they were all gifted and talented 
educators� Even more than that, they were passionate about the curriculum and 
brought that energy and passion to the classroom� Each in his own way set the 
conditions that enabled the students to think about the material, apply it to their 
lives, and then share those experiences with others in seminar� Regan revealed, 
“Most tellingly, in the class students would often bare their souls and bring to 
light moral dilemmas they had to deal with—and most implicitly trust their class-
mates not to let their statements be repeated�”59 Rather than simply spouting in-
formation about ancient philosophers or literature in the seminar, the instructors 
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empowered their students to apply what they learned to their daily lives and share 
this with their classmates�
The syllabus and course readings that Stockdale and Brennan originally select-
ed almost forty years ago have remained fairly consistent across time� Of the ten 
lessons in the original syllabus, six are relatively similar today� In an after-action 
report dated January 29, 1980, Brennan wrote, “[T]he course should center on, 
though not be restricted to, important classical and modern readings in phi-
losophy and the humanities� Moreover, whenever possible the readings should 
consist of primary, not secondary, sources�”60 This guidance has stood the test 
of time and still is reflected in the syllabus� In 1982, Stockdale noted that “[w]e 
studied moral philosophy by looking at models of human beings under pressure, 
their portraits drawn from the best materials we could find in philosophy and 
literature� The professional implication for military men and women followed� 
We did not have to draw diagrams: the military applications came up naturally 
in seminar discussions�”61
Many of the readings are time-consuming and difficult to understand the first 
time through� Students often ask themselves, “Now, what did I just read?” How-
ever, the lessons and pearls of wisdom in the readings are priceless� Cook wrote, 
“I guess I was pleasantly surprised how many students seemed to make serious 
and genuine efforts to read and understand the material, even if they really didn’t 
get it until class�”62 In the seminar it is easy to see when the light goes on and a stu-
dent suddenly “gets it” and really understands the text� This enables the learners 
to apply a text to their own lives and share it with others� One important metric of 
success is that, no matter how uncertain they were whether they had understood 
the week’s assigned reading when they arrived in class, during subsequent lessons 
most students would refer back unfailingly and accurately to previous readings�
Although they are difficult for many, the course readings are timeless and tend 
to make a lasting impression on students� In fact, many times on the last day of 
class the instructors provided supplementary reading lists for students to con-
tinue their studies in military ethics long after graduation� One student wrote, “I 
believe that I am better prepared after taking the Stockdale Course� Dr� Regan has 
given us a pretty impressive reading list to follow up our studies in this course� I’m 
making it a mission in my life to try and read all these classic works� If anything, 
this course has provoked a hunger in me to learn more about ethics and moral 
behavior� It must surely be a positive thing in a man’s life if he at least yearns to 
learn more about living a proper existence�”63
For some, the readings opened new doors and exposed them to material they 
never would have selected on their own� In a letter to Brennan a student wrote, 
“The readings introduced me to material that I should have read a long time 
ago, and never had either the inclination or the opportunity�”64 Stockdale wanted 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   134 4/21/17   8:35 AM
139
War College: Summer 2017 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
G I B B O N S  1 3 5
students to read and discuss the classics� He trusted that doing so would help 
them to develop a moral compass and enable them to think critically� Brennan 
later wrote, “Training in the humanities, Stockdale believed, would show that 
much of what goes by the name ‘social science’ serves up ideas expressed earlier 
and better in classical philosophy and modern literature�”65 This course provided 
an opportunity for many Naval War College graduates to read and discuss classic 
literature, which shaped their personal and professional development and had a 
positive impact on their lives�
The students are the third critical element in the triad of success� For the most 
part, the students at the Naval War College are motivated, want to learn, and work 
hard� In other words, they are avid consumers of the educational experience� 
Many have recent combat experience and are willing to share those experiences 
with classmates� They bring a willingness to learn and an insatiable desire to 
question things that others often take for granted� Why do the students like the 
Foundations elective? Regan’s analysis is as follows:
Almost any military career path is technical in one way or another� Rarely is there 
the opportunity to answer the real questions: What makes life worth living? For the 
military, what is worth dying for? How should I raise my children? These fundamen-
tal questions require a certain maturity to address� The students at the NWC have 
reached an age where these questions are important, as are the answers� There are few 
times in life when one has the opportunity to look in depth at such questions�66 
The Foundations elective provides an opportunity for students to ask these 
“hard questions” in a nonthreatening environment among peers who are asking 
the same things� Cook opined, “I think it’s popular because I think Aristotle’s 
observations about the study of ethics (that it’s not useful to do it with the young, 
who lack experience) is borne out by the fact that after a couple of decades of 
adult experience they seem so eager to think about these matters�”67 There is a 
difference between studying philosophy as an undergraduate and as a graduate 
student: the graduate student can relate more to the lessons because of his or her 
greater life experiences�
Countless letters express students’ gratitude to the College for offering the 
Foundations elective� A USN officer and future President of the Naval War Col-
lege wrote to Stockdale, “Some students questioned the course’s relevance, if you 
can believe it� For me it would be like questioning the relevance of oxygen� � � � 
I find the subjects of the course extremely useful� Thanks for the effort—it is 
still bearing fruit 20+ years later�”68 Another student wrote, “It’s a dangerous and 
deadly working environment we have chosen to work in� Without this foundation 
(pun intended) in moral and ethical behavior, when we do get in the buzzsaw, can 
we really be sure we’ll be prepared?” (emphasis original)�69
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Students continue to rate the course high on their end-of-course evaluations� 
Recent students’ comments reflect this sentiment� 
“Amazing course to only add to my tool box in becoming a better effective 
leader and thinker�”
“Reading and understanding certain philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, 
Socrates, Thomas Aquinas, Kierkegaard, etc� can be difficult� This course 
definitely challenged my ability to read and interpret their works� Also, the 
course work challenged my thinking and long-held beliefs, which was great�”
“Foundations of Moral Obligation is one of those courses that changes one’s 
perspectives and the lenses that we perceive events in life—both of which is 
[sic] important in an increasing multi-national world�”
“Had me think about why I did certain things or why I should do things 
differently�”
“Excellent course� Needed for anyone who considers themselves a future 
senior leader�”
“The best course that I have taken�”70 
It is not just one or two things that have made the Foundations elective popu-
lar for almost forty years� It is a combination of many that contributed to making 
possible those magical moments in seminar when students are able to discuss 
controversial issues and then open their minds to a different way of thinking�
Naval War College graduates have liked the Foundations of Moral Obligation 
elective so well that some have proposed making it part of the core curriculum, 
to be taken by all students� This aspect is especially relevant given the recent spike 
of events questioning the moral compass of senior USN leaders�
However, it would be a mistake to require all students at the College to take 
Foundations of Moral Obligation� Part of the value of the course comes from the 
well-qualified and passionate instructors who have taught the elective in the past� 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to educate enough faculty members to of-
fer the course to all students at the same level of proficiency� Nor would the qual-
ity of student participation be as high if the course was a mandatory requirement� 
Those students who choose to take the course do so out of a desire to discover 
new ways to think about life’s fundamental questions�
Vice Admiral Stockdale understood the importance of a liberal arts education 
and the study of the humanities in a highly technical defense organization� “The 
philosophy course he took at Stanford in his thirties, said Stockdale, did him a 
lot more good in Hanoi than any of the Naval Academy’s technical subjects�”71 
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Stockdale also realized that leaders need to develop more than just their techni-
cal proficiency� As Brennan noted in 1983, “The study of good philosophy and 
literature, he [Stockdale] held, would benefit human beings; and, since military 
officers were human, it would be good for them, too, not only as human beings 
but as military officers�”72
Stockdale recognized the importance of military officers becoming lifelong 
learners� Officers should never stop learning and questioning� Brennan related 
that “[w]hat the officers liked best about the Stockdale course was the opportu-
nity to reflect on questions they felt had always been in their own minds, but just 
below the surface� This course, they agreed, provided them with the chance to 
raise those questions to the level of mature consciousness�”73
The continuing relevance and popularity of the course only serve to reinforce 
Stockdale’s original reason for establishing it: to develop a course for military of-
ficers, focusing on leadership and ethics, that gives them the moral tools for suc-
cess, whether on the battlefield or in a staff job at the Pentagon� A reporter from 
the Washington Post summarized it best when he wrote as follows: 
Called “Foundations of Moral Obligation,” the course that Stockdale himself will 
teach represents the latest attempt to help American fighting men cope with pressure, 
including but not limited to that inflicted by captivity� 
He will try to convey to young officers what teachings got him through his 7½ years 
of captivity, which began on Sept� 9, 1965, when he parachuted from his damaged 
A-4 fighter-bomber into a tree� He will try to explain how and why a man can sum-
mon up astonishing courage if he has committed himself to integrity—“one of those
words which many people keep in that desk drawer labeled ‘too hard,’” in Stockdale’s
words�74
Over 1,900 graduates and family members have taken the Foundations of 
Moral Obligation course since Vice Admiral Stockdale and Dr� Brennan intro-
duced it in 1978� Little did the two men know at the time how this one course 
would impact the lives of so many over the years�
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REMARKS, STOCKDALE TO PILOTS, 1965
Martin L. Cook
Dr. Cook taught at the Naval War College from 2009 to 2016 and is the 
Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Professor Emeritus of Professional 
Military Ethics at the College. He now serves as a distinguished visiting 
professor of philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
In Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, his collection of reflective essays 
published long after his time in Vietnam, Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale 
writes eloquently about the importance of the study of philosophy in helping him 
to endure the prisoner of war (POW) experience. While at Stanford completing a 
degree in economics, he found his most important questions being deflected by 
the economics faculty, often with the remark, “Well, we’re getting into philosophy 
now.” Exasperated by that reaction, Stockdale found his way to the Philosophy 
Department and embarked on a course of reading in the subject, guided by Pro-
fessor Philip H. Rhinelander.
As Stockdale was leaving Stanford, Rhinelander gave him a copy of the work 
on Roman Stoicism by the freed slave–philosopher Epictetus, which Stock-
dale read (he says) initially only out of respect for Rhinelander. But Epictetus’s 
thoughts clearly stuck with him and, in the end, helped him find the resiliency 
and determination to endure the POW experience honorably. The key tenet of 
Stoic philosophy is the distinction between what one can control (only one’s own 
actions and inner reactions to things) and what one cannot (the actions of others 
and the unavoidable circumstances life brings).
Although written well before Stockdale began his POW experience, this 
speech to his aircrews en route to Vietnam demonstrates the degree to which he 
already was thinking about and articulating what they were about to undergo in 
Stoic terms. His discussion about moving up bomb-release altitudes or adding 
REDISCOVERIES
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fuel reflects exactly the Stoic notion of accepting the mission one is given, realis-
tically and uncomplainingly. His unflinching dismissal of “Hollywood answers” 
and straightforward recognition that, as military officers, his listeners do not get 
to pick, or even to some degree judge, the war to which they are assigned are a 
perfect illustration of recognizing what is within one’s own powers and what is 
not. It recognizes that political decisions about where military force is used are 
“above the pay grade” of his officers.
Stockdale reminds his listeners, “[Y]ou [are] an actor in a drama that you’ll 
replay in your mind’s eye for the rest of your life.” In other words, you are not 
the playwright, but how you perform in the play rests entirely in your hands. In 
this remark, he is virtually paraphrasing Epictetus (Enchiridion 17): “Remember 
that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it. 
If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a 
poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. 
For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is 
another’s.”
So, in this short address, we see Stockdale the Stoic warrior attempting to 
impart Stoic wisdom to his aircrews. It is the perfect illustration of the “opera-
tionalization” of the importance of philosophy that he will write about years later 
with such eloquence. But already, here, he is attempting to help his aircrews steel 
themselves mentally to accept the war and the missions assigned to them un-
flinchingly, realistically, without illusions. He is, as the Stoics would say, leading 
them to live “in accordance with Nature” (kata phusin) by calling things what 
they are and calmly facing what lies before them.
Remarks of wing commander James B. Stockdale to the pilots of Carrier Air Wing 16 aboard 
USS Oriskany, at sea en route to the Gulf of Tonkin, on April 29, 1965, one week before they 
entered combat. Presented as found in the archives of the Naval War College. Excerpted version 
available in U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Presidio, 1978).
Having reviewed for you the terrain of Vietnam, the enemy’s order of battle, the 
rules of engagement, and to some extent the modern history of the conflict and 
the evolution of America’s strategy, I think I owe you in addition a straight-from-
the-shoulder discussion of pilots’ mental attitudes and orientation in “limited 
war” circumstances. I saw the need for this last summer aboard Ticonderoga—
after the start of the war had caught us by surprise and we had gone through 
those first, exciting days pretty much on adrenaline. In the lull that followed, as 
we prepared for a next round, I could sense that those fine young men who had 
measured up so well in the sudden reality of flak and burning targets wanted to 
talk and get their resources and value systems lined up for the long haul. Like 
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most of you, they were well read, sensitive, sometimes skeptical—those educated 
in the American liberal tradition to think for themselves—those who are often 
our most productive citizens and, just as often, our best soldiers. They realized 
that bombing heavily defended targets is serious business and no game—that it is 
logically impossible, in the violence of a fight, to commit oneself as an individual 
only in some proportion of his total drive and combative instinct. It has to be 
all or nothing; dog eat dog over the target. I think they were asking themselves, 
as you might—Where do I as a person, a person of awareness, refinement, and 
education, fit into this “limited war,” “measured response” concept?
I want to level with you right now, so you can think it over here in mid-Pacific 
and not kid yourself into imagining “stark realizations” in the Gulf of Tonkin. Once 
you go “feet dry” over the beach, there can be nothing limited about your com-
mitment. “Limited war” means to us that our target list has limits, our ordnance 
loadout has limits, our rules of engagement have limits, but that does not mean 
that there is anything “limited” about our personal obligations as fighting men to 
carry out assigned missions with all we’ve got. If you think it is possible for a man, 
in the heat of battle, to apply something less than total personal commitment 
—equated perhaps to your idea of the proportion of national potential being 
applied—you are wrong. It’s contrary to human nature. So also is the idea I was 
alarmed to find suggested to me by a military friend in a letter recently: that the 
prisoner of war’s Code of Conduct is some sort of a “total war” document. You 
can’t go halfway on that, either. The Code of Conduct was not written for “total 
wars” or “limited wars,” it was written for all wars, and let it be understood that it 
applies with full force to this air wing, in this war.
What I am saying is that national commitment and personal commitment are 
two different things. All is not relative. You classical scholars know that even the 
celebrated “free thinker” Socrates was devoted to ridiculing the sophist idea that 
one can avoid black and white choices in arriving at personal commitments; one 
sooner or later comes to a fork in the road. As Harvard’s philosophy great, Alfred 
North Whitehead, said: “I can’t bring half an umbrella to work when the weather-
man predicts a 50 percent chance of rain.” We are all at the fork in the road this 
week. Think it over. If you find yourself rationalizing about moving your bomb-
release altitude up a thousand feet from where your strike leader briefs it, or add-
ing a few hundred pounds fuel to your over-target bingo because “the Navy needs 
you for greater things,” or you must save the airplane for some “great war” of the 
future, you, you’re in the wrong outfit. You owe it to yourself to have a talk with 
your skipper or me. It’s better for both you and your shipmates that you face up 
to your fork in the road here at 140 degrees east rather than later, two thousand 
miles west of here, on the line.
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Let us all face our prospects squarely. We’ve got to be prepared to obey the 
rules and contribute without reservation. If political or religious conviction helps 
you do this, so much the better, but you’re still going to be expected to press on, 
with or without these comforting thoughts, simply because this uniform commits 
us to a military ethic—the ethic of personal pride and excellence that alone has 
supported some of the greatest fighting men in history. Don’t require Hollywood 
answers to “What are we fighting for?” We’re here to fight because it’s in the inter-
est of the United States that we do so. This may not be the most dramatic way to 
explain it, but it has the advantage of being absolutely correct.
I hope I haven’t made this too somber. I merely want to let you all know first 
of all where this wing stands on “Duty, Honor, Country.” Secondly, I want to warn 
you all of excessive caution. A philosopher has warned us that, of all forms of 
caution, caution in love is the most fatal to true happiness. When that Fox flag is 
two-blocked in the Gulf, you’ll be an actor in a drama that you’ll replay in your 
mind’s eye for the rest of your life. Level with yourself now. Do your duty.
Footnote: No one came forward with reservations. By the time Oriskany returned to San Diego 
in December 1965, its pilots had earned a record total of military decorations for Vietnam 
carrier deployments. Of the 120 pilots addressed in this talk, thirteen did not return to the ship: 
eight were killed in action, one is still unaccounted for, and four—including the speaker—spent 
seven and a half years as POWs in Hanoi.
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DIRECT FROM GENDA PRIMARY-SOURCE EVIDENCE FROM GENDA  
BEARING ON PARSHALL-BENNETT EXCHANGE REGARDING FUCHIDA AT 
PEARL HARBOR
Norman Polmar
In a Research & Debate (R&D) item in the Winter 2013 issue of the Naval War 
College Review, Martin Bennett authored a scathing—and correct—attack on Jon 
Parshall’s R&D item “Reflecting on Fuchida,” which had appeared in the Spring 
2010 issue of the Review. A key point of the original article and the subsequent 
commentary was Fuchida’s alleged “demands” that the Japanese carrier task force 
that attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, undertake a third strike— 
primarily to destroy the fuel tanks.
As Bennett states, there was no such discussion or debate on the flag bridge 
of the carrier Akagi. My sources for this contribution are my lengthy correspon-
dence and personal discussions with Minoru Genda, who was on the flag bridge 
as the carrier force’s air operations officer and had been one of the two initial 
planners of the Pearl Harbor strike. (After the war, with the rank of general, he 
commanded the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.)
I recently found a letter from Genda to me from September 1965, at which 
time he was assisting me with my book Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier 
Aviation and Its Influence on World Events. In the 
letter Genda stated:
There were no hot discussions on board the Akagi. 
Commander Fuchida might [have] expressed his 
opinion about the further attacks, I do not know. 
The only thing I know is “If they come out [of Pearl 
Harbor], we will strike again,” Commander Fuchida 
said just after he landed on the deck.
Norman Polmar has authored or coauthored more 
than fifty published books, including extensive writ-
ings on carrier aviation. He also writes a column on 
historic naval aircraft for Naval History magazine. 
Previously, Mr. Polmar wrote a column for the U.S. 
Naval Institute’s Proceedings for thirty-eight years.
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Anyhow, Adm� Nagumo [the task force commander] and Rear Admiral Kusaka (chief 
of staff, 1st Air Fleet) made up their minds, “No Second Attack,” long before we 
started the attack�
Genda later confirmed these recollections in personal discussions with me 
in Annapolis in May 1969� A specific concern he mentioned to me was the 
unknown locations of the three U�S� aircraft carriers in the Pacific� With search 
planes from Oahu seeking the Japanese carriers and the U�S� carriers possibly in 
the area, Admiral Nagumo (1) was concerned about being surprised by the U�S� 
carriers, and (2) feared that the surviving aircraft on Oahu could mount strikes 
against his ships if they remained in the area�
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BOOK REVIEWS
PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MÊME CHOSE
TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P� O’Hara� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015� 384 pages� $49�95� 
In the literary mountain of scholarship, 
research, and writing devoted to World 
War II, the story of Operation TORCH, 
the Allied landings in North Africa in 
November of 1942, is presented often as 
something of an overture to the massive 
amphibious symphonies that followed� 
Accounts may include some discussion 
of Eisenhower’s growing facility for 
strategic leadership, the byzantine nature 
of Vichy and Free French politics, and 
the gradual emergence of Charles de 
Gaulle as the leader of Free France� The 
landings themselves all too often have 
been presented as hinting of a Kabuki 
production, if not of opéra bouffe, with 
a few desultory shots fired to assuage 
Gallic honor, followed by capitulation� 
Then, it seems, the real war begins, 
moving down dusty roads to Kasserine, 
the initial blooding of the U�S� Army, 
the rise of Patton and Bradley, and the 
inexorable sweep of operations to Sicily, 
the Italian mainland, and eventually the 
beaches and hedgerows of Normandy�
Vincent O’Hara has done much to 
correct this impression and to give 
TORCH the attention it deserves� 
Readers will come away with a much 
better understanding of the difficulties 
faced by both the French defenders and 
the Allied invaders and the political 
currents that swirled about the operation 
from the very beginning—and with 
an appreciation for how the results 
could have been very different�
As O’Hara points out, 1942 was a 
parlous time for the Allies� Axis 
armies were cutting deep into the 
Soviet Union, and fear that it would 
drop out of the war was palpable� U�S� 
leaders, particularly George Marshall, 
eschewed what might be considered 
military sideshows and argued for a 
rapid buildup of force in Great Britain, 
followed by a cross-channel invasion 
at the earliest opportunity� The British, 
led by Churchill and scarred by their 
experience in World War I, preferred 
less direct approaches, avoiding the U�S�-
favored direct attack until victory was 
assured� TORCH represented a victory 
for British planners and a setback for 
Marshall� This is among the better-
known elements of the North African 
campaign, and O’Hara does it justice 
without dwelling overlong on the topic�
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BOOK REVIEWS
PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MÊME CHOSE
TORCH: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory, by Vincent P� O’Hara� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015� 384 pages� $49�95�
In contrast, French politics usually 
are, for the most part, underexamined, 
and O’Hara provides a valuable 
understanding of French actors and 
motives� His examination of Marshal 
Pétain’s efforts to end the German 
occupation and restore France to 
something approaching its former status 
is both convincing and useful� So too 
is O’Hara’s meticulous description of 
French forces, plans, and readiness in 
North Africa on the eve of invasion�
O’Hara’s discussion of invasion 
planning and preparation and the 
movement to the various landing 
beaches is excellent� Although dwarfed 
by later invasions, TORCH required 
a major effort at a time when Allied 
amphibious resources were extremely 
limited� Scheduling convoys, arranging 
for carrier-based air support, and 
coping with potentially lethal surf 
conditions all foreshadowed difficulties 
that would have to be overcome in later 
amphibious operations� The plan was 
audacious� Allied forces were to carry 
out five simultaneous and geographi-
cally separated landings on the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean shores of North 
Africa, then race to Tunis to trap 
German forces in Africa and deny those 
forces additional support from Europe� 
Accomplishing this would bring the 
Mediterranean under much greater Al-
lied control, and the Axis might have to 
take some pressure off the Soviet Union 
to deal with the new threat to the south�
As O’Hara makes clear, French 
resistance, while affected by conflict-
ing orders on whether to take Allied 
troops under fire, was not a token 
effort, although the loss of only 1,700 
Allied wounded and killed may have 
contributed to this impression� Although 
ill equipped and often outnumbered, 
French forces, including colonial auxil-
iaries and units of the Foreign Legion, 
fought well� While some French units 
offered no resistance, they did so in obe-
dience to orders from their command-
ers� O’Hara details the action on each 
of the five invasion beaches in detail�
The naval battle of Casablanca was, as 
O’Hara describes it, “the largest surface, 
air, and subsurface naval action fought 
in the Atlantic Ocean during World War 
II�” The battle, which lasted six hours, 
featured naval gunfire duels between 
USS Massachusetts and the disabled 
French battleship Jean Bart. French 
shore batteries engaged U�S� warships 
and French combatants shelled Allied 
landing craft en route to the invasion 
beaches� French officers handled their 
ships with courage and daring, and they 
came close to engaging the Allied troop 
transports� Maps are provided, greatly 
aiding the reader’s understanding of 
how the battle was conducted� There 
was also a naval engagement off Oran, 
and Italian and German aircraft and 
submarines conducted significant 
antishipping actions as the campaign 
wore on� O’Hara illustrates that, far 
from being an Allied walkover, the 
possibility of TORCH resulting in a 
disaster at sea was much more likely 
than is normally acknowledged�
A greater appreciation of TORCH by 
students of amphibious warfare is war-
ranted� Many of the problems associated 
with projecting power from the sea were 
identified during this campaign� The 
role of beachmasters, the timing and 
coordination of shore bombardment, 
and the logistical difficulties associ-
ated with landing supplies on an open 
beach in high surf all were factors� At 
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times the lessons learned were small, 
such as the discovery that landing net 
rungs spaced too far apart posed a 
significant danger to debarking troops�
Some elements of the TORCH landings 
touch on current questions� For example, 
although the Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe 
raids had demonstrated previously the 
inherent difficulty in conducting an 
amphibious assault on built-up areas, 
TORCH would feature several efforts 
along these lines� The most dramatic of 
these was an attempt to land U�S� troops 
from HMS Walney and HMS Hartland 
(the former U�S� Coast Guard cutters 
Sebago and Pontchartrain, respectively) 
directly onto the moles of Oran Harbor� 
Both vessels quickly were identified as 
hostile and ran an intense gauntlet of 
French fire until sunk� In contrast, an 
attempt was made to sail USS Dallas, a 
vintage destroyer carrying seventy-five 
specially trained assault troops, six miles 
up Port Lyautey’s Wadi Sebou waterway 
to carry out an attack on a critically im-
portant all-weather airfield� The effort, 
despite experiencing significant delays, 
succeeded� In an ever-urbanizing world, 
the viability of direct amphibious as-
saults may be open to debate once again�
O’Hara rightfully points out that TORCH, 
in the main, failed to deliver hoped-for 
results� It would take five months to 
achieve victory in North Africa, not the 
three weeks anticipated� The operation 
did nothing to ease the plight of the 
Soviet Union and the Mediterranean 
remained contested waters� The African 
campaign drew men, matériel, and 
shipping away from efforts to support 
a direct invasion of Europe� TORCH 
resulted in the total occupation of 
France by Germany and the intentional 
scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon� 
None of these results, according to 
O’Hara, inflicted real loss on Italy and 
Germany� However, in the opportunity 
to identify and resolve amphibious 
challenges and as a beginning to the 
development of a truly combined 
strategic command, TORCH was of 
value� If, as O’Hara claims, TORCH also 
ensured that France would not become 
a true ally of Germany, the strategic 
benefit may have been significant�
TORCH sheds some welcome light on 
a campaign that too often is passed 
over� Scholars and lay readers alike will 
find the book useful� While O’Hara 
has performed yeoman service in 
providing this detailed account of the 
amphibious portion of the campaign, 
perhaps his greatest contribution 
is to restore the reputation of naval 
forces that, far from offering token 
resistance, fought with courage and 
tenacity, often against superior odds�
RICHARD J� NORTON
How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Al-
lied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson 
O’Brien� Cambridge, U�K�: Cambridge Univ� 
Press, 2015� 640 pages� $35�
This book provides a detailed reexami-
nation of the main contributory factors 
leading to Allied victory in World War 
II� In many ways the book’s argument
is not so much new as it is a revision
of the revisionists� During the Cold
War the narrative was largely that the
Western Allies had triumphed over
Germany and Japan with some help
from the Soviet Union� That narrative
was challenged at the time, and with
more success after the end of the Cold
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War by revisionist historians who 
placed an increased emphasis on the 
role of Soviet ground and air forces in 
the defeat of Germany. The Russian 
front, it was argued, was where the 
bulk of Germany’s forces was engaged 
and, as far as the revisionist narrative 
went, defeated by the Soviet Union. Dr. 
O’Brien, a reader at the University of 
Glasgow, challenges that argument with 
a wealth of data and looks at the war in 
more global terms. He argues that the air 
and sea forces of the United States and 
the British Empire played the decisive 
role by preventing “the Germans and 
Japanese from moving” (p. 16).
How the War Was Won provides a broad 
array of detailed information discussing 
the enormous industrial contribution 
of all sides. Indeed, the author’s analysis 
of all this information makes a compel-
ling case for his argument. Yet there is 
something missing: it is difficult to see 
the link between cause and effect. One 
can see such a link better regarding the 
war against Japan, but in the case of the 
war in Europe the author does not show 
clearly the link he claims between air 
and sea power causing immense damage 
to Germany’s war economy and Soviet 
troops wandering around Berlin in 1945. 
I suspect that the Soviet forces’ killing 
and wounding of millions of German 
combat troops might have something to 
do with this, for without the physical re-
moval of German soldiers from the Sovi-
et Union’s route to Berlin Hitler might 
not have felt the need to commit suicide.
Now, there is no denying that Allied 
air and sea power contributed to Allied 
victory in Europe; the argument seems 
to be to what extent they did so. Thus, 
this book is welcome for the depth of 
detail it provides as fodder for such a 
debate. That this reviewer is not entirely 
convinced of the author’s arguments 
does not make this a bad book; it is in 
fact a very good book, and an extremely 
welcome addition to the literature on 
World War II. It provides an enormous 
amount of information and analysis 
about the role of air and sea power, 
which furthers our understanding of 
the reasons for Allied success. That it 
causes the questioning of the current 
orthodoxy is to be applauded, as 
greater understanding often results 
from challenges to the status quo.
This book should prove of great benefit 
to advanced students of World War 
II, and it is particularly pertinent for 
specialists interested in current U.S. 
national security needs. Given the 
friction that exists among the United 
States, China, and Russia, the book 
provides an opportunity to think about 
how the U.S. armed services should 
structure their forces for any future 
conflict with these potential adversaries. 
Dr. O’Brien’s book should be read by 
any sailor, marine, or airman invested 
in a budget fight, because “the only way 
to ‘win’ a war is to stop your enemy 
from moving” (p. 488). That argument 
seems a particularly pertinent one when 
looking at the problems of Southeast 
Asia or the Baltic or Black Sea regions.
NICHOLAS MURRAY
A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the 
Samurai to the 21st Century, by John T. Kuehn. 
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014. 299 pages. $75.
Japan is at an inflection point. Depend-
ing on how particular peoples and 
nations view this enigmatic country, it 
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now either is turning away from rightly 
enforced demilitarization and back 
toward the more martial and expansion-
ist policies of its past, or is working to 
become a security provider concomitant 
with its economic power� A Military 
History of Japan is therefore a timely 
work that will add studied moderation 
and critical analysis to the argument 
regarding the path on which the country 
is located now and down which it 
is likely to progress in the future�
This book goes well beyond a traditional 
historical narrative� The author fol-
lows Japan from its origin myths up 
to the present time, adding elements 
of geographic determinism and 
cultural anthropology as well as his own 
experiences� The military and warfare 
aspects obviously receive the most 
focus, but they are not, and perhaps 
cannot be, separated from the overall 
history of the country and culture�
In the first chapter, “From Sun Goddess 
to Samurai,” the author helps explain 
Japan’s nature by telling its creation story 
and examining how landscape, climate, 
outside influences, and internal competi-
tion shaped Japanese development and 
societal worldview� Around the eighth 
century CE, when that first chapter con-
cludes, the seminal samurai culture, and 
an overall Japanese culture distinct from 
those of neighboring Korea and China, 
is in place, one the author argues still 
manifests itself in Japanese society�
The following chapters chronicle the 
subsequent maturation of Japan’s 
political and military power structure� 
The many accounts of royal machina-
tions and specific battles may confuse 
or lose those not well versed in Japanese 
geography or language, but those the 
author includes do add to the story of 
how and why Japan’s military evolved as 
it did� These middle chapters also shed 
light on the Japanese military’s actions 
during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and on the still-tense relationship 
between Japan and its neighbors, much 
of that distrust predating World War II� 
The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese 
Wars get ample attention and analysis, 
as does the very calculated, top-down 
manner in which Japan’s post-samurai 
military attempted to imitate the best 
militaries of contemporary Europe�
The “Great East Asian War” chapter 
may not cover much new ground for 
those readers with more-than-standard 
knowledge of World War II� But in 
“After the Samurai,” the book’s final 
pages tie in themes present in Japan 
for at least 1,200 years� They provide 
an excellent argument that Japan’s 
future will be determined by the same 
geographic, cultural, and geostrategic 
influences that have shaped its past�
The author is a retired naval aviator and 
a professor at the Army Command and 
General Staff College� He spent time 
living in Japan both as a dependent 
child in the mid-twentieth century and 
later as a Navy officer� These experi-
ences give him insights different from 
those expected from either a pure 
academic analyst or a strategist viewing 
the country simply as an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier� He effectively inter-
sperses personal and family recollections 
with more-standard history to give 
better descriptions of cultural norms 
and practices, as when he writes about 
Japanese rioters sending teams ahead 
to warn citizens, including his parents, 
to stay indoors for their own safety�
For the casual reader, A Military History 
of Japan functions as a needed update 
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to Ruth Benedict’s much-maligned 
yet still-influential 1946 work The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, a 
general primer on the seemingly 
contradictory forces driving this global 
power� For those with a professional 
interest in the country and its region, 
this book is a must-read, an enlightening 
facilitator in the current debate over 
Japan’s place in Asia and the world�
 J� OVERTON
Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, by 
George Friedman� New York: Doubleday, 2015� 
288 pages� $28�95� 
Flash Points is both an elegant and a 
disturbing book� Not simply elegant 
in its writing style, which is direct and 
clear, but also in its initial discussion of 
the age of discovery and enlightenment 
that propelled the European nations 
into becoming world powers—you 
rarely find a more cogent and concise 
explanation of the roots of European 
social, cultural, political, and economic 
development� Yet the book is also very 
disturbing because it details how the 
factors that allowed Europe to transform 
the world—faith, individualism, scien-
tific inquiry, ideas of self-determination 
and legal rights, and nationalism—also 
contributed to the almost unfathomable 
destruction of the two world wars that 
tore it apart� George Friedman details 
the region’s history, current events, and 
potential future in a way that makes 
an admonishment from his father, a 
Hungarian Jewish survivor of both the 
Nazis and the Soviets, seem very true: 
“Europe will never change� It will just 
act as if nothing happened” (p� 23)�
Freidman, the well-known founder of 
Stratfor�com, one of the first private 
intelligence firms to be a major pres-
ence on the web, and an author of 
prescient books on the future security 
environment, begins with the personal 
history of how and why his fam-
ily escaped Hungary in 1949� Having 
survived the horrors of World War 
II and the Communist takeover in a 
weak, dependent, and occupied nation, 
Friedman’s father wanted his family 
to go to America and “live in a strong 
country with weak neighbors and, if 
possible, no Nazis, communists, or 
anyone else who believed in anything 
deeply enough to want to kill him 
and his family over it” (p� 17)� His 
view—that a humane peace in Europe 
always would be a mere interlude—sets 
the scenario for the rest of the book�
This fear is, of course, what spurred the 
creation of the European Union (EU)� 
Friedman analyzes the weaknesses 
of the EU and the sources of conflict 
throughout Europe, particularly in a 
situation in which NATO’s perceived 
importance has diminished, and 
concludes that the centripetal forces of 
geopolitics are just too strong� It is not 
just the potential collapse of the euro; it 
is the fact that national identities cannot 
be supplanted by a European identity 
without destroying a cultural diversity 
established over millennia� The fact that 
the EU appeared to achieve some small 
success in cultivating a cosmopolitan 
Europeanness is, in Friedman’s view, 
merely a veneer that a U�S� commitment 
to defending a cold peace under unique 
historical circumstances made possible�
Those circumstances have devolved� 
With the controlling pressures 
removed, Yugoslavia—perhaps the 
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greatest attempt at fusing otherwise 
hostile nationalities—exploded into 
violence until all sides were exhausted 
by fighting or concluded that opposing 
NATO’s wishes was too costly� But that 
was before a resurgent Russia could 
intervene on behalf of the Serbs� Fried-
man’s book tours the other potential 
flash points of Europe within a back-
ground where Russia is back, and the 
geopolitical question of who will be the 
hegemonic leader of Europe—France, 
Germany, or Russia—has returned� It 
is not ambition that drives; it is fear of 
the power of the others (as Thucydides 
described so many centuries ago)� By 
all measures, Germany would remain 
the dominant power in economics, as 
it is the economic engine of the EU 
today� But it also is the power most 
easily invaded from both east and west� 
And it is growing impatient with the 
seeming impossibility of creating an EU 
that conforms to its view of necessary 
order� The Germans, according to 
Friedman, view themselves as the 
victims of the EU/euro economic 
crisis� What would it mean to the EU, 
NATO, and specifically eastern Europe 
if Germany were to cut a deal with 
Russia to secure its own “permanent” 
peace—secure to be the export 
power it already is beyond Europe?
In Friedman’s view, the question of 
Germany, Russia, and European peace 
is one of national culture as well as 
geopolitics: “For the Germans, success 
and disaster are intimately linked, so 
they are simultaneously afraid of what 
they have achieved and tremendously 
proud of it� � � � They do not aspire 
to lead a new Europe� They fear that 
they cannot escape the role� The rest 
of Europe harbors suspicions that 
Germany’s public fears and modesty are 
feigned, that in the end the old Germany 
has never died but has merely been 
asleep” (p� 153)� Add in Russian pressure 
and the fact that post–Cold War 
Germany is united, and the European 
foundation seems a lot less stable�
Even if the European powers never 
are moved to conflict with each other, 
Friedman’s conclusion is that the situ-
ation can make the continent safe for 
ethnic breakups, with all the resulting 
potential for wars—or perhaps hybrid 
wars and gray-zone conflicts—to 
occur� Russia will be the first to take 
advantage of that, prompting others to 
do the same� He predicts that “Europe’s 
history of conflict is far from over� � � � 
[I]n many places Europe’s anger against
other Europeans is still there” (p� 251)�
Ultimately, Friedman sees the future still 
controlled by Europe’s “Faustian spirit” 
that “haunted its greatest moment, the 
Enlightenment,” defined as “the desire 
to possess everything even at the cost of 
their souls,” and today “everything at no 
cost” (p� 257)� By “everything,” he means 
national sovereignty without the exercise 
of national sovereignty; wealth distribu-
tion without work distribution; a world 
in which they can feel like the hegemon 
but not have to be it; a world in which 
wars would stop without interven-
tion; and, perhaps worst of all, ethnic 
nationalism without its implications�
What can be done to prevent growing 
conflicts? Friedman flirts with the fact 
that America today is still as powerful 
as it was when it put out “the European 
fire in 1918 and 1945” and contained 
it during the Cold War� But can it do 
so in the future? Should it do so in the 
future, or do the fires need to burn 
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themselves out? Friedman is not sure, 
but he does give us a disturbing prospect 
about which we need to think deeply�
SAM J� TANGREDI
The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, 
and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region, 
by Michael R� Auslin� New Haven, CT: Yale Univ� 
Press, 2017� 304 pages� $30�
The signature foreign policy move, 
and greatest strategic insight, of Barack 
Obama’s presidency was “the pivot”—
later renamed “the rebalance”—to the 
Asia-Pacific region� President Obama’s 
initiative grew out of his conviction that 
Asia had become the most important 
region in terms of economic dynamism, 
explosive demographic growth, and 
growing military tensions� And if one 
broadens the geography and semantics 
to include India—yielding the “Indo-
Pacific”—this makes utter sense, since 
the region claims 60 percent of the 
world’s population, nearly 40 percent of 
total global economic output, some of 
the fastest-growing and most capable 
militaries, and three nuclear states� No 
surprise, then, that the Obama White 
House argued in a November 2015 fact 
sheet that this region “is increasingly the 
world’s political and economic center of 
gravity�” Or, as top Asia expert and dip-
lomat Kurt M� Campbell astutely wrote 
in The Pivot: The Future of American 
Statecraft in Asia, “[T]he lion’s share of 
the history of the twenty-first century 
will be written in Asia” (pp� 1, 344)�
While the Obama administration 
made a compelling case for the logic 
of pivoting to Asia—that is, elevating 
the time, attention, and resources 
given to the region relative to other 
parts of the world—the results were 
uneven� Washington reinvigorated its 
diplomacy in the region, strengthened 
commitments with U�S� treaty allies, 
forged relationships with new partners 
such as Burma, began shifting military 
assets to the region, and negotiated 
a far-reaching trade deal intended to 
deepen economic integration� But it also 
failed to ratify that trade deal, suffered 
significant political setbacks with treaty 
allies Thailand and the Philippines, 
was unable to counter Pyongyang’s 
rush toward acquiring nuclear weapons 
capable of reaching the United States, 
and did little to restrain Chinese 
maritime assertiveness and economic 
and political coercion in the region�
How then should one understand and 
evaluate the myriad factors contributing 
to Asia’s future? And are the risks to 
the continued growth and stability of 
the region now eclipsing the region’s 
promise? These are the questions that 
Michael Auslin, scholar in residence 
at the American Enterprise Institute, 
asks in his judicious, sobering, and 
compelling new book The End of the 
Asian Century� Auslin argues that Asia’s 
future is significantly less assured than 
is commonly held� As a longtime scholar 
of, frequent traveler to, and trenchant 
observer on the geopolitics of Asia, he 
is positioned well to make such a case� 
This book is far from a polemic; in 
fact, Auslin approaches these questions 
as a skeptic, describing how he in fact 
originally held the opposite belief—that 
the twenty-first century inevitably 
looked to be an Asian century� Yet 
through repeated trips to the region and 
multiple meetings with senior policy 
makers, businessmen, and military 
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officers, he became convinced that risk 
rather than opportunity was the most 
salient feature of the Asian political, 
economic, and military landscape� He 
argues that U�S� policy makers have been 
overly optimistic about opportunities in 
the region and insufficiently attentive to 
risks, thereby warping U�S� perception of 
regional trends and causing the United 
States to pursue misguided policies�
This book is Auslin’s attempt to intro-
duce a framework to assess risks in Asia 
properly, across five major categories� 
These include threats to Asia’s growth 
from the end of its economic miracle 
and the failure to implement structural 
macroeconomic reforms; demographic 
pressures that will place increasing strain 
on rapidly modernizing and urban-
izing political and economic systems; 
unfinished political revolutions that will 
address these large-scale economic and 
social dislocations; long-term historical 
antagonism among various Asian states, 
the lack of effective regional political 
community among them, and the dearth 
of effective institutions to mitigate crises; 
and, most alarming, the growth of power 
politics and the increasing potential for 
war� The book’s organization follows 
these categories, with chapters mapping 
risk in each thematic domain� A final 
chapter both summarizes and concludes 
with a series of policy recommendations�
Auslin posits that as risk increases, 
prudent investors take out more insur-
ance� This advice is as relevant to nations 
as to individual investors, and applies 
across all the categories of risk contained 
in the earlier sections of the book� In the 
security realm, he argues for a concen-
tric triangular approach, with an inner 
core of states—Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Singapore—working 
closely with an outer core of the region’s 
liberal-democratic heavyweights, 
Australia, India, and Japan, to counter 
an increasingly aggressive China� 
Economically, he advocates for struc-
tural reforms within Asian nations and 
trade liberalization among them� To 
alleviate political instability, he pushes a 
realistic democracy-promotion program� 
To avoid isolating China, he promotes 
an agenda for enhancing contact with 
ordinary Chinese citizens� Linking all 
these recommendations is a belief that 
long-term stability in Asia is most likely 
to flow from increased liberalization and 
democratization, and that the United 
States should have an indispensable 
role as partner and catalyst in that 
process� Absent American involvement, 
investment, and leadership, short- and 
long-term instability are likely to rise�
Auslin issues the caveat that his book is 
not intended as a comprehensive guide 
to all the countries in the region or all 
the issues affecting them� And yet in just 
222 pages his book manages to serve 
not only as an excellent introduction 
to the region but as an incisive guide to 
understanding the contemporary risks 
roiling the most consequential region of 
the world� Extremely useful for national 
security professionals, investors, and 
interested observers alike, this book 
moves beyond headline news to analysis 
and advice in navigating the region’s 
shifting geopolitical, demographic, and 
economic landscape� Some will find 
his recommendations too aggressive, 
although his policy prescriptions explore 
both costs and benefits� Others perhaps 
will allege that Auslin is too bearish, too 
gloomy on what many are expecting to 
be the dawn of the Asian century� But, 
given the acceleration of tensions in 
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Asia, the demise of trade liberalization, 
the erosion of democracy and advance 
of autocratic rulers, and the doubts 
the Trump administration has cast on 
its commitment to alliances, we may 
find that he was in fact too sanguine�
CHARLES EDEL
Warring Navies: India-Pakistan; Indian Navy’s 
Role in the Indo-Pak Wars, by Ranji Rai and Jo-
seph Chacko� Dombivli West, India: Frontier In-
dia Technology, 2014� 320 pages� $20�
Ranji Rai and Joseph Chacko’s book, 
Warring Navies, is a welcome addition 
to the scant coverage of the naval 
history of South Asia� The authors are 
a retired Indian navy commodore and 
a defense journalist, respectively, and 
the book draws heavily on Commodore 
Rai’s experiences in the navy� The book 
itself crosses the boundaries between 
memoirs and popular history, covering 
the history of the Indian navy’s opera-
tions from independence through the 
end of the Cold War� It also includes 
several stand-alone essays on various 
topics related to maritime and regional 
security by prominent retired Indian 
military leaders, such as former army 
chief Ved P� Malik, former navy chief 
Vishnu Bhagwat, and Lieutenant 
General C� Satish Nambiar� One of 
the major strengths of the book is its 
coverage of the many lesser-known uses 
of the Indian navy (e�g�, the liberation 
of Goa in 1961 and the interventions 
in the Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri 
Lanka in the 1980s)� It is particularly 
useful for both Indian and non-Indian 
readers to be aware of these past actions 
today, as both India and its international 
partners debate India’s role as a security 
provider in the Indian Ocean region�
The book is pitched toward a general 
audience interested in military and 
naval affairs in South Asia� The prose is 
engaging and humorous, which makes 
the book a quick read� For example, 
the title for the chapter on the 1965 
war—in which the Indian navy was not 
particularly active—is “The Navy Does 
Sweet Fanny Adams in 1965�” One of the 
more interesting aspects of this book is 
its use of various Indian, Pakistani, and 
American autobiographies and memoirs 
to interject vignettes from people 
involved in the conflicts, ranging from 
Indian naval officers to Pakistani leaders 
and even to Henry Kissinger� These 
provide insight into the perspectives of 
participants in the events� The book’s 
main strength is that it gives an insider’s 
view on the challenges of joint opera-
tions for the Indian military� There are 
some excellent examples, ranging from 
air force and naval aviation in the 1965 
war to amphibious operations in 1971 
and smaller operations in the 1980s�
A couple of minor points detract from 
the book� Given that it is a popular 
history based on personal observations 
and the memoirs of participants, some 
of the general history of the conflicts 
does reflect older interpretations and 
narratives that are now debatable� The 
book is not academically sourced and 
does not have citations, so the reader is 
left wondering whether the book would 
have been improved if the authors had 
engaged more with the work of recent 
historians, such as Srinath Raghavan’s 
excellent work on the 1971 war, or  
even the classic histories of the Indian 
navy done by Admirals Singh and  
Hiranandani� Similarly, the book could 
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have given greater attention to format-
ting and editing to improve its structure 
and eliminate typographical errors that 
distract the reader� In particular, the 
intersection of long quotations from 
other authors sometimes confuses the 
narrative; perhaps some of these longer 
passages could have been placed in an 
appendix so the authors’ narrative would 
not be interrupted� Last, some of the 
additional essays by other authors do not 
seem to fit within the theme of the book�
However, these shortcomings need to be 
taken in context, given the nature of the 
book and its intended audience� Readers 
should keep in mind that the work 
is intended to be neither a definitive 
history nor an academic book, so they 
should not expect it to engage with the 
academic literature or offer extensive 
footnoting� But for its intended audience 
and modest ambitions, it does succeed 
in bringing a valuable perspective with a 
great deal of personal experience to the 
reader in an approachable and readable 
format� It will be of use to readers who 
want more anecdotal details of the 
history of naval operations and the naval 
cultures of India and Pakistan, and those 
who want a short overview of the naval 
aspects of the conflicts in question�
PATRICK BRATTON
Vietnam Narratives and the Collective Memory 
of the Vietnam War, by John A� Wood, War and 
Society in North America series� Athens: Ohio 
Univ� Press, 2016� 200 pages� $69�95�
More than forty years after the last U�S� 
combat troops departed Vietnam in 
1973, the conflict looms large in Ameri-
can popular culture and memory� Vivid 
depictions of guerrilla warfare, antiwar 
protests, and psychologically troubled 
veterans proliferate in print and film� 
This was not always the case, however� 
Silence followed in the immediate af-
termath of the Vietnam War as veterans 
and civilians alike grappled to forge 
meaning from the long, costly interven-
tion and ultimate American defeat� The 
arrival of veteran-authored memoirs in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s reignited 
popular interest in the war and inspired 
numerous others to follow suit� In sub-
sequent decades, the gritty authenticity 
of these best-selling narratives, written 
by “those who were there,” profoundly 
shaped American collective memory 
and historical discourses about the war� 
John A� Wood’s Vietnam Narratives and 
the Collective Memory of the Vietnam 
War aims to expose myriad misconcep-
tions that have developed as a result�
Undertaking a comprehensive analysis 
of the best-known Vietnam veteran 
memoirs, Wood delineates the accura-
cies, omissions, and miscues inherent 
in the genre to ascertain its overall 
influence on American understanding of 
the war� His methodology centers on the 
collective analysis of fifty-eight Vietnam 
veteran memoirs and oral histories 
published between 1967 and 2005� He 
supplements this primary set of texts 
with films, newspapers, U�S� government 
studies, historical scholarship, and 
personal accounts from Vietnamese 
civilians, African Americans, women 
veterans, and other less prominent 
authors� Wood’s primary argument 
is that veteran narratives are subject 
to the properties and limitations of 
memory� Based on personal recollection 
usually written long after the events in 
question, memoirs necessarily provide 
a fragmentary and biased perspective�
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Seven chapters ranging in topic from 
author demographics to race, sex, 
and postwar life illustrate this point� 
Examining the backgrounds of the most 
prominent authors, chapter 1 generates 
a demographic profile for the typical 
Vietnam-veteran memoirist: a college-
educated, white, male officer� Although 
enlisted personnel tended to be younger 
and more-diverse working-class men, 
Wood astutely notes that most veteran-
writers were low-ranking officers whose 
combat experiences were not only simi-
lar to but representative of those of the 
men they commanded� Chapter 2 delves 
into the authorial ambivalence common 
to many veteran narratives, which 
simultaneously disparage the military 
mission and condemn Vietnamese civil-
ians as duplicitous enemy collaborators 
and greedy opportunists� Wood attempts 
to rehabilitate popular perception of the 
Vietnamese by justifying their behaviors 
as the desperate actions of the inhabi-
tants of a war-ravaged nation� Observing 
a conspicuous absence of racial tensions 
in the best-known Vietnam memoirs, 
chapter 3 foregrounds the narratives 
of nonwhite veterans as a race-centric 
“countermemory” of the Vietnam War� 
Wood’s analysis reveals two competing 
paradigms: authors either highlight ra-
cial cooperation and pride in the combat 
performance of their particular ethnic 
groups or they underscore incidents of 
white racism and express a separatist 
racial ideology derived from the Black 
Power movement� Women and sexual-
ity are the focus of chapter 4, which 
concedes that male soldiers generally 
behaved in a sexist manner in their 
interactions with Asian and American 
women in Vietnam� Wood attributes the 
prevailing misogynist attitude of Ameri-
can servicemen to mainstream and 
military cultures that emphasized sex 
and promoted a general hostility toward 
women� Chapter 5 debunks prevailing 
myths about veterans’ homecomings 
and postwar lives: first, that Vietnam 
veterans suffered from post-traumatic 
stress disorder at a greater rate than 
soldiers who survived earlier wars; 
second, that Vietnam veterans literally 
were spat on by an ungrateful American 
public on their return home� Chapter 
6 underscores the ambivalent political 
sentiment common to Vietnam vet-
eran memoirs and concludes that such 
characterizations accurately reflected 
the views expressed in U�S� government 
opinion polls� The final chapter tracks 
numerous similarities between Vietnam 
memoirs and narratives produced 
by veterans of other American wars, 
arguing that cross narrative parallels 
reflect a consistent demographic among 
authors as well as the fact that “combat 
soldiers’ wartime experiences have not 
changed in many fundamental ways 
since at least the 1940s” (p� 109)�
Wood’s desire to present a comprehen-
sive analysis of the genre has produced a 
volume that is both more superficial and 
more repetitive than necessary� Wood 
also overlooks the ways that memoirs 
as a genre guide veterans’ selection of 
stories to include� Memories are at once 
distilled to a carefully curated collection, 
embellished with expository detail and 
context, and stitched together to form 
a compelling narrative arc� Vietnam 
veteran narratives not only inspired 
and made acceptable “uncensored” 
accounts but provided a model and 
template for the types of stories that 
should be featured� Noncombatant 
veteran memoirs, for example, represent 
a potentially rich, untapped vein of 
information for scholars but almost 
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certainly lack the high-intensity combat 
usually considered “worthy” of retelling�
Although Wood’s research is volumi-
nous, it relies heavily on published 
materials� Archival records and 
Vietnamese-language sources would 
strengthen an already insightful analysis 
of American veteran narratives and 
their imprint on popular perception 
of the war� Moreover, Wood’s reliance 
on previous scholars’ works undercuts 
his oft-repeated claim that the book 
offers an overdue corrective to exist-
ing scholarship� Indeed, this slender 
volume is directed not only to the casual 
reader but to the professional historian� 
According to Wood, Vietnam veteran 
memoirs have received “inadequate 
treatment” by literary scholars and 
historians, who generally consider only a 
small sample of texts and fail to distin-
guish fiction from nonfiction narratives� 
He further charges that few military 
historians scrutinize veteran-authored 
texts� Yet Wood’s fundamental premise 
that this book “is a work of history, but 
it does not treat veteran memoirs as 
sources that can be straightforwardly 
mined for information” belies a naive 
understanding of professional historical 
practice (p� 5)� Any responsible scholar 
approaches her sources—archival and 
secondary—with a professionally  
critical eye�
Even so, this book would be an excellent 
addition to an undergraduate military 
history curriculum� Wood’s clear and 
impressive synthesis of historical and 
literary scholarship provides a useful 
introduction to the critical study of 
Vietnam veteran memoirs� Interested 
readers will want to supplement Wood’s 
book with fine-grain examinations such 
as David Kieran’s Forever Vietnam: How 
a Divisive War Changed American Public 
Memory, Thomas Myers’s Walking Point: 
American Narratives of Vietnam, and 
Jerry Lembcke’s The Spitting Image:  
Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of  
Vietnam�
BREANNE ROBERTSON
The Role of the Royal Navy in South America, 
1920–1970, by Jon Wise� London: Bloomsbury, 
2014� 288 pages� $122�
Although arguably not a very enticing 
title for American naval professionals, 
this small, hardback book is nonetheless 
well worth their time� The author’s aim 
is to illustrate the contribution that the 
maritime service can make to a nation’s 
foreign policy in peacetime, and in 
particular to the health of its shipbuild-
ing and defense exports� While the 
book obviously showcases the fortunes 
of twentieth-century Great Britain, the 
points it makes are broadly transferable 
and increasingly relevant in this era of 
growing emphasis on seamless inter-
governmental cooperation� Besides, the 
subject matter is refreshing: How often 
among naval monographs do you find 
a top-notch scholarly investigation into 
that most mundane and yet ubiquitous 
naval mission of “presence” or “show-
ing the flag”? Naval officers are quick 
to extol the virtues of these activities 
in conversation, but few actually can 
substantiate their claims� This book 
goes some way toward filling that gap�
The book has its origins in a PhD disser-
tation on the history of the relationship 
between the Royal Navy and its Chilean 
counterpart� As such it limits the focus 
to a manageable analysis of the presence 
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mission in a particular theater at a given 
time, while at the same time allowing a 
useful extension into the broader topic 
of naval diplomacy throughout the 
Americas as a backdrop� The work be-
gins with a survey of the extant scholar-
ship on showing the flag—a term that the 
author explains is really too broad to be 
useful—before moving chronologically 
through the decades of the last century� 
By and large the chapters flow logically 
into one another, although the compara-
tive chapter on U�S� postwar defense 
plans (chapter 6) seems something of an 
outlier, particularly in view of the title� 
The research is excellent and uses a wide 
variety of contemporary official sources 
and established scholarly works� The 
author is an academic researcher and 
does not appear to have had any naval 
experience, although he has done his 
homework in gathering the appropriate 
naval opinions� The work forms a 
concise and usable package� (However, 
from a publishing point of view, the 
physical ink used in the printing leaves 
a lot to be desired� In the reviewer’s 
copy, even the action of fingering a page 
lifted the print right off the paper!)
The book’s overall message is that, while 
the Royal Navy was suffering through a 
stretch of undeniable decline throughout 
the period, even in its heyday the 
service never really enjoyed a position 
of complete, influential dominance 
on the South American continent� 
Furthermore, by being proactive and 
focusing its efforts on areas where 
success was more likely, it managed to 
maintain a surprising level of influence 
for far longer than one might have 
imagined in what was, after all, very 
much a secondary theater for the 
United Kingdom� To this end, the book 
showcases the importance of the attaché 
in linking naval and diplomatic efforts, 
as well as the enormous value of offering 
educational experiences and exchanges 
to foreign officers, thereby sowing the 
seed corn for future cooperation�
Interestingly, it also demonstrates that 
even in the absence of such schemes, 
the Royal Navy leadership could and 
did lead the impetus for change, with 
surprising success—as evidenced by the 
impact of the 1970s “Group Operating” 
concept, which enhanced the prestige 
value of the navy’s visits ashore while at 
the same time sustaining its skills and 
capabilities at sea� The navy benefited in 
that its “blue-water” skills were pre-
served far longer than would have 
been possible otherwise, and defense 
sales benefited from the showcasing 
of those skills� It truly was a “win-win” 
development� In conclusion, this is a 
worthwhile read for anyone interested 
in the broad topic of naval diplomacy 
overseas or defense sales in particular�
ANGUS ROSS
The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary 
Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetrical, by Pauline 
M� Kaurin� Surrey, U�K�: Ashgate, 2014� 154 pages�
$149�95�
Pauline Kaurin is associate professor 
of philosophy at Pacific Lutheran 
University, specializing in the just war 
tradition and military ethics� For this 
volume, Kaurin developed her research 
during time at the U�S� Naval Academy 
and U�S� Military Academy and in 
dialogue with academic colleagues in 
the International Society for Military 
Ethics� This volume examines the ethical 
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complexities facing the modern warrior 
engaged in asymmetrical warfare (AW)�
In the introduction, Kaurin begins 
with a thorough discussion of the term 
warrior, giving it a meaning distinct 
from soldier, sailor, airman, or any other 
military operator� To give meaning to 
the warrior concept, Kaurin reaches 
back to ancient Greek mythology: she 
finds Achilles, of Homer’s Iliad, to be 
the “touchstone” for the ethical warrior� 
Kaurin does not see Achilles as the per-
fect example of a warrior; instead, Achil-
les exemplifies the military professional’s 
existential essence in war and personifies 
warrior virtues, resilience, and prowess�
Even though Achilles fought his wars 
in antiquity, Kaurin sees Achilles as 
relevant to the AW of the current era� 
Examined through the lens of jus in 
bello, how do we fight like Achilles and 
how do we fight against Achilles? The 
volume addresses the moral education 
of the warrior to engage and interpret 
better the unconventional conflicts 
that present ethical challenges, as 
well as ethical impediments that are 
contrary to jus in bello� How do we 
equip the warrior to engage ethi-
cally complex weapons technology and 
changing asymmetrical conflict?
Kaurin argues for a systematic examina-
tion of the ethical challenges posed by 
autonomous weapons and AW� What are 
the ethics of the strategies and tactics 
of each of the two sides in AW? One 
side may use torture against captives, 
whether combatants or noncombatants, 
while the other side chooses not to 
reciprocate owing to countervailing 
moral norms, contrary public opinion, 
and lack of political will� How does 
the warrior question, think, and 
respond to such moral dichotomies 
faced in AW? Kaurin’s premise is that 
moral education must address AW 
within the scope of jus in bello�
The focus on AW stems from two 
points� The first is a mind-set fixed 
on a conventional-war theory that 
understands asymmetrical conflict as 
part of conventional warfare� A second 
point is that AW requires new challenges 
to ethical thinking that are counter 
to that associated with conventional 
war� When will serious ethical thought 
be given to the changing nature of 
war, which confronts the norms of 
traditional war between nations?
Kaurin’s thoughts and observations 
go beyond AW� She identifies the 
deeper nuances of moral asymmetry, 
as defined by Michael Gross and Rob 
Thorton� The adversary’s failure to 
practice reciprocity undermines the 
moral norms, strategy, and tactics of 
the generally stronger opponent� With 
disproportional impact, the effect 
represents a symbolic and ideological 
stance against the stronger opponent�
Of the ethical questions Kaurin 
poses throughout the book, some are 
being contemplated already, while 
others are harder to engage because 
the moral scope involved cannot be 
brought into focus yet� She contends 
that understanding the full scope of the 
ethical issues requires getting into the 
hearts and minds of the adversary; yet 
often it is the adversary who artfully 
gets into the hearts and minds, and 
the social fabric, of the opponent�
Kaurin contends that if warriors are to 
engage in asymmetrical moral conflict, 
they must have courage� Yet the techno-
logical development of weapons means 
that the physical distance between 
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opponents is growing, so it takes less 
courage to go to war� Achilles had the 
courage to fight face-to-face, taking  
risks and facing danger directly�  
For many, distancing oneself from 
danger—even the risk of danger—by 
using technology imposes a fundamental 
weakness on the modern warrior amid 
the challenges he faces� Kaurin presents 
a detailed analysis of courage in an 
asymmetrical context, with a prescrip-
tion for developing courageous warriors�
Another moral attribute that Kaurin 
sees as essential to the warrior ethos is 
loyalty� This loyalty is built on leader-
ship and trust and is a foundation of 
the profession of arms� Referencing 
the Illiad, she compares the loyalty of 
Achilles, the traditional warrior, with 
that of Hector, the contemporary, 
professional warrior� A strategy for 
training warriors for loyalty is laid 
out� In addition to excellent military 
ethics literature references, Kaurin uses 
film to illustrate key ethical points�
The combatant/noncombatant 
distinction must be made clear for the 
soldier considering jus in bello� Kaurin 
proposes a five-level gradation of power 
and threat, from highest to lowest:
• uniformed combat personnel
• unconventional belligerents
• those provisionally hostile
• neutral or nonhostile noncombatants
• vulnerable noncombatants
Discerning the appropriate category
of combatant/noncombatant would
determine the appropriate level of force�
Such a moral model of ascertaining
the threat level would equip the soldier
better in the ethics of jus in bello.
Kaurin’s thoughts are a contribution 
to the literature on the higher level of 
moral thinking for military leaders� She 
does not shy away from the conundrums 
the warrior faces� To maintain an 
ethical edge in asymmetrical warfare, 
military ethics must be embedded into 
the culture of the profession of arms�
THOMAS E� CREELY
The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Tru-
man at the Brink of Nuclear War, by H� W� Brands� 
New York: Doubleday, 2016� 448 pages� $30�
The relief of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur by President Harry 
S� Truman remains one of the most
controversial and debated wartime
command decisions made in the
military history of the United States�
By April 1951, Douglas MacArthur was
at the peak of his game as a military
leader� His public pressing to widen the
war in Korea, in direct contradiction
to the intent of his president, and his
public statements to that end that led
to his dismissal still fuel debate today�
H� W� Brands gives depth to the tale of 
MacArthur versus Truman by includ-
ing the complexities that existed in 
the Korean conflict and its Cold War 
context, when a U�S�-led “free world” 
was engaged in a global struggle against 
Soviet-led Communism (and especially 
Soviet interest in Central Europe)� As 
the fighting in Korea continued, official 
Washington, and the Pentagon in 
particular, worried that the war effort 
was tying down more and more U�S� 
military resources—worries that 
fueled further concerns that Moscow 
might see the United States stretched 
militarily and unable to defend 
Central Europe adequately�
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Brands highlights another lesser-known 
aspect of the Korean War: MacArthur’s 
desire to bring Chinese Nationalist 
forces into the fight� Truman and the 
Joint Chiefs, knowing how this could 
antagonize Mao’s China and possibly 
widen the war, did not view the idea 
favorably� Truman and the Joint Chiefs 
were not convinced that Chiang 
Kai-shek’s corrupt and recently defeated 
forces would prove more of an advantage 
than a burden to the fight in Korea� 
MacArthur also clearly chafed at what 
he perceived to be Truman’s hesitancy 
in fighting Communism� Truman, in 
turn, remained focused on the Com-
munist threat to Central Europe and 
U�S� commitments to its European allies, 
all the while trying to balance resisting 
Communist aggression in Korea against 
preventing the conflict from widening�
Yet the conflict in Korea did widen 
when Chinese forces entered the fray 
in November 1950—an escalation 
that caught MacArthur off guard� 
Only a month earlier, in his famous 
meeting with Truman at Wake 
Island, he categorically had dismissed 
Chinese intervention as a concern�
The central element of the MacArthur-
Truman controversy proved to be the 
persona of Douglas MacArthur himself� 
Having lived and fought in the Pacific 
since 1937 (and not having returned to 
the United States until his relief in 1951), 
MacArthur had a self-described faith in 
his understanding of the “Asian mind�” 
By 1951 MacArthur, then seventy-one, 
had lost touch with his country, which 
had changed considerably in the thirteen 
years since he had been there last� Be-
lieving he could speak for the American 
people, MacArthur allowed a draft effort 
to go forward for the 1952 Republican 
presidential nomination� Yet, not 
desiring to campaign and growing ever 
more shrill in his speeches, MacArthur 
quickly doomed his potential candidacy 
to oblivion� His seeming advocacy for 
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea 
gave civilian and military leaders further 
pause, particularly when he suggested 
“sowing of fields of suitable radio-active 
material” in theater� Interestingly, it 
was President-elect Eisenhower who 
later broke the peace talk deadlock 
by intimating his openness to using 
nuclear weapons against the Chinese�
Perhaps the most damning part of 
the MacArthur story is the general’s 
testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations Com-
mittees upon his relief of command 
and forced return from Japan� The 
testimony, which Brands recounts in 
great detail, makes for some of the best 
reading� MacArthur tries to live up to 
his reputation, yet appears to be out of 
his league before inquisitive senators� 
He ultimately loses what support he 
had from Republicans, who, while no 
fans of Truman, in the end opted not 
to cast their lots with MacArthur�
A few aspects of the book did prove 
distracting� Detailed maps of the 
Korean Peninsula showing the many 
stages of the Korean War would have 
added to the reader’s understanding of 
the conflict but are absent� Further, a 
glitch in binding resulted in the Korean 
Peninsula map that was included on the 
inside cover being upside down� The 
reviewer contacted the publisher via 
e-mail and, although acknowledged,
was not responded to� And on page
329 the author’s passage “MacArthur’s
prediction that by January 1950 the
victory would be so complete” is clearly
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a misprint, because North Korea did not 
invade South Korea until June 1950�
These items are minor and easily 
corrected in a future edition� What 
remains still is a powerful book that 
goes into great detail, benefiting 
from the storytelling ability of H� W� 
Brands� We hope that a civil-military 
conflict between a towering figure like 
MacArthur and a sitting U�S� president 
is unlikely to reoccur� Yet the story 
remains a valid one today, with its les-
sons on the reach of military power in 
a democracy, the role of the president 
in setting national policy, and the role 
of civilian oversight of military power�
DAVID L� TESKA
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why 
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael 
W� Myers� Lawrence: Univ� Press of Kansas, 2015� 
208 pages� $34�95�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
is “an exercise in the elucidation of 
terms”—an exercise necessary to 
determine whether the Empire of 
Japan could have avoided defeat at the 
hands of the United States and its allies� 
The focus on “terms” is important, 
as precision and clarity are vital to 
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to 
challenge the near-universal acceptance 
of the idea that Japanese defeat was 
inevitable� On the contrary, Myers 
argues that there were several points 
in the war where the arc of history was 
subject to change, given a different mix 
of luck, skill, will, or strategy� Myers’s 
book takes aim at British historian H� 
P� Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
assertion that since “the defeat of 
Japan was assured” no single battle or 
campaign can be considered “decisive�” 
The Pacific War and Contingent 
Victory challenges this conventional 
view that inherent industrial, financial, 
and demographic shortcomings all 
but guaranteed Japanese defeat�
Myers is also careful to argue that, 
while the Japanese could have avoided 
defeat, this does not mean necessarily 
that they ultimately could have gained 
victory� Rather, Japan might have 
realized outcomes short of actual defeat, 
such as an armistice preserving some 
of the gains made early in the war, a 
return to the status quo ante bellum, or 
even a negotiated surrender that left 
Japan more intact than it would be when 
it ultimately did surrender in 1945�
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the 
rest of the proponents of inevitable 
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence 
on precise terms: as he explains, all that 
is required is to show that there was the 
slightest chance of a Japanese victory, 
however long the odds or improbable 
the required chain of events� If, even 
under the most remote of conditions, 
a different outcome could have oc-
curred, then the inevitability argument 
is defeated� Myers then argues that if 
defeat was not a certainty, then one 
or more events—be they battles or 
campaigns or just a moment of good 
or ill fortune—had to be decisive� It is 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to 
argue with Myers’s logic� His position 
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer 
defending the owners of a carnival who 
offer a commonly found midway game 
involving tossing softballs into milk cans 
for prizes� All the lawyer has to do is 
show that it is possible for the softball to 
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go into the can, even if the likelihood of 
that happening is as close to zero as one 
can get, and no one ever wins a prize�
Myers produces ample evidence to prove 
his point� He notes that even Willmott 
himself acknowledges that a German 
victory in Europe could have enabled 
Japan to achieve something other than 
defeat in the Pacific� If the avatar of 
inevitability admits the possibility of 
an alternative outcome, what else is 
needed to carry the argument? However, 
the clarification that Japanese defeat 
was nearly inevitable versus simply 
inevitable is a distinction without a 
difference� If this were all there was to 
Myers’s book, it would be scant reward 
for the cost of purchase or the time 
spent reading it� Luckily there is more�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
identifies a number of ways by which 
Japan might have avoided defeat� 
These include a United States willing 
to settle for a negotiated conclusion 
in the face of mounting casualties 
and war weariness� Greater success 
against Australia, which Myers argues 
could have been achieved, perhaps 
combined with a successful invasion 
and occupation of Hawaii, might have 
been another means to a different end�
In sum, Myers’s book—which has 
been used in the Naval War College’s 
curricular case on the Pacific theater 
in the Second World War—by focusing 
on war’s contingent nature, illustrates 
well the oft-noted maxim that in war 
the enemy truly does “get a vote�”
RICHARD J� NORTON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Patrick Bratton is an associate professor of national security and strategy studies at the U�S� 
Army War College� He graduated with a BA in history from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, 
completed graduate studies at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (U�K�) and the Université de 
Rennes 2 (France), and received his PhD from the Catholic University of America�
Thomas E. Creely is associate professor of leader development and ethics in the College of Opera-
tional and Strategic Leadership at the Naval War College� He received his PhD from Salve Regina 
University� A retired Navy chaplain, his Navy career included sea, shore, and Marine Corps assign-
ments, as well as service as an enlisted sailor�
Charles Edel is an associate professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College� He recently 
served as a strategic adviser to the Secretary of State on northeast Asia, the South China Sea, and 
the western Pacific region in the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning� He received a BA in 
classics from Yale College and holds a PhD in history from Yale University� An intelligence officer 
in the Navy Reserve, he is the author of Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy 
of the Republic (Harvard Univ� Press, 2014)�
Nicholas Murray teaches in the Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War College� He 
received his doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford� He is the author of The 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   164 4/21/17   8:35 AM
170
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/13
B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 6 5
Rocky Road to the Great War (Potomac Books, 2013), and he advises the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Personnel and Readiness on professional military education�
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College� He is a retired 
naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy� His most recent 
publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and the Marine Corps University 
Journal.
J. Overton is the writer/editor for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Division Keyport� He was 
previously an adjunct instructor in the Naval War College Fleet Seminar Program and the Marine 
Corps Command and Staff College Distance Education Program� He served in the U�S� Coast 
Guard, and has worked in other public affairs and historian positions for the Navy and Army�
Breanne Robertson is a historian with the Marine Corps History Division at Marine Corps Uni-
versity� She has published articles on Marine Corps activities in the Dominican Republic between 
1916 and 1924 and on U�S� efforts to cultivate Pan-Americanism through the visual arts during 
World War II� She is currently editing a volume on the history and meaning of the Iwo Jima flag 
raisings, entitled Investigating Iwo: The Flag Raisings in Myth, Memory and Esprit de Corps.
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer and professor of joint military operations at the Naval 
War College� He is a graduate of the College, received a second MA from Providence College, 
and is working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War� His 
recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the 
Royal Navy and the U�S� Navy in the wake of the dreadnought revolution�
Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, and maritime strategy at the Center for Naval 
Warfare Studies, Naval War College� He is the author of Anti-access Warfare: Countering A2/AD 
Strategies (Naval Institute Press, 2013) and two earlier books on the future security environment�
David L. Teska is a retired captain in the U�S� Coast Guard Reserve� He is a graduate of Texas Tech 
and Kansas Universities� He works for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U�S� Home-
land Security Department�
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Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
n late February 2017, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) launched his more 
comprehensive and digitally focused CNO Professional Reading Program (CNO-
PRP)� The revised program comprises over 140 books, which are arranged in 
categories that align with the “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority�”
CNO Admiral John Richardson, USN, launched the website with these words:
Warfare is a violent, intellectual contest between thinking and adapting adversaries� 
The team that can think better and adapt faster will win� As we prepare for operations 
and war with an increasingly complex set of potential adversaries, we must do more 
to sharpen our thinking, learn the lessons from history, and expand our minds� The 
books on this list are those that have influenced my leadership development� It is our 
responsibility as leaders to continue to grow and to always question the status quo� 
These books have helped me do just that� If you find just one book on this list that 
challenges you as a leader, then it has been a success� I encourage you to discuss what 
has challenged you as a leader in our new forum� Remember to never stop striving to 
expand your mind�
The site provides book summaries aligned with the lines of effort and attri-
butes identified in the Design� They include the following:
Naval Power. These books provide a strong foundation of knowledge on classic 
and modern maritime strategy, emerging issues, and new threats and opportuni-
ties� Historical works in this category span from the age of sail to the many naval 
battles of World War II and beyond; studying the history of naval power deepens 
the context and offers precedent for the challenges of the present�
Fast Learning. Books in this category address the challenges of creating a flexible 
and adaptive learning environment, from the deck plates to the Pentagon, which 
is critical to the success of our fleet� Applying the best concepts, techniques, 
and technologies accelerates learning for individuals, teams, and organizations� 
Clearly knowing the objective and the theoretical limits of performance comes 
I
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
through practice and education� We must adapt processes and thinking to be 
inherently receptive to innovation and creativity�
Navy Team. These books recognize that we are one Navy team comprising a di-
verse mix of active-duty and reserve sailors, civilians, and families, with a history 
of service, sacrifice, and success� Mariners who read these titles will be better 
prepared to build on this history to create a climate of operational excellence that 
will keep us ready to prevail against all future challenges�
Partnerships. Books in this category speak to the need for our Navy to deepen 
operational relationships with the other services, agencies, industry, allies, and 
partners who operate with us to support our shared interests� Partnerships in-
clude those with joint service and interagency partners, with international part-
ners, and with research-and-development labs and academic institutions�
The Canon. These books provide core knowledge that is fundamental to the na-
val profession� Understanding the causes of conflict, the dynamics of power, and 
the intersections of politics, diplomacy, economics, and military power is part of 
the core knowledge each sailor should have�
Core Attributes. Books in this category address the four core attributes of our 
professional identity—integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness—that 
help to serve as guiding criteria for our decisions and actions� By embracing these 
attributes, our core values of honor, courage, and commitment should be clearly 
evident in our actions�
In addition to the books and documents that comprise the CNO-PRP, several 
movies and documentaries have been identified to support the learning objec-
tives of the program�
To be more responsive to changes and to reduce procurement and distribu-
tion costs, the CNO-PRP is now limited to electronic/digital versions of books 
(e-books); hard copies no longer will be distributed automatically to Navy com-
mands afloat and ashore� Many of these e-books are available as downloadable 
files that can be borrowed (for limited periods but at no cost) from the MWR 
digital library� Most titles in the reading program also are available for free at My 
Navy Portal or directly through a log-in from the Navy General Library Program� 
Security restrictions at your work site may preclude downloading these books 
via Navy-owned computers, so downloading them to personally owned devices 
may be necessary� More-detailed instructions on how to access the available 
books can be found on the program website at www�navy�mil/ah_online/cno 
-readingprogram/�
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Reading books of consequence can be an interesting and effective way to be-
come more professional sailors and informed citizens� This tradition goes back 
nearly two hundred years, to Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard’s order that 
every Navy ship be outfitted with a professional library of thirty-seven books on 
topics that included mathematics, history, and philosophy� Two centuries later, 
we should follow in the footsteps of our predecessors and “Read, Write, and 
Win!”
JOHN E� JACKSON
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